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The theme of this thesis is "metaphor-based negotiation". By metaphor-based nego¬
tiation I mean a category of approaches for problem-solving in Distributed Artificial
Intelligence (DAI) that mimic some aspects of human negotiation behaviour. The
research in this dissertation is divided into two closely related parts. Cooperative in¬
teraction among agents in a multiagent system (MAS) is discussed in general, and
the discussion leads to a formal definition of metaphor-based negotiation. Then, as
a specific application, a "spring-based" computational model for metaphor-based ne¬
gotiation is developed as an approach to solving movement planning, specifically the
AGV scheduling problem (AGVSP) — determing the timings of AGVs' activities, of
automated guided vehicles (AGVs) in a factory.
By formally addressing the multi-agent cooperative interaction problem and assuming
that agents in a MAS are rational, benevolent and fully informed, an initial strategy
set of cooperative interaction can be reduced to a strategy set by eliminating strategies
that are irrational in a group sense. However, it is proved in this dissertation that, in
the remaining strategy set, no unique strategy can be found that is acceptable to all
agents according their individual preferences. More specifically, in this smaller strategy
set, if one agent moves from one strategy to another in an attempt to better its indi¬
vidual goal achievement, then there is at least one agent whose goal achievement will
be negatively affected by such a move. So, the cooperative interaction problem can
only be partially solved if no further knowledge is given to those agents. The idea of a
common sense principle is introduced in this dissertation to overcome the deficiencies
of the assumptions of rationality, benevolence and full-informedness.
In reality, the assumption of full-informedness of agents may not be practical. Commu¬
nication is needed for agents to (1) exchange their local problem solving information,
and (2) exchange proposals for global problem solving, when their views are in conflict.
Based on the discussion of cooperative interaction, a formal definition of metaphor-
based negotiation is proposed to formally indicate what is a proposal and what is the
condition for accepting a proposal from another agent. In this definition, the common
sense principle is one of the most important features, not found in definitions of ne¬
gotiation available so far in the literature, which guides agents to find an agreement
when negotiation is running into difficulties.
The AGVSP involves timing activities for each AGV in a AGV-based factory. The
AGVSP is naturally distributed: the whole problem can be easily divided into several
subproblems each of which involves timing of activities of one AGV. Therefore, it is
intuitively straightforward for us to seek DAI approaches to solving the AGVSP. In
spired by Kwa's Iterative Negotiation Model [Kwa 88b] [Kwa 88a] for the AGVSP, we
developed a spring-based (metaphor-based) negotiation model for the AGVSP to over¬
come some vital problems in Kwa's model. The idea of the spring-based negotiation
model is described below:
The AGVSP can be regarded as a Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DCSP)
and solved in a MAS. Each agent in the MAS is designed to solve a subproblem — a
local scheduling problem which is a small Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). Con-
ii
flicts exist when intra-agent constraints or inter-agent constraints are violated. These
constraints can be classified into hard constraints— those that can not be relaxed at
the agent level unless the system designer permits (e.g., by providing an arbitrator),
and soft constraints — those that can be relaxed at the agent level when necessary.
When agents are in conflict, i.e, when some inter-agent constraints are violated (or
say, when one agent's timings of its activities overlap those of some other agents),
these agents involved will resolve the conflicts through a (metaphor-based) negotiation
procedure in which conflicts will be gradually resolved by each agent's relaxation of
its intra-agent constraints, i.e, by yielding some amount of its initially allocated re¬
sources to other agents or by shifting its initially allocated resources. The negotiation
can be viewed as a process of exchanging proposals (of cooperative strategies) between
conflicting agents, where a cooperative strategy is a possible resolution to a conflict
according to the viewpoint of the proposing agent. However, since agents are designed
to be rational, each agent that is involved in the conflicts will try hard to relax its
intra-agent constraints as little as possible. Further, it is reasonably acceptable that
the more an intra-agent constraint has been relaxed the less the respective agent is
willing to relax it further. This feature can be modeled by a spring — the more it
has been compressed the harder it is to compress it further. Based on this inspiration,
a spring-based computational model of metaphor-based negotiation is proposed: each
agent's local schedule is represented by a local spring network in which each spring ele¬
ment represents a soft intra-agent constraint. Relaxation of an intra-agent constraint
is likened to a spring being compressed by external forces from other agents. As a
consequence, the compressed spring will also show a reacting force upon those com¬
pressing agents. An agreement will be reached when those forces and reacting forces
are balanced. This is the common sense principle in the spring-based negotiation. The
model solves some key issues, e.g., how to select negotiation techniques and skills dur¬
ing the process of negotiation, that have not been solved by Kwa's iterative negotiation
model. Some experimental evidence of the value of this model is presented.
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The theme of this dissertation is metaphor-based negotiation. By metaphor-based ne¬
gotiation I mean a category of approaches for problem-solving in Distributed Artificial
Intelligence (DAI) that mimic human negotiation behaviour in some aspects. The re¬
search in this dissertation is divided into two closely related parts. In general, I shall
discuss cooperative interaction between agents with their individual goals which are in
conflict. This discussion will lead to a formal definition of metaphor-based negotiation
(see Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4). specifically, based on this formal defini¬
tion, I shall propose a negotiation model for movement planning of automated guided
vehicles (AGVs) (Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).
1.1 AGV Movement Planning
1.1.1 AGV Systems
The evolution of unmanned production in manufacturing of medium and low volume
machine saw the development of flexible manufacturing systems which possess much
higher economic advantages in production with reduced crew and increased efficiency.
In an unmanned factory, one problem which must be solved is the automation of
material flow from one place to another, for example, the movement of raw ma¬
terials from a warehouse to machine tools and the ready parts back to warehouse.
One economic solution t.o this problem is given by automatic guided vehicle systems.
AGV systems can be used for computerised random linking of quite different work-
1
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ing places. Today, various AGV systems for unmanned production are already avail¬
able [Valery 87] [Elbracht & Plum 88]. AGV movement planning involves generating a
set of AGV movement schedules which define the paths and the movement timings of
the AGVs [Kwa 88a] [Kwa 88b]. More specifically, AGV movement planning has three
major subproblems to achieve:
1. task assignment concerns the selection of an AGV to undertake a given task, such
that a set of given tasks are assigned to the available AGVs optimally (i.e., cost
for completing all the tasks, such as the overall distance required, time spent,
energy consumed, etc., is minimised;
2. route planning concerns the selection of a route for each tasked AGV such the
cost for complete all the tasks is minimised;
3. movement timing involves timing activities for each AGV, which has been as¬
signed a task during task assignment and has been selected a route during route
planning, to carry out the activities. Activities are operations at stations such as
loading at, unloading at, and passing by stations. The objective of the movement
timing is to meet the various requirements specified in tasks while meeting the
requirement of collision-free movements.
Naturally, the order of solving the three subproblems is task assignment —» route plan¬
ning —> movement timing, as illustrated in Fig 1.1. However, when a later subproblem,
e.g., route planning, cannot be solved, then that problem-solver may report the failure
to the former problem-solver, e.g., the one for task assignment, and seek alternative
solutions. Loops between subproblems are possible and they are indicated by Re-TA,
Re-RP in Fig 1.1, meaning task re-assignment and route re-planning respectively. We
call the movement timing problem the AGV scheduling problem (AGVSP), since it is
similar to many scheduling problems, such as the job shop scheduling problems (JSSPs),
that involve allocating times to activities.
This dissertation focuses on the AGVSP.
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RP : Route Planning












Figure 1.1: The AGV Movement Planning System
1.1.2 The AGVSP
The AGVSP involves timing activities for each AGV, which has been assigned a task
during task assignment and has been selected a route during route planning, to carry
out the activities. Activities are operations at stations such as loading at, unloading
at, and passing by stations. For example, AGV a has been selected a route
(A, B, C) (1.1)
where A, C are stations, B is a road junction, and there are traversable paths from A
to B and from B to C. The task assigned to it is broken down into three activities:
1. Loading at A. The time needed for loading is estimated as lja;
2. Passing by B. The passage time needed is estimated as cob-
3. Unloading at C. The time needed for unloading is estimated as u>c",
Of our interest are not the actual operations but the processing-times spent on the
them, namely, lja, which are associated with A, B, and C respectively: The
task of the AGVSP is then to select a sequence of times:
(^a^B^C) (1*2)
with t^, tfi and tg. as arrival times at which a is planned to arrive A, B, and C
respectively: The timed or scheduled activities above are illustrated in Fig 1.2: Let us
call timed or scheduled activities for each single AGV an individual schedule or a local
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stations
Figure 1.2: An Example of the AGVSP
schedule. In the Figure, t\B and tTBC are traveling times for a to travel from A to B
and from B to C respectively. Traveling times depend on an AGV's speed at which it
moves from a station to another. Apart from the speed limit, each AGV's activities
are also constrained by other requirements such as the earliest start-time of the task,
the latest finish-time of the task. All these requirements are set for each single AGV,
so we call them intra-agent constraints. These constraints are not relaxable by the
problem solver of the AGVSP, so they are often called hard constraints.
Another type of requirement for a single AGV are the soft constraints which are the
preferences by the user over timings of the activities, such as the preferred finish-time
of the task, etc. Soft constraints are relaxable, so they need not be strictly satisfied.
However, a good schedule is expected to satisfy them as well as is possible.
So far, we only considered the AGVSP with one AGV a. Now let consider the AGVSP
problem with two AGVs, a and a'. Suppose a has the same specification as above, and
a' has the following specification:
A',
B, u)Q\
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C\ toc'
That is to say, a and a' have different routes but both of them have to travel cross
junction B. a' is scheduled as follow:
A', a)A', 4Q .A''
/Q' .lB '
C", UC', ±alC'
The basic requirement is that one of the AGVs should cross the junction after the other.
In other words, the arrival time tB at which a' is planned to arrive at B should be
such that its processing-time (passage time) ujb does not overlap with the processing-
time of a, ub (see Fig 1.2). This requirement is set for safety. Since this requirement
involves two AGVs, so we call it an inter-agent constraint which is a hard constraint.
There are other inter-agent constraints, such as no-overtaking: one AGV moving along
a route should not overtake another AGV which is moving along the same route. Some
requirements may depend on the layout and the AGV guidance system: requirements
such as no-overtaking etc. are essential in an AGVS with tracked guidance techniques
(e.g., [Brussel et al. 88] [Elbrancht & Plum 83]) but may not be necessary with free-
range guidance techniques (e.g., [Bohlander 87]).
The AGVSP can be easily extended to an arbitrary number N of AGVs. The AGVSP
is to plan each AGV an individual schedule such that for any single AGV, (1) all intra-
agent hard constraints are strictly satisfied; (2) all intra-agent soft constraints are best
satisfied; and for any two arbitrary AGVs (3) the inter-agent hard constraints are
strictly satisfied, and (4) the inter-agent soft constraints, if there are any, are satisfied
as well as possible.
1.1.3 Features of the AGVSP
Taking stations and junctions as machines, we can see that the AGVSP is related to
the JSSP which involves allocating start-times to activities (or operations). A JSSP
can be described by four aspects: (1) m machines, (2) N jobs with each of them being
a set of operations with each of them being specified by a machine where the opera¬
tion is processed and a processing-time needed for the operation being processed; (3)
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disciplines (or constraints) that restrict the manner in which allocations can be made
and (4) the criteria by which a schedule will be evaluated. Many JSSPs are regarded
as constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) which are generally described by a set of
variables with a set of constraints which describe the relations among variables. As
we will see in Chapter 3, the AGVSP is a CSP problem as well. So, many existing
approaches to the JSSP and the CSP may be in the candidates to be chosen as ap¬
proaches to the AGVSP.
Efforts have been made by researchers in the last several decades to seek efficient meth¬
ods of solving the JSSP and CSP and they are continuing. No general methods have
been found that adapt to all kinds of the JSSP or CSP. Every existing approach is
based on some assumptions and is appropriate for a certain kind of the JSSP or CSP.
As for the case of the AGVSP, it has several requirements:
• Strictly ordered activities — for each AGV, its planned route prior to the AGVSP
determines the order in which the AGV moves from one station (or junction)
to another. So, the order of activities are fixed and cannot be changed during
problem solving. This is not the case in many JSSPs where the order of activities
may be changed;
• Strong links between activities — for each AGV, two consecutive activities are
linked by the traveling time between a station for the first activity and another
for the second. The constraints on the traveling time are critical: the shortest
traveling time is limited by the AGV's speed, and longer traveling times will
affect the feasibility of the overall system. By feasibility we mean whether a
planning system can organise all the movements of the AGVs required by a
factory. Obviously, the longer the traveling times, the fewer movements can be
organised.
• Strong preferences over solutions: the parts should be delivered to each work
station at the time when workers (or robots) need them, arriving earlier may
cause a local inventory problem, while arriving later will make less efficient use of
resources — workers, machines, robots, etc; ready products should be delivered
to customers in time to satisfy them. In other words, JIT (—just in time) is
required. Classical approaches to the JSSP are aimed at shortening the makespan
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— the time period between the time when the first job is started and the time
when the last job is finished. The makespan in the case of JIT as in the AGVSP
is not as strongly desired as would be in the case of other JSSPs. For example,
if a task for AGV a is to deliver some parts through route (ABC) to C and the
best time for the worker at C to receive the parts is at 3:00 in the afternoon,
then there is no point in making effort to finish the task in the morning.
• Dynamic scheduling — the need for dynamic scheduling arises in the AGVSP for
two reasons: (1) re-scheduling— since activities for each AGV are strongly linked
as explained above and activities between AGVs are constrained for the sake of
safety, failure of one AGV's execution with respect to its planned timetable will
need the timetable to be re-scheduled, and this may cause a chain reaction —
the timetables for others AGVs may be required to be re-scheduled consequently;
(2) possibility of withdrawal of tasks from, and addition of tasks to, the existing
task set — withdrawal of tasks means some resources which are allocated to the
withdrawn tasks previously are now available for other purposes. So re-scheduling
for the remaining AGVs is unavoidable in dynamic movement planning.
These distinguishing requirements have their advantages and disadvantages. One of
the disadvantages is that many existing approaches to the JSSP or the CSP are not
applicable since they are not designed to adapt to those requirements. The advant¬
ages include: (1) critical constraints narrow the solution space to the AGVSP, hence
narrowing the search space — this may lead to an efficient, constraint-directed search¬
ing approach to the problem; (2) strong preferences may be taken as heuristics in
searching for the optimal solution to the problem and lead to the development of
preference-directed approaches.
1.2 Kwa's Work on the AGVSP
1.2.1 Brief Introduction to Kwa's Work on the AGVSP
Movement planning involves generating a set of AGV movement schedules which define
the paths and the movement timings of the AGVs. On the movement timing, i.e., the
AGVSP, Kwa argues that merely generating a logically correct order of actions to
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achieve a goal only solves the real problem in part [Kwa 88a] [Kwa 88b]. If it over-
optimistically assumes that the states of the world will change as expected according
to its model of the world, then there is a likelihood that the plan will fail. In other
words, besides logical correctness, plans must also have a degree of executability in
real world, i.e., the ability to cope with real world issues during execution. A plan
with poor executability demands a dynamic replanning capability. However, dynamic
replanning can be expensive or is liable to be futile if it fails to complete in time.
Hence it is desirable to minimise or defer dynamic replanning as much as possible. As
an approach to avoiding frequent dynamic replanning, Kwa proposes applying toler¬
ant planning to AGVSP, i.e., allocating some redundant resources to each agent's (or
AGV's) plan to allow leeway for execution errors. In this case, as long as an agent's
execution deviation does not exceed the allowed by the redundant resources allocated,
then replanning can be delayed.
While this approach is feasible, it raises another problem — more resource conflicts
must be resolved during planning. Kwa then proposes a novel model of iterative ne¬
gotiation for multi-agent coordination in resolving resource conflicts between agents
(AGVs). The basic idea of his proposal is: (1) the AGVSP is solved in a multi-agent
environment where each AGV is taken as an agent which is responsible for constructing
its own local schedule; (2) initially, each agent will allocate some redundant resource
(Kwa calls this interval-based planning) to its local schedule; (3) once local scheduling
is finished, the respective agent will check whether its resource allocation is in con¬
flict with that of other agents; and (4) if it is in conflict with other agents' allocation,
then the agent will initialise a negotiation procedure in which the conflict agents ex¬
change information and make concessions until the conflict is resolved. The concession
techniques can be either shifting its original resources without yielding any amount of
resources, or yielding some amount of resources, or both shifting and yielding.
Kwa examined the characteristics of negotiation, they are: conflict knowledge, will¬
ingness to negotiate, knowing the negotiables, selfishness of agents, negotiation being
an iterative process, etc. Kwa also outlined the procedure of the iterative negotiation
model and illustrated how agents with resource conflicts can resolve them by the ne¬
gotiation procedure.
More detailed introduction to Kwa's work on the AGVSP is given in Chapter 5.
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Although Kwa's iterative negotiation model can be understood easily, and is correct
qualitatively, it lacks a quantitative model of how each agent should negotiate with
other involved agents. More specifically, it does not tell each agent quantitatively: (1)
when it should concede, and (2) how much it should concede (i.e., how much it should
shift and how much it should yield). The main question is whether the iterative nego¬
tiation model can solve real problems.
In negotiation, agents are selfish but they must also be cooperative to keep the negoti¬
ation going. Selfishness of an agent means it will try to acquire as many resources for
its own plan as possible, while cooperativeness of the agent means it should concede
some of its originally allocated resources to other agents if without any good reason
to keep them. What is the compromise between selfishness and cooperativeness? Kwa
did not provide any satisfactory answer to this.
1.3 Metaphor-based Negotiation: a Form of Cooperative
Interaction in Multi-agent Systems
Although negotiation is a novel approach for solving AGV movement planning, it is
not new in Artificial Intelligence. Since Davis & Smith's work [Davis and Smith, 1983],
negotiation has been used in many ways in multi-agent systems. There are many ways
of interpreting the term, here are just a few of them:
Negotiation is a discussion in which the interested parties exchange information and
come to an agreement [Davis and Smith 1983]
Negotiation is the communication established between two conflicting agents in which
they try to develop or refine their plans jointly so that the goals of each are satisfied.
[Adler 1989].
Negotiation is composed of two phases: a communication phase where information
relevant to the negotiation is communicated to participating agents, and a bargaining
phase where "deals" are made between individuals or in a group. The Negotiation pro¬
cess can be viewed as constraint-directed search in a problem space [Sathi & Fox 89].
Although there are many different interpretations of the negotiation term in DAI, ne-
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gotiation is a metaphoric term for human negotiation. So, we call it metaphor-based
negotiation. It is well understood that it is difficult to include all characteristics of hu¬
man negotiation in a DAI negotiation model, however, a negotiation metaphor should
at least include the following aspects:
• A multiagent system with more than one agent;
• Each agent is assigned a goal (a single goal or a compound goal which may have
several separate sub-goals) and is required to achieve it against the objective as
well as possible;
• One agent's goal achievement may interfere with that of others, i.e., there are
conflicts among agents in goal achievements;
• Agents are required to resolve those conflicts through communication in which
agents exchange information to reach an agreement that is acceptable to all the
agents involved.
1.3.1 Deficiencies of Metaphor-based Negotiation in DAI
Suppose there are two agents A and B which are required to solve a problem which
has three possible solutions: X, Y and Z. Each agent has its own preference over
these solutions and their preferences are different from one another. Which is the best
solution?
From a purely individual perspective, each agent wants its most preferred solution.
Suppose in A's perspective, X is preferred to Y to Z. If B's preference is the same as
A's, then it is not difficult for them to agree on solution X. However, if B's preference
is reversed with A, then they will be in conflict over which solution to choose. Most
negotiation models in DAI try to avoid this problem which, as far as the author is
concerned, is a key problem in human negotiation that each negotiator faces. For
example, in [Davis & Smith 83], even if a bidder might have a preference over two
tasks X and Y, it will contract with the manager to undertake a task the manager
wishes it to undertake. That is to say. the bidder's preference is completely ignored.
This occurs very rarely in human negotiation: every negotiator's preference should be
respected as far as possible.
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1.4 Toward Formal Metaphor-based Negotiation
An agent in a multi-agent system is an automatic entity or computational model with
knowledge provided by the system designer and the user of the system. This knowledge
includes its own local problem-solving (local objective, solution space, searching tech¬
niques, etc.) methods as well as knowledge about the environment (about other agents'
problem-solving knowledge, about communication mechanism e.g., speech act, about
compromising in the case of conflict, etc). Agents are always assumed to be rational
— they always aim to maximise their local objectives. From a system designer's view
point, allowing each agent to achieving its individual goal maximally will in general
assist in achieving the global goals maximally. However, agents in a multi-agent system
are not independent. One agent's local goal achievement may interfere with that of
others. When this happens, agents must seek a compromise for resolving the conflict.
If only assuming rationality, then each agent will possibly stick to a solution that is the
most preferred to itself but that is not globally consistent. So, in this case, an agent
must be given knowledge about the global solution space and global preferences over
global solutions.
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I shall discuss this problem using formal mathematical ap¬
proaches. This discussion will finally lead to a formal definition of metaphor-based
negotiation. The basic points of the definition can be expressed in words as follows:
Metaphor-based negotiation is a process of communication in which agents exchange
proposals of conflict resolution through common language until a proposal is found that
is acceptable to all in term of common sense.
Common language guarantees that a proposal introduced by one agent can be under¬
stood by other agents. For example, if an American salesman and a British customer
are negotiating the price over a product, the salesman would prefer talking about the
price in term of USA dollars, while the buyer might prefer talking about the price in
term of Sterling pounds. In this case, they would probably agree to use USA dollars
(or Sterling Pounds) as the price unit in their negotiation.
Common sense guarantees that there is conflict resolution when dispute occurs. Com¬
mon sense could be any knowledge that is known to both agents involved in a nego¬
tiation and that could help to solve the dispute. For example, suppose the salesman
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offers a price of $100 for the product, and the customer offers $80, then the salesman
would finally probably agree on $80 if the customer tells the salesman that he can buy
the same product at a price of $80 somewhere else. Here, common sense is that if
the sales price is over $80, buyers would leave. Common sense is represented in our
definition by what we called a common sense principle. The common sense principle
is introduced to guide conflicting agents to resolve conflicts between them when agents
can not resolve them according to the rational agent assumption. The common sense
principle also takes part in a role as a law in a society: each individual agent has a cer¬
tain degree of freedom in its own problem solving, but, when disputes between agents
occur, agents must compromise if the principle implies so. In a society (e.g., a nation),
when individuals have disputes which can not be resolved by themselves or arbitrated
by any third party, then these conflicting individuals may negotiate and compromise
under the guidance of the law.
This definition specifically covers what a proposal is; what is a common language
is; and what the conditions for accepting a proposal are. This definition is domain
independent.
1.5 Spring Model for Local Scheduling in AGVSP
The formal definition of metaphor-based negotiation provides us with a view of what
kind of knowledge an agent should have and what is an agreement. However, for
a specific problem-solving scenario, an agent's knowledge must be a computational
model. In the AGVSP, each agent must have a computational model for its local
schedule solution space. The model must also express the preference of the agent over
the solution space such that the agent will always choose the most preferred solution in
a given circumstance. In this thesis, I shall propose a spring model for local scheduling.
The basic idea is described in the following several subsections.
1.5.1 Solving the AGVSP in a Multi-Agent System
Another two properties of the AGVSP, which should be considered in addition to the
features of the AGVSP as described in Section 1.1.3 are: (1) the AGVSP can be easily
partitioned into a set of subproblems, each of which is to find an individual schedule for
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one AGV; (2) all subproblems are homogeneous, so an approach which is considered
to be suitable for one subproblem will be suitable for any others. For these reasons,
we believe that it is very natural to solve the AGVSP in a multi-agent system where
each AGV is taken as an intelligent agent with knowledge of solving its own problem
— scheduling its own activities. All agents are homogeneous, therefore the efforts on
seeking the methods of solving each subproblem are reduced.
1.5.2 Incremental Scheduling
To meet the requirements of dynamic movement planning, the initial consideration
could be incremental scheduling by which the overall scheduling is built up by schedul¬
ing one AGV after another, i.e., local AGV scheduling problems are solved in a par¬
ticular order. In this way, dynamic scheduling is possible. For example, when a new
task is added to the existing task, it can be simply considered as another local AGV
scheduling problem.
1.5.3 Negotiation as Resolution for Resource Conflicts
The AGVSP, like many other JSSPs, is resource-based. In a multi-agent system, if the
intra-agent constraints can be not satisfied, then they will cause intra-agent conflicts.
Similarly, if the inter-agent constraints cannot be satisfied, then they will cause inter-
agent conflicts. These conflicts are displayed as resource conflicts between two activities
for one AGV, or among activities for several AGVs. Conflicts in a multi-agent system
are often resolved by metaphor-based negotiation. We think there is much potential
in applying negotiation as a mechanism for resolving resource conflicts in solving the
AGVSP using a multi-agent system: the hard constraints are the reservation line
for negotiation, and the soft constraints express the negotiability. More preferred
requirements are less likely to be negotiated away than less preferred requirements.
For example, a scheduled its activity at B before a' as shown by ujb with arrival time
in Fig 1.3. Then a' scheduled its activity at B as shown by uB with arrival time tg
for a'. Now, a' found that the times for the two activities overlap one another. The
conflict can be resolved by only one of them shifting its arrival time until the overlap
disappears, or — in the general case — by both shifting in different directions.
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Figure 1.3: An Example of Resolving Resource Conflicts via Negotiation (a)
1.5.4 Using a Spring to Represent Soft Constraints
Soft constraints are negotiable (or relaxable), though each agent will try to relax its
soft constraints as little as possible. There is also a tendency that the agent, once it
relaxes some of soft constraints, will return to its initial state (i.e., the best solution in
its local viewpoint). These features can be described by a spring: originally, without
any external force, the spring will be in a state in which it preserves the lowest energy;
when compressed or stretched by an external force, then the spring will be changed
in form; when the external force disappears the spring will return to its original form.
In any static situation, a spring will be in a static state (the optimal state) where it
preserves the lowest possible energy in that situation.
A soft constraint with a lower degree of relaxability can be represented by a spring
with a larger spring constant, while a soft constraint with higher degree of relaxability
can be represented by a spring with a smaller spring constant.
1.5.5 A Simple Example of Applying Spring Model to Resolve Re¬
source Conflict
The resource conflict shown in Figure 1.3 can be resolved by applying the spring models
illustrated in Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5. Each of the two conflicting intervals u>B and
u;g is connected to a spring which constrains its shifting (see Figure 1.4). ug will shift
right and uiB will shift left. The shifting strategy will be applied continuously until
the conflict (or the overlap) is completely resolved (see Figure 1.5). How much each
interval has shifted will be discussed in Section 1.5.6.










Figure 1.4: An Example of Resolving Resource Conflicts via Negotiation
1.5.6 Common Sense in the AGVSP Negotiation Model
The spring constant for a spring that represents a soft constraint expresses the degree
of negotiability in a negotiation. If an agreement is achieved after the negotiation, then
some of both agents soft constraints are relaxed (i.e., for both agents some springs are
compressed). We can view each local schedule as a local spring network, and a global
schedule is a global spring network properly connected by local schedules. What is the
optimal state of the global spring network? The optimal state is one in which the total
energy preserved by the spring network is minimal. This is the common sense that
should be known to each agent to guide it in negotiation. In this state, the forces of
jj which is the reacting force of spring u)B being compressed by uig should be equal
to }uB which is the reacting force of uig being compressed by uB.
1.6 Contributions of the Dissertation
As an overview, this section will present the reader with an outline of the major
contribution of this dissertation.










Figure 1.5: An Example of Resolving Resource Conflicts via negotiation
1.6.1 Cooperative Interaction among Fully Informed Rational Agents
When an agent in a multi-agent system is said to be fully informed (or having com¬
plete knowledge), it means that the agent has knowledge about itself (its own problem-
solving — the solution space, the preference over solution space, the searching tech¬
niques, etc.) as well as knowledge about other agents (other agents' knowledge about
their problem-solving). When an agent is said to be rational, it means that the agent
will always try to maximise its own goal-achievement (or to maximise it objective func¬
tion). When agents' goal-achievements are in conflict, cooperative interaction can be
introduced to resolve conflicts.
As the reader will see from the literature review in cooperative interaction in Chapter 2,
cooperative interaction has been a phrase widely used in DAI. There are two approaches
to understanding multiagent cooperative interactions in general: formal mathematical
approaches that attempt to develop theories of interaction and cooperation and system-
building approaches that attempt to build systems that support real or simulated agent
interaction. Unfortunately neither approach found so far is convincing.
Based on assumptions of rationality and complete knowledge, I shall construct a co¬
operative interaction environment from which I shall discuss in detail to what extent
agents with conflicting individual goals can cooperate with each other. By assum-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 17
ing also that agents are benevolent — an agent will cooperate with other agents if
that cooperation does not affect its own goal achievement (See Chapter 3 for formal
definition), I shall prove that for any initial cooperative situation, agents' cooperative
interaction will run into a difficult cooperative situation where one agent's move which
is aimed at improving its own goal achievement will definitely impair at least one of the
other agents' goal achievements. So, merely assuming agents are benevolent, rational,
and fully informed cannot guarantee successful cooperative interaction.
1.6.2 Common Sense in Cooperative Interaction
When multiagent cooperative interactions run into a difficult situation where one
agent's move which is aimed at improving its own goal achievement will definitely
impair at least one of the other agent's goal achievements, the cooperation seems to
get into a impasse. I shall introduce the use of common sense to break the impasse.
The basic idea is that when no agent in a cooperative interaction is willing to com¬
promise any more, all agents will agree on a solution that may not be satisfactory to
all agents but that is not against a particular rule which I call the "common sense
principle." For example, in a football game, the two teams often decide who kick off
first by tossing a coin. Here the common sense principle is that both teams should
abide by the result of the toss (which is a result of nature and fair to our common
sense).
1.6.3 Negotiation: A Form of Cooperative Interaction among Agents
with incomplete knowledge
In a situation where agents do not have complete knowledge, cooperative interaction
will be even more difficult. Communication can bridge agents to exchange information.
When conflicts occur, those agents can exchange proposals until a proposal is found
that is acceptable to all agents. I shall propose a formal definition of metaphor-based
negotiation which formally defines what is a proposal, and what is the condition under
which an agent has to accept a proposal, etc.
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The Spring Model is used for two purposes:
• It is a model of local scheduling. An agent's intra-agent soft constraints are
represented by springs which are connected properly as a local spring network.
• It is a model of guiding an AGV in negotiation about what negotiation strategies
to apply quantitatively. When an agent's local schedule is in conflict with that
of another agent, it will force that agent to concede just as it will push a local
spring network that represents that agent's local schedule. The other agent will
act in a similar way. How much will it concede? It will depend on their reacting
force: the one with smaller reacting force should concede more. The negotiation
will finish when their reacting forces are equal.
1.6.5 Repairing Schedules
During execution, one AGV has to change its original schedule for some reason. As a
consequence, some other AGV's schedule may also need repairing. The spring model
serves this purpose very well. For example, when an agent withdraws its schedule,
then it will leave some resource space unused. In this case, other agents may intend to
use that resource space by relaxing their springs that were compressed before.
In general, repairing schedules is just another round of negotiation.
1.7 Guide to the Reader
The dissertation can be viewed to have two closely related parts. The first part, which
includes Chapter 2, Chapter3 and Chapter 4, investigates the general DAI problem,
i.e., how rational agents can cooperate? The investigation leads to a formal definition
of metaphor-based negotiation. The second part, which includes Chapter 5, Chapter
6, and Chapter 7, is to solve the AGVSP problem by a novel spring-based negotiation
model which is based on the formal definition given in the first part and the spring-
based representational model we developed. The outlines of each chapter are as follows:
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• Chapter 2 presents a literature review in cooperative interaction in DAL
• Chapter 3 discusses how agents that are assumed to be rational, benevolent and
fully-informed can cooperate each other when they are situated in a cooperative
interaction problem (CIP) scenario.
• Chapter 3 continues Chapter 3's discussion by assuming that agents are partially
informed. A metaphor-based negotiation definition is proposed.
• Chapter 5 introduces Kwa's work related to the AGVSP problem, especially his
iterative negotiation model for conflict resolution.
• Chapter 6 formally specifies the AGVSP domain and presents our representa¬
tional spring-based model for AGV local scheduling and for guiding AGV to
work out negotiating proposals.
• Chapter 7 outlines our implementation of the spring-based negotiation model
and presents some experimental results.
• Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by presenting our major contributions in





Distributed Artificial (DAI) is the subfield of AI concerned with studying a broad
range of issues related to the distribution and coordination of knowledge and actions
in environments involving multiple entities (or agents) [Bond & Gasser 88]. These
agents are grouped into communities which work together to achieve the goals of the
individuals and of the system as a whole [Jennings 94]. The world of DAI can be
divided into three areas: Distributed Problem Solving (DPS), Multi-agent System
(MAS) and Parallel AI (PAI). Research in DPS considers how the work of solving
a particular problem can be divided among a number of modules, or "nodes" that
cooperate at the level of dividing and sharing knowledge about the problem and about
the developing solution. Research in MAS is concerned with coordinating intelligent
behaviour among a collection of autonomous agents so that they can coordinate their
knowledge, goals, and plans jointly to take action or to solve problems. Research
in PAI is concerned with developing parallel computer architectures, languages, and
algorithms for AI. The work in this dissertation can be regarded as in the area of MAS.
Cooperation and negotiation is one of the major research areas of MAS and also is the
theme of this dissertation. In the rest of the chapter, I shall survey the related research
in cooperation and negotiation.
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2.2 Formal Models of Cooperation and Negotiation
Formal models of cooperation and negotiation are mathematical models
[Rosenschein & Genesereth 88] [Genesereth et al. 86] [Ephrati &; Rosenschein 91]
[Zlotkin & Rosensein 89] [Zlotkin & Rosensein 90] [Zlotkin & Rosensein 91]. These mod¬
els are aimed at solving the following problem: given a scenario, what are the best
strategies for agents to take in cooperative interactions, or what are the best com¬
promises (or deals)?
Most formal models assume that agents in a multiagent system are rational, i.e., they
are aiming at maximising their own local utilities. Negotiation is viewed as a separate
process used to select a solution from a set of candidate solutions [Lander 94]. Each
agent involved in the negotiation attempts to select the candidate that will maximise
local utility with the understanding that all agents must ultimately agree on a single
candidate. The negotiation process does not itself define the set of candidate solutions.
It is usually assumed that only two agents are involved in the negotiation, that agents
are rational (rationality), meaning that they will not select an action that will result in
an avoidably poor payoff, and that each agent knows the other agent's potential payoffs
for all candidate solutions (full-informedness or complete knowledge). Conflicts exist
in general between these fully informed and rational agents since they have different
preferences over possible solutions.
Deals among rational agents [Rosenschein & Genesereth 88] [Durfee & Lesser 87]
[Ginsberg 87] can be made by assuming agents are benevolent. By benevolent is meant
that all agents are fundamentally assumed to be helping one another, and will trade
data and hypotheses as well as carry out tasks that are requested of them. Rosenschein
and Genesereth made various assumptions about rationality (e.g., minimal move ra¬
tionality, separate move rationality, etc.), and derived several strategies of cooperative
deals. The role of communication is emphasised in this formal model: communication
makes possible mutually beneficial activity that is otherwise impossible to coordinate.
The work of Rosenschein and Genesereth in [Rosenschein & Genesereth 88], together
with some other early formal models of cooperative interaction such as [Rosenschein 85],
became the earliest work in AI that formalises multiagent cooperative interaction
through a game-theoretic approach. However, these models suffer from some inadequa-
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cies: (1) incompleteness — models cannot guarantee that a compromise can always
be made regardless of what the interactive situation is; (2) some assumptions (e.g.,
fully informed agent assumption, benevolent agent assumption (i.e., agents are willing
to sacrifice their own goal achievements to help other agents, etc) are too strict to be
practical.
Deals among rational agents can also be implicitly made even without communica¬
tion [Genesereth et al. 86] [Kraus & Rosenschein 92] [Fenster et al. 95]. For example,
agents can apply a coordination technique common to communication-free interac¬
tions, namely focal points, to resolve conflicts when there is more than one possible
cooperative strategy. Focal points are the dominant properties of objects, plans, ac¬
tions, etc. When several agents are in a situation where one object must be jointly
chosen from several possible objects and where communication is not possible between
those agents, they have a tendency of choosing unanimously the same object (hence
no conflict happens) that has some dominant properties. Focal points are an im¬
portant concept in psychological and economics study [Schelling 60]. In adapting the
idea of focal points from human behaviour patterns to automated agents, as stated
in [Kraus & Rosenschein 92], one major difference must be considered. Focal points
are based on the naturalness and intuitiveness of certain objects (or solutions) in the
world. Automated agents do not have the cultural background (common sense) needed
to judge naturalness and intuitiveness. In other words, the formal algorithms developed
in [Kraus & Rosenschein 92] depend very largely on what focal points the designer will
endow them with. Finding focal points could be difficult, as far as the author is con¬
cerned. However, one important point made in [Kraus & Rosenschein 92] which is
particularly of our interest is that when agents run into a difficult situation of cooper¬
ative interaction, agents must be endowed with some additional knowledge, such as
knowledge of focal points, so that their cooperation process can be continued. I shall
call this knowledge, the common sense principle, which is an important concept in the
definition of metaphor-based negotiation given in Chapter 4.
Assumption-based cooperation is the main stream of the formal cooperation model in¬
troduced so far, i.e., besides the basic assumptions that agents are rational and fully
informed, one agent must reason about cooperative strategies strongly based on as¬
sumptions on what assumptions the other agents are based on. For example, in focal
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points algorithms, one agent will assume that the other agents will assume the same
focal points. Otherwise, it might be not possible for them to choose the same object.
Equilibrium-based negotiation is another major stream of cooperative interaction and
negotiation [Kraus & Wilkenfeld 91b] [Kraus & Wilkenfeld 91a] [Kraus et al. 95]. Agents'
cooperation is based on a so-called negotiation process in which they jointly reason
about the best compromises by proposing offers or counter-offers. The process usu¬
ally stops at a time point when none of those involved agents has the motivation of
moving away from a compromise proposal that is often called an equilibrium in game
theory [vonNeumann & Morgenstern 44]. In this situation, agents are said to be co¬
operative since it is generally assumed (1) that agents agree to make a joint plan before
an action to be taken rather than they make decisions independently, and (2) agents
will be bound by any decision that is jointly made. However, regarding what is the
compromise, this kind of negotiation is sometimes called non-cooperative interaction,
since compromises are made in a competitive manner: in each step of the negotiation,
an agent, as long as it see there is still something achievable, will propose a new plan to
achieve the achievable, regardless of what (negative) effect it has on the other agents.
For example, in [Kraus et al. 95], work has been concerned with how automated agents
can be designed to interact effectively in both resource allocation and distribution en¬
vironments. A strategic model of negotiation has been proposed as a way of reaching
mutual benefit while avoiding costly and time consuming interactions which might in¬
crease the overhead of coordination. The work is based on the game-theoretic model
of Rubinstein [Rubinstein 82]. This formal model does not assume that agents have
common sense as in [Kraus & Rosenschein 92], i.e., the negotiation can converge to an
agreement without exploiting any common sense. In this sense, the model developed in
[Kraus et al. 95] does have some advantages in some situations where common sense
is not attainable. However, according to my study, this model suffers at least such
an inadequacy: even when all negotiators' initial states are the same, the negotiation
cannot guarantee a negotiation result that is symmetric. In other words, the fairness
of compromise using this formal model is questionable.
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2.3 Computational Model of Cooperation and Negotiation
2.3.1 Contract Net
Davis and Smith [Davis & Smith 83] [Smith & Davis 88] could be considered els pi-
oneers for introducing the negotiation concept to the AI research field. The use of
negotiation for the allocation of tasks in their contract net protocol was studied. The
process of negotiation was considered as one (the manager) announcing the task and
the others (the bidders) bidding, and the bidder who bids at the lowest price will
be awarded the task and hence become the contractor. The agreement is therefore
reached. In this approach, the agents are hierarchically related, one agent (manager)
will be in relation to several other agents (the bidders). The bidder who becomes the
contractor may decompose the task and announce them to the public, other agents
start to bid. So this is a totally hierarchical system: agents are hierarchically related,
tasks are hierarchically decomposed, and conflict resolution is hierarchical. The work
is extremely elementary. However the contract net protocol is a single-shot negotiation
process, i.e., announce - bidding - decision, this is very rare in human negotiation in
which there are many rounds of the information exchange.
A similar work to [Davis & Smith 83] is presented by [Sandholm 93] in which the
bidding and awarding decision process that was left undefined in the original contract
net task allocation protocol is formalised based 011 marginal cost calculations based
on local agent criteria. In this way, agents having very different local criteria (based
on their self-interest) can interact to distribute tasks so that the network as a whole
functions more effectively. The application in the transportation domain is discussed.
Work related to Contract Net can also be found in [Conry et al. 91] where the Contract
Net approach is used to resolve conflict in distributed constraint satisfaction problems.
As indicated in [Davis & Smith 83], the Contract Net Negotiation cannot solve the
following typical problem (which is also unsolved by the other computational models
that are introduced below):
Consider for example a situation in which two managers (A and B) have both an-
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nouiiced tasks, and two potential contractors (X and Y) have each responded by bid¬
ding on both tasks. Imagine further that from A's perspective, X's bid is rated 0.9 (on
a 0 to 1 scale), while Y's is rated 0.8. Conversely, from B's perspective, X is rated 0.8
and Y is rated 0.2. Which bidder should be assigned task from A, and which bidder
should be assigned task from B? From a purely local perspective, both of the managers
want X as their contractor; form a more global perspective it may make more sense to
have A "settle" for Y, and give X to B. However, this question has not been discussed
in depth [Davis &: Smith 83]. That is to say, the preferences of managers are totally
ignored. I shall consider this is also not the case generally in a human negotiation. In
our formal definition of metaphor-based negotiation, this issue is carefully addressed.
2.4 Constraint-directed Negotiation
Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSPs) can be solved in DAI approaches. For ex¬
ample, in a related class of problems in which satisfaction of each goal presented to
the network requires a coordinated set of actions distributed over a subset of the
nodes for completion [Conry et al. 91], each node has limited resource available for
satisfaction of global goals, and once a resource has been committed in satisfaction
of one goal, it cannot be used for another. Planning relative to satisfaction of the
set of global goals is nontrivial. The combination of local resource constraints and
required coordination of actions among nodes that results gives rise to a complex
set of global interdependent constraints. Such a problem is referred to as the Dis¬
tributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DCSP) [Conry et al. 91] [Sycara et al. 90]
[Yokoo et al. 90] [Sathi & Fox 89].
In [Sathi & Fox 89], Sathi and Fox describe constraint-directed negotiation in the do¬
main of resource reallocation in an engineering organisation. In this domain, negoti¬
ation is composed of two phases: a communication phase where information relevant
to the negotiation is communicated to participating agents, and a bargaining phase
where "deals" are made between individuals or in a group. In resource reallocation,
information about available bids has to be communicated minimally, while agents may
individually or as a group make tradeoff decisions about how to satisfy requirements.
Negotiation is performed among a set of agents. Each agent owns a set of resources
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employed by the agent to fulfill resource requirements. If there is a difference between
the resource requirement and the resources owned by an agent, changes in resource
ownership are solicited through buy and sell bids. Constraints can be used both for
evaluation of existing alternatives as well as creating new ones. A set of qualitative
evaluation and relaxation (alternative generation) techniques based on human negoti¬
ation problem solving is defined.
Work in [Sathi & Fox 89] has profoundly addressed several important issues:
• The constraint specifies preference for an alternative in the form of utility, min¬
imally accepted or a threshold for a utility and a constraint importance relative
to other constraints. That is to say, agents have preferences over solutions and
these preferences are well considered. So, constraints can be relaxed if necessary
but the relaxation must be in accordance with their respective preferences. This
observation is directly related to the spring model developed in this dissertation
in which (soft) constraints are rated according to their importance and springs
is used to represent the preferences.
• The combination of these utilities for constraints are made to form a global utility
to evaluate the global solutions.
• Constraints are taken as roles of heuristics for searching solutions. Although
this issue is not directly relevant to this dissertation, it provides a view that
searching techniques for efficiency of problem solving in DAI are as important as
in centralised problem solving.
2.4.1 Iterative Negotiation Model for Conflict Resolution in AGV
Movement Planning
Kwa [Kwa 88a] [Kwa 88b] developed an iterative negotiation model for conflict res¬
olution in AGV movement planning. Since, to some extent, this dissertation is a
continuation of Kwa's work in AGV planning, a reimplementation of Kwa's iterative
negotiation model has been made by the author with the negotiation model proposed
in this dissertation. The detailed introduction to and the re-implementation of the
iterative negotiation model can be found in Chapter 5.
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Kwa's model is procedural and straightforward. The most important points that re¬
main unanswered are:
• How to define negotiation skills, and negotiation techniques?
• which agent involved in a resource conflict should concede more than the other
quantitatively?
2.5 Al-based Negotiation Support System
2.5.1 PERSUADER — Resolving Goal Conflicts via Negotiation
PERSUADER [Sycara 88] acts as mediator between a company and a trade union. Sy-
cara built a centralized planner, PERSUADER, for resolving conflicts between agents'
goals. Given a particular conflict and the context in which the conflict occurs, the
planner has two alternatives: one is to find a new compromise by using case-based
reasoning or multi-attribute preference analysis strategies, the other is to use per¬
suasive arguments to convince agents to accept the proposed compromise by using
explanation-based reasoning or to try to improve the compromise by asking for justi¬
fication of disagreements. Negotiation is coordinated by a centralised mediator, making
it an explicit process that is outside the scope of the agents. The mediator has access
to local and global information about the situation and about the negotiation parti¬
cipants. In this approach, the mediator is introduced to act as a persuader to give
proposals.
2.5.2 Apply Genetic Algorithm in Negotiation Support System
Stan Matwin is a researcher who made many contributions to Al-based negotiation.
Many problems in studying negotiation are pointed out [Matwin et al. 89]
[Matwin et al. 91]: Many two-party multiple-issue negotiations have been described,
but only informally; some have been cast in mathematical models. An expert system
shell for negotiation support is described, called Negoplan which supports one party's
negotiation during a negotiation process (asymmetrical system). The decision is made
by production rules and these rules can be generated by using Genetic Algorithms.
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2.6 Frameworks of Cooperation and Negotiation
There are several frameworks of cooperation and negotiation developed in recent years.
The frameworks are emphasised on system structures of cooperation and negotiation,
such as general stages of problem solving in cooperation and negotiation, communica¬
tion protocols, mental representation of agents, etc.
2.6.1 TEAM
Lander and Lesser [Lander et al. 91] [Lander & Lesser 91] [Lander & Lesser 92]
[Lander & Lesser 93], describe a framework, TEAM, for multi-agent cooperative design
of mechanical systems using negotiated search. This work focused on integrating dis¬
tributed search among a set of heterogeneous and reusable agents. In TEAM, negoti¬
ation is initiated through the detection of a conflict as an agent critiques or extends a
proposal initiated by another. The detecting agent notifies the initiating agent of the
conflict and communicates relevant information about the cause of the conflict. The
initiating agent gathers critiques of its proposal and integrates the shared information
into its own knowledge base, making choices about how best to do that. Those choices
can include relaxing its own solution requirements to accommodate another agent or
refusing to relax a particular requirement even though it is explicitly incompatible
with a requirement stated by another agent, in consequence, the final proposed solu¬
tion may be unacceptable to one or more agents under the complete set of preferences.
Each agent participating in the negotiation has the option of accepting or rejecting
a proposed solution. If a solution is initially rejected, it remains available and may
be reconsidered in the future as agents continue to relax requirements in their search
for a mutually-acceptable solution. The TEAM framework provides a flexible control
structure that allows agents to share information about their problem-solving capab¬
ilities and preferences with respect to a particular problem. TEAM is structured as
a blackboard system where overall solutions are integral, and agents build their sub-
solutions with their own expertises. A very important concept presented in TEAM is
linear compromise which is claimed as a limited, but very efficient, negotiated-search
strategy: a compromise is reached when two agent's linear utility functions over the
value of a solution intersect at a point of price, then the point is taken as the "fairest"
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value, i.e., a compromise.
2.6.2 The Recursive Negotiation Model (RNM)
In [Laasri et al. 92], a generic model, called the Recursive Negotiation Model (RNM),
is presented to serve as a basis for classifying and specifying where conflict resolution
among multiple experts, viewpoints, or types of reasoning is needed in building a
sophisticated Cooperative Distributed Problem Solving (CDPS) system. This model
defines where and how negotiation can be applied during problem solving based on
structuring problem solving into four stages: problem formulation, focus-of-attention,
allocation of goals or tasks, and achievement of goals or tasks. It also categorises
the various styles of negotiation that could occur depending on (1) whether or not
negotiation is an integral part of the problem solving, (2) the particular problem-solving
stage where negotiation may be used, and (3) the assumptions on which the agents'
cooperation is based. It points out that negotiation may be a recursive, complex, and
pervasive process that is relevant not only to domain problem solving but also to control
(meta-level) problem solving. Some general aspects of negotiation are discussed, such
as information exchange, conflict detection, propagation, conflict resolution, and the
organisation of negotiation, etc.
2.6.3 The Decentralised Negotiation (DENEGOT) Model
In [Moehlman et al. 92], a distributed negotiation framework, the DENEGOT, is de¬
scribed. In the system, the negotiation search space is structured into a lattice of sets
of potential compromise solutions based on hard constraints to estimate the quality of
potential solutions. A solution in a higher set in the lattice, if it is achievable, will be
preferable over a solution in a lower set. Agents search first under the hard constraint
level representing the highest quality solution standard achievable in the current situ¬
ation. By relaxing hard constraints, the set of compromises that qualify as a solution
are enlarged. Agents search for a resolution under the relaxed hard constraint set when
a solution cannot be found under the current set of constraints. Three iterative phases
(coordinated search, negotiation state analysis, and constraint relaxation) of the sys¬
tem are discussed, among them of most interest to us is the second phase during which
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suboptimal solutions will be found if ones exist. Though not explicitly pointed out in
the article, we would take this is a procedure of relaxing soft constraints, partially, or
fully. If no solution is achieved, then it enters into the third phase to relax some hard
constraints. Each agent is assumed to cooperatively work to optimise the overall goals
and if necessary to sacrifice its own goal in order to achieve overall optimal solutions.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed some work in the DAI field concerning multi-agent co¬
operation and negotiation. Research on multi-agent cooperation and negotiation is
classified into formal models and computational models. The formal models focus on
what is the best compromise based on some axioms or assumptions while the compu¬
tational models focus on how a complex application problem can be solved in the DAI
manner by several cooperative agents. Our investigation in the first part of the disser-
ation (Chapter 3 and 4) falls into research on a formal model while our investigation
in the second part (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) falls into research on a computational model.
Chapter 3
Cooperative Interaction
This chapter focuses 011 cooperative interaction among rational agents. Cooperative
interaction here means joint agreement between willing entities in a situation where
none of the agents have the total control of a problem solving, neither does there exist
any third party that could possibly be involved in this matter. Agents are assumed to
be fully informed, or say, have complete knowledge about themselves and about others.
Each agent is also assumed to be rational. By rational I mean the agent is a utility
maximiser. This assumption is obviously widely accepted in the DAI community as
well as other research fields, such as game theory. However, our study here shows that
even rational agents that are willing to cooperate could run into a conflict situation
where one agent's gain means the others' loss. In this difficult situation, compromise
is impossible if agents are only assumed to be rational. The idea of a common sense
principle is therefore introduced as mediation between these conflicting agents.
3.1 A Scenario of Cooperative Interaction
In order to carry out our investigation, we construct a cooperative interaction scenario,
denoted as < A. E, < 7Ti, 712,..., 7ri,... >>:
1. A is the agent set: Each member, i, of A is an agent.
2. E is the problem domain, we call it the cooperative strategy set. Each member of
E is called a cooperative strategy
3. 7Tj (i G A) is a payoff function (or utility function) which maps E into the
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real number domain 3? indicating the preference of agent i over E: for any two
strategies, one that yields a higher payoff to agent i is preferable to the other
7Ti : E —> 3£
4. The task of the CIP is to select a strategy from E that can satisfy all agents'
preferences as well as possible.
5. No agent in A has the total control over which strategy to choose.
6. There exists no any third party that can take part in a role as an arbitrator.
3.2 Cooperative Interaction in DAI
In this section, we will illustrate some typical cooperative interaction problems in DAI.
3.2.1 Resource Allocation Problem: Cake-sharing Domain
Resource Allocation Problem
When a set of agents each having its own goal to achieve shares resources that are
limited in quantities and that are not reusable or that can only be used by one agent
at a time, then conflicts are likely to occur if more than one agent intend to use the
same resources at the same time. Agreements acceptable to all are therefore sought so
that the resources can be divided among them with good reasons.
Distributed constraint scheduling problems (DCSPs) are examples of the resource al¬
location problem. In a DCSP, an overall scheduling problem is decomposed into several
subproblems. Each of the subproblems is assigned to an agent. According to the as¬
signment, the assigned agent is responsible for solving the subproblem, i.e., to allocate
resources to a subset of operations. Resources could be communication bandwidth,
machines, routes, etc, depending on what the application domain is. Initially, each
agent is always trying to allocate a piece of resource to each operation in its assigned
subproblem such that the subproblem is optimally solved. If there is only one agent in
the world we are concerned with, then traditional AI approaches can be applied to solve
the problem. Now in a multiagent system, when two or more agents' initial demands
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overlap, then agents involved should concede from their initial demands. Concession
can be made through negotiation by one agent putting forward a concession proposal
and the others evaluating it, criticising it, or putting forward their counter-proposals.
Each such proposal expresses the proposer's will of how the conflict should be resolved.
It is obvious that the more the proposer is willing to concede, the easier the conflict
is to resolve. On the other hand, the more the proposer concedes, the worse for its
own problem-solving. Each proposer must find a proposal that can balance between
resolving the overall conflict and its individual problem-solving. This sometime proves
to be very difficult.
The AGVSP is an resource allocation problem: several agents, each of which is as¬
signed a sub-problem of the AGVSP and aims to build up an optimal local schedule
to its sub-problem, and compete for limited resources. Conflicts will occur when one
agent's resource requirement overlaps that of others. Overlap of resources violates the
AGVSP constraints. Agents involved in an overlap can resolve these conflicts through
negotiation. The following example illustrates a resource allocation problem.
Example 3.1 Cake-sharing Domain:
A piece of cake is to be shared between agent 1 and agent 2. Suppose the cake can be
divided into two portions, x(0 < x < 1), y(0 < x < 1) (the whole cake is 1 unit), and
x is the share for agent 1 and y is for agent 2. Agent 1 evaluates its share by a payoff
function it\{x), and agent 2 evaluates it share by 7r2{y) (payoffs can be considered as
the quality of satisfaction — the larger the payoff for an agent the happier the agent
is). Also none of them has the total control about how to divide the cake, nor there is
any third party involved in this matter.
Can they make a joint decision on how to share the cake?
We have given a similar cake-sharing example in [Huang 95] where the cake can only
be divided into 7 equal portions. Example 3.1 assumes that the cake can be divided in
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a continuous domain. The cake-sharing domain is a CIP problem < A, £, < 7Ti, 1x2 »'■
Here hi(x) (i = 1,2) is a function measuring agent i's satisfaction over an agreement
according to which he gets a portion of x of the piece of the cake. We may take hi(x)
as a function returning a value positively proportional to x, i.e., the larger the portion
x agent i gets, the more satisfied he is.
3.2.2 Task Allocation Problem
In the resource allocation problem, we are interested in how agents that have been
assigned their specific goals (or tasks) overcome resource conflict rather than how
these goals are assigned to them. The task distribution problem is concerned with how
these goals are assigned to agents in a multiagent system. When all agents have a
common goal to achieve, they can divide the overall goal into several subgoals each of
which is undertaken by a subgroup of these agents. Since undertaking a task is costly,
each agent intends to do as little as possible. So, agents have to negotiate with each
other to reach an agreement. An example of task distribution is the postman domain
(see Example 3.2). In AGV Planning, it is obvious that task assignment is a task
distribution problem if this problem is to be solved by an multiagent approach. In this
case, several agents (AGVs) can negotiate over how these tasks should be divided. Each
agent is trying to undertake a subset of the tasks that costs it little. Conflicts will occur
when a task cannot be allocated, or when several agents compete for one task. Work
relating to the task allocation problem can be found in, for example, Davis and Smith's
Contract Net ([Davis & Smith 83], [Smith & Davis 88], [Smith 88]) in which several
agents (bidders) compete for one task announced by the manager; and the partial
Global Planning of Durfee and Lesser ([Durfee &: Lesser 89], [Durfee & Lesser 87]) in
which agents negotiate over task decomposition and distribution of tasks by sharing
all of their information, or by exchanging proposals and counter-proposals.
.4={1,2}
E = {(z,y) |0 < x,y < 1}
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Example 3.2 Postman Domain [Zlotkin & Rosenschein 93]:
Agents have to deliver sets of letters to mailboxes, which are arranged on a weighted
graph G = G(V, E). There is no limit to the number of letters that can fit in a mailbox.
After delivering all letters, agents must return to the starting point (the post office).
Agents can exchange letters at no cost while they are at the post office, prior to delivery.
Task Set: The set of all addresses in the graph, namely V. If address x is in an agent's
task set, it means that he has at least one letter to deliver to x.
Cost Function: The cost of a subset of addresses X C V, i.e., c(X), is the length of
the minimal path that starts at the post office, visits all members of X, and ends at the
post office.
We can view the postman domain as a CIP problem < A, E, < -k\, tt2 »:
= {1,2}
E = {(*,K) \XuY = X0L1 V0}
tt1(O) = C{X) X CXQUYO [ '
7r2(cr) = C(Y) YCXoUYo
The two agents may wish to cooperatively reallocate their tasks if there exists a new




However, if there exist more than one such allocation, then which of them should be
chosen by them as an agreement of reallocation?
3.2.3 Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DCSP)
The postman domain (see Example 3.2) and the cake-sharing domain (see Example 3.1
can all be classified as a Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSPs) as their variable
assignments are limited in one way or another. For example, in the cake-sharing
domain, x + y = 1 is a constraint on assignment of x and y. In fact, most DAI
problems can be represented as CSPs.
CHAPTER 3. COOPERATIVE INTERACTION
Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP)
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A CSP problem can be described by
<X, C, ir>
where A is a set of variables, and C is a set of constraints that must be satisfied and ir
is the global objective function that evaluates assignments of X to indicate preference
of the problem solving. We call C the hard constraint and 7r the soft constraint.
C decides the possible solution space £:
£ = {X\C(X) = TRUE} (3.3)
So, each member, o (£ £), of £ is an legal assignment of X.
The target of Solving the CSP is to find an assignment, namely a', (1) that is a member
of £ and (2) that n(a*) yields the maximal value, i.e.,
Va(e £)7t(ct*) > 7r(<r) (3.4)
When the size of £ is very large, efficient searching approaches are essential to guarantee
that an optimal solution can be reached within a time allowed. In some difficult CSPs,
it is not computationally possible to guarantee an optimal solution. In this case, a sub-
optimal solution will be sought. Heuristics are often used to increase the possibility of
obtaining a sub-optimal solution and the quality of the solution.
Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DCSP)
When a CSP is naturally (i.e, logically or geometrically) distributed, then the problem
could possibly be solved in DAI approaches. We describe the Distributed Constraint
Satisfaction Problem (DCSP) as
CSP,
< A, < Xi, Ci,TTj >, Cij, 7r (i,j e .4) >
Basically, a DCSP problem is composed by a set of CSP problems, CSP, (i 6 A) and
a set of inter-agent constraints, Cij (i,j € A) concerning the relation between Xi and
Xj and a global objective function 7r evaluating synthetically the overall assignments
of all X, (i 6 -4). For each subproblcm, CSP,, it has a solution space £,.
£, = {X, |Ci(Xi) = TRUE} (3.5)
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And a solution a* is said to be optimal for agent i, if
Ver; (e Ei)7r((f*) > ft (pi)
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(3.6)
For the whole DCSP problem, the solution space is £:
E = I X* e E<; CijiX^Xj) = TRUE (i, j G A)} (3.7)
A solution a* (G E) is said to be optimal if
V<7 (G E)7r(cr*) > 7r(cr) (3.8)
Solving DCSP in a Multi-agent System (MAS)
We are interested in a class of the DCSP problem in which n has the following property:
(3-9)
That is to say, each local objective 7T, is related with the global objective 7r such that
the value of 7r can be increased by increasing the value of 7r2. In this case, the whole
DCSP might be solved in a multi-agent system: each agent, namely i, solves one CSP
problem C5Pj, aiming at maximising 7Tj.
But these agents cannot solve their individual problems independently. Their local
assignments are constrained by inter-agent constraints Cij\ two agents' local optimal
assignments might not satisfy their inter-agent constraints and hence are not legal in
the global sense. Such a potential conflict could be resolved by these conflicting agents'
cooperation.
However, how can it be possible for agents with their own local objectives to cooperate?
This is the our main concern in this chapter. When discussing agents' cooperative
interaction, we can view the DCSP as a CIP Problem
< A, E, < 7Ti, 7T2, ..., 7Ti, ... > (i e A) > (3.10)
Note that the global objective ir(cr) (a G E) has been omitted in Equation 3.10. It will
be considered in later sections in this chapter.
CHAPTER 3. COOPERATIVE INTERACTION
3.3 Notations, Definitions and Assumptions
38
Definition 3.1 Individual Preference In a CIP situation, < A, S, < 7Ti,7T2, ... >>,
suppose i is an agent in A, g and o are two arbitrary strategies, then we say
1. a is preferable to a if
7ti(a) > ni(cr') (3.11)
This relation is denoted by
a y i a
2. g is indifferent to o if
(g )/- i a') A (a >/- i a) (3-12)
This relation is denoted by
g « i a
3. We also use g >z i g to denote:
(g y i g ) V (g % i g )
Definition 3.2 Group Preference In a CIP situation, < A, E, < 7Ti,7T2, ... >>,
suppose g and g are two arbitrary strategies, then we say
1. g is preferable to g for A, if
Vz(€ A) 3j(€ A) (g >z i g ) A (g >- j g ) (3.13)
In other words, for all agents, g is preferable or indifferent to g and there exists
at least one agent for which g is preferable to g . This relation is denoted by
g y A G .
2. g is indifferent to g for A, if
V2(E.4) g^A G . (3.14)
In other words, for all agents in A, g is indifferent to g .
CHAPTER 3. COOPERATIVE INTERACTION 39
3. We also use a >z A o to denote
(a > A ia') (3.15)
Assumption 3.1 Rationality: All agents in A are rational. We say an agent i is
rational if its intention, action and preference are consistent. More specifically, suppose
o and a are two possible strategies known to agent i, and o >- i o then it will not
intend to use strategy o , and further more it will not use strategy o . In this case, we
say a is irrational for agent i.
Assumption 3.2 Benevolence All agents in A are benevolent. We say an agent i in
an agent set A is benevolent if the agent will help other agents under condition that its
own goal is not affected. More specifically, suppose o and a are two possible strategies
known to agent i, and o >- A o is also known to agent i, then all agents in A will
not intend to use strategy o , and further more it will not use strategy a . In this case,
we say a is irrational for A.
Assumption 3.3 Full-Informedness
(1) Each agent in A knows it is rational and benevolent;
(2) Each agent assumes that all other agents are rational and benevolent;
(3) Each agent has complete knowledge about the problem domain E;
(4) Each agent assumes that all other agents have complete knowledge about the prob¬
lem domain E;
(5) Each agent has complete knowledge about its own payoff function;
(6) Each agent assumes that all other agents know their own payoff functions;
(7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) are common sense, i.e., each agent assumes they are true
and it assumes other agents assume they are true as well.
We say Assumption 3.2 is a benevolent agent assumption for the following considera¬
tion:
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Suppose there are two agents, agent 1 and agent 2, and they have to jointly make a
decision on which strategy to choose from a strategy set of two strategies, A and B:
suppose also that A zz 1 B and Ay 2 B. In this situation, agent 1 can choose any of
the two strategies, because they are indifferent to each other from agent l's perspect¬
ive. If he is hostile, or malevolent, then he might choose B which is less preferable to
A in agent 2's perspective. However, by Assumption 3.2, then agent 1 has to agree on
A which (1) will not affect his own payoff compared with B, (2) is preferable to B in
agent 2's perspective. In other words, agent 1 helped agent 2 by choosing agent 2's
preferable strategy while its own payoff has not been affected negatively. Therefore,
we say agent 1 is benevolent.
The benevolent agent assumption was first seen in [Rosenschein & Genesereth 88]
where the benevolent agent assumption was described as "All agents are fundament¬
ally assumed to be helping one another, and will trade data and hypotheses as well
as carry out tasks that are requested of them". Since there was no formal defini¬
tion about what does the term "benevolent" mean, this assumption is criticised in
[Durfee et al. 87] as "Rosenschein and Genesereth misleadingly call agents that share
goals benevolent agents". Following this criticism, Durfee and his co-authors present
another view point — "Actually, these agents are completely self-interested since each
performs actions only to satisfy its own local interpretations of these goals. Benevol¬
ence is neither assumed nor needed for the agents to cooperate." We think this arguing
can be stopped only if the term benevolent is clearly defined. We assume agents are
benevolent only according to Assumption 3.2.
Relevant to Assumption 3.2 is selfish agent assumption, malevolent agent assumption,
altruistic agent assumption, etc. These assumptions are very often used in human
negotiations. But we think that are not necessarily assumed. For example, the al¬
truistic agent assumption requires each agent to sacrifice its own goal achievement for
the sake of other agents' goal achievement. This is contradictory to the rational agent
assumption which requires each agent to aim at its own goal achievement.
3.4 Cooperative Games
In this section, we will show another example of the CIP problem: cooperative games.
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Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. Game theory provides gen¬
eral mathematical techniques for analysing situations in which two or more individu¬
als make decisions that will influence one another's welfare. As such, game the¬
ory offers insights of fundamental importance for scholars in all branches of the so¬
cial sciences, as well as for practical decision-makers. In this section we introduce
some basic concepts about game theory. Detailed knowledge about game theory
can be found from [vonNeumann & Morgenstern 44] [Luce & Raiffa 57][Myerson 91]
[Shapiro 89], etc. We limit our introduction to the two-person game.
3.4.2 Basic Strategic Model of Two Person Game
The two person-game can be modelled by a payoff matrix: There are two agents (or
agent 2
A A
A (*"}>*?) (A, A)
A (A, A) (A* A)
Figure 3.1: Two-Person Game Payoff Matrix
players), namely agent 1 and agent 2. meeting an interactive situation where each
agent i (e A = {1, 2}) has two strategies, a\ and o\. This game matrix can be easily
extended to a two-person game in which each agent has more than two strategies. n'lk
is the payoff for agent i when agent 1 uses strategy a} and agent 2 uses If
VI, k TT[k + irfk = 0 (3.16)
then the game is called the zero-sum game, otherwise it is the non-zero-sum game.
In a zero-sum game, agents' interests are diametrically opposed — one agent's gain is
exactly equal to the loss of the other agent. Therefore, game theorists say that there
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is no cooperation possible in the zero-sum game. We will not follow this assumption
in this dissertation. We treat both types of the two-person game in the same way.
Example 3.3 shows an interaction situation called the Battle of the Sexes [Thomas 84]:
Example 3.3 The Battle of the Sexes: A married couple are trying to decide
where to go for a night out. She would like to go to the theatre, and he would like to
go to a football match — they have been married a few months! However, they are still
very much in love and so they only enjoy the entertainment if their partner is with
them. If the first strategy, namely a\, for each is to go to the theatre, the second to go
to the football match, agent 1 represents the wife and agent 2 represents the husband,





Figure 3.2: Payoff Matrix of the Battle of the Sexes
3.4.3 Concept of Equilibrium
In game theory, agents are assumed to be rational, fully informed. Another important
assumption is that communication between agents is prohibited and agents must decide
which of their individual strategies to use simultaneously. What is the best strategy for
each agent? This is the major concern of game theory. The concept of an equilibrium is
the answer to this question. An equlibrium is a strategy pair (al,a%) (cr^ is a strategy
of agent 1, o\ is a strategy of agent 2) such that no agent will get a higher payoff by
moving to any of its another strategies. In Example 3.3, (ct},ctj) (the couple both go
to the theatre) is an equilibrium pair, since, if any of then has definitely decided to
go to the theatre, then the other will get a zero payoff (the lowest) if she/he decides
to go to the football match instead of going to the theatre. If there exists only one
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equilibrium pair, then it seems each agent can choose its strategy from the equilibrium
pair. Unfortunately, a game often has more than one equilibrium pair. In Example 3.3,
for obvious reason, (cr2,(r2) (both go to the football match) is a equilibrium pair as
well.
3.4.4 Mixed Strategies
Each agent may not just simply use the pure strategies — going to the theatre and
going to the football match. They can use mixed strategies. For example, going to the
theatre with a probability of 30% and going to the football with a probability of 70%.
If the two agents are not willing to cooperate, then they might use a fixed pattern:
where p\ is a probability with which agent i is going to the theatre and p2 is a prob¬
ability with which agent i is going to the football, we have
Pure strategies are the special cases of the mixed strategy: < 1,0 > means going to
the theatre and < 0,1 > means going to the football match. When < p\, p2 > is used,
the payoff, 7q for agent i is calculated by the expected payoff:
where 7Ti(<7*, cr^) is the payoff for agent i if agent 1 uses pure strategy (a = 1, 2) and
agent 2 uses pure strategy cr% (b = 1, 2). It has been proved that when mixed strategies
are used, the Battle of the Sexes has a third equilibrium (crj,a2) [Owen 82].







The prisoner's dilemma (see Example 3.4) [Luce & Raiffa 57] is often used by game
theorists as an example of cooperative game.
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Example 3.4 Prisoner's Dilemma:
Two prisoners, agent 1 and agent 2, are accused of conspiring in two crimes, one
minor crime for which their guilt can be proved without confession, and one major
crime for which they can be convicted only if at least one confesses, the confessor will
go free now but the other will go to jail for 6 years. If both confess, then they both go
to jail for 5 years. If neither confesses then they both go to jail for only 1 year. So
each agent i has two possible strategies: to confess (cr\) or to deny (a\). The payoffs,
measured in the number of years of freedom that the player will enjoy over the next 6
years, are shown in the payoff matrix in Figure 3.3.
agent 2
a\ (deny) a\ (confess)
a\ (deny) (5,5) (0,6)
a\ (confess) (6,0) (1,1)
Figure 3.3: Payoff Matrix of the Prisoner's Dilemma
Intuitively we would possibly agree that (deny, deny) is the best strategy pair for both
prisoners. However, this game has a unique equilibrium pair that is (confess, confess):
From agent l's point of view, he thinks if agent 2 uses deny strategy, then the best
strategy for him is to confess so that he will receive a payoff of 6 larger than 5, a payoff
for him if deny is used; also if agent 1 uses confess then the best strategy for him is to
confess as well since he will receive a pay of 1 instead of 0. Similarly, from agent 2's
point of view, confess is the best strategy too. Therefore, the game will converge to
(confess, confess) which is in fact a strategy pair worse than (deny, deny) from both
agents' point of view. This is a typical example in game theory — rational agents' good
will at the beginning will turn out a bad result. The problem arises as communica¬
tion is not allowed between them. If they can communicate before they choose their
strategies, they might not choose (confess, confess). There might be some cooperation
possible. For example, they might sign an agreement on using (deny, deny) and act
accordingly. And indeed, many game theorists suggest that (deny deny) is the best
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cooperative strategy pair (e.g., [Thomas 84] (page 64), [Myerson 91] (page 97), etc.).
Cooperation in cooperative games means that both agents choose unanimously a joint
strategy. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, there are four possible pure
joint strategies: (deny, deny), (confess, confess), (deny, confess) and (confess, deny).
A mixed cooperative strategy has the similar meaning to that of an agent's mixed
strategy. A mixed cooperative strategy a can be represented by




where pn is the probability with which a pure cooperative strategy, e.g., (deny, deny),
is used. Agent i's payoff is calculated by expected payoff:
Ti=T,niPn (319)
n
where 7r" is the payoff for agent i when a respective pure cooperative strategy is used.
A cooperative game can be then described by a CIP problem < A, En >:
A = {1,2} )
£ = {<Pl,P2,-,Pn,- > |0 < pn < l;EnPn = 1} > (3-20)
*i = £„ K?Pn (it A) J
For example,
pure strategy Index n probability pn payoff 7r" payoff -n-J
(confess, deny) 1 Pi 6 0
(deny, deny) 2 P'2 5 5
(deny, confess) 3 P3 0 6
(confess, confess) 4 PJ 1 1
Figure 3.4: Cooperative Game for Prisoner's Dilemma
Generally, it is possible for cooperative agents to get higher payoffs than that they can
achieved from a non-cooperative (independent game). For example, Figure 3.5 shows
the non-cooperative region of payoff pairs and the cooperative region of payoff pairs for
the Battle of the Sexes. The cooperative region is extended from the non-cooperative
region. So, the whole area of triangle is the cooperative region.







Figure 3.5: The Cooperative and Non-cooperative Payoff Regions in the Battle of the
Sexes
3.5 Summary So far
In previous sections in this chapter, we formally addressed the CIP problem. We
showed also that many DAI problems can be regarded as CIP problems. Cooperative
games are CIP problems too. We also made several assumptions of agents. All agents
are rational, benevolent, and fully informed. We defined a set of preference notations
which would be useful for the discussion in the rest of the chapter and some other
chapters that follow.
3.6 Decision-making in a Single Agent Environment
Suppose a rational agent i has the total control over decision-making on which strategy
to choose from a problem domain S, then the problem is already theoretically solved.
The agent will choose one strategy from £ that is the most preferable.
Definition 3.3 In a CIP situation < *4, £, < 7Ti,7T2, ... >>, suppose i is an agent in
A, a* is a member ofZ, then we say g* is the most preferable for agent i, if
Vcr(€ E)cr* y i o
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In practice, we may obtain one of the most preferable strategies from the remainder of
£ by moving all strategies that are irrational.
Definition 3.4 A strategy cr(G £) is irrational for agent i, if there exists another
strategy a (G £) such that
a >- i a
We denote a procedure for removing all irrational strategies by
remove-irrationals(£, i)
which can be an algorithm as simple as follow:
Algorithm 3.1
procedure remove-irrationals(£, i)
1 until all strategy in £ has been considered do
2 Select an strategy, namely a not considered before
3 if 3a (G £)cr >- i a (a is therefore irrational) then




When procedure remove-irrationals(£, i) is applied to a strategy set £, all irrational
strategies will be deleted from it and the remaining strategies in the set are therefore
rational.
Theorem 3.1 In a CIP situation < A, £, < 7Ti,7T2,... >>, suppose i is an agent
(i G A), and £* is a subset of £ given by:
£* = remove-irrationals(£, i) (3.21)
we have
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1. If E is not empty, then E* consists of at least one strategy, formally,
E ^ </>=(. £* ^ <t>
48
(3.22)
2. If there exists two or more strategies in E* then any strategy in it is indifferent
to others, i.e.,
\/aa'(e E*)cr » i o (|E*| > 2) (3.23)
where |E*| is the size o/E*.
3. Any o* in E* is the most preferable for agent i, i.e.,
a* E E* => Ver(E E)(j* y i a (3.24)
Proof:
(1) Suppose there is only one strategy in E, then remove-irrationals(E, i) pro¬
cedure will simply return E. If there is more than one strategy in E, and suppose
remove-irrationals(E, i) will return an empty set, then, since strategies are moved
from E one by one, there is definitely a time when there is only one strategy in E.
However, when there is only one strategy left in E, the procedure will simply return
it and E* is therefore not empty. This is contradictory to the hypothesis that E* is
empty.
(2) Suppose there are two strategies, o and o , in E, such that
a 56 i a
Then it means
(a >- i o ) V (cr y i a)
Suppose a y i o then o is irrational and should be removed from E*. Similarly, if
a y i a then a is irrational and should be removed from E*. This contradicts. □.
So, all strategies in EJ are the optimal strategies for agent i, therefore agent i can choose
any strategy from Ej* as its best plan. So, theoretically, remove-irrationals(E, i) can
be taken as a single agent decision-making procedure which will yield a set of strategies
that is the most preferable for agent i.
(3) Suppose there exists a (E E) such that
a y i a*
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then a* should have been removed. This is contradictory to the hypothesis that a* is
in E*. □.
3.7 Joint Decision-making
We are interested in the CIP problem where there is more than one agent involved.
What is the best cooperative strategies for these agents? We would like to obtain such
strategies by removing all irrational strategies from £.
3.7.1 Ideal Cooperative Interaction
In last section, we illustrated that in a single agent environment, agent i selects a
best strategy from a set E* which is the remainder of E by removing all irrational
strategies. We also proved that all strategies in E* are indifferent to one another. Let
us now consider the CIP problem < A, E, 7r > when there is more than one agent in
A. Let us first define E* as a set of unification of E} {i £ A), i.e.,
S* = f| s* (3.25)
i(zA
then there are two possibilities:
1. E* (f) — the Ideal cooperative interaction: In this case, there is at least
one member in E*. Since, according to Equation 3.25, every member, namely
<7*, in E* should be in £* (i € A), a* is one of the most preferable strategies for
all agents in A. In this case, the cooperation is ideal and becomes simple: agents
only need to coordinate to find a member of E*.
2. E* = (f> — the Difficult cooperative Interaction: In this case, there does
not exist any strategy that is the most preferable for all agents. In this case,
cooperation will be difficult.
We are interested in the difficult cooperative interaction in which there does not exist
any strategy that is the most preferable to all agents in A.
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3.7.2 Cooperative Interaction between Benevolent Agents
Definition 3.5 In a CIP situation < .4, E, < 7Ti,7T2, ..., 7Tj,... >>, we say a cooperative
strategy o (G E) is irrational for A if and only if there exists a strategy o (6 E) such
that cr is preferable to o for A, i.e.,
a y A a (3.26)
Borrowing the way we used to deal with decision-making in a single agent environment,
we construct a set E^:
E*A = remove-irrationals(E, A) (3.27)
Then E^ is the remainder of E by removing all irrational strategies for A.
Theorem 3.2
E* 7^ (f) => E*a = E* (3.28)
In other words, if there exist strategies in E that are the most preferable for A, then
remove-irrationals(E, A) is a feasible procedure for choosing all of these strategies.
Proof:
(1) Suppose a* is a member of E* then it is a member of E* (i € A) according to
Equation 3.25. Since o* is a member of E* (i E A), according to Theorem 3.1,
we have,
Vi(E A)a(e E)(T* y i a (3.29)
This is equivalent to
Vi(E A) E)<7 i a* (3.30)
This is equivalent to saying,
^ct(e e)ct y A cr* (3.31)
Therefore, according to Definition 3.5, a* is not irrational for A, therefore,
it should not be removed from E when remove-irrationals(E, A) is applied.
Therefore, o* should be a member of E^. We can now conclude
E* C E^ (3.32)
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(2) Suppose a strategy, namely aA is a member of £^, then
fla(e £)<r > A oA (3.33)
since, otherwise, it will be removed. However, Equation 3.33 is equivalent to
Vi(€ A) E)yi o'A (3.34)
or
Vi(e -4) ct(€ E)o*a >: i aA (3.35)
Therefore, aA should be a member of each E* (i G A) according to Definition 3.3.
Since £* is the unification of £* (t 6 .4), therefore we conclude
E^ C E* (3.36)
(3) According to Equation 3.32 and Equation 3.36, we conclude
£^ = £* (3.37)
□
Theorem 3.2 says that if there exists any strategy that is the most preferable for all
agents in A, then agents can cooperatively obtain it by assuming that they are all
benevolent.
Theorem 3.3
E ^ (f> =► £^ ^ 0 (3.38)
In other words, if £ is not empty, then there exists at least one member in £^.
Proof
The proof is similar to Theorem 3.1. □
Theorem 3.4 Suppose there are more than two members in £^, then
Vcr a (£ £^)3z(G A)a >- i o => 3j{€ A)o >- j a) (3.39)
In other words, if there exist two arbitrary strategies, namely a and o in £^ such that
a is preferable to a for one agent, namely agent i, then there exist at least one agent,
namely agent j such that a is preferable to a for agent j.
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Proof
Suppose there does not exist an agent j such that
<7 >- j a (3.40)
then we will have
Vj(eA)a>zj a (3.41)
since we also assume that
a >- i o (3.42)
According to Definition 3.5, we will have
a y A G (3.43)
And therefore, a is a irrational strategy for A and it must not be in E^. This
is contradictory to our hypothesis. □
3.7.3 Discussion
Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 illustrate what rational, benevolent agents can do and
what they cannot do. More specifically, when agents in A all have a strategy that is
the most preferable for them, then Theorem 3.3 says that this strategy can be achieved
by assuming agents are rational, benevolent. For example, in a game with the payoff
matrix illustrated in Figure 3.6, agent 1 could easily drop a\ and choose strategy a\
which is the most hopeful for agent 2 which would like to choose when agents are
assumed to be benevolent. If agents are not assumed to be benevolent, then agent 1
could possibly choose a\ by which its payoff is also guaranteed to be 10. However,
in many interactive situations cooperation is not expected to be as easy as given in
Figure 3.6. In Example 3.3, when they are assumed to be benevolent, they can easily
drop plans that say that they do not go together. However, they could not be able
to unanimously concentrate on any of the two remaining interactions: going to the
theatre together or going to the football match together.




Figure 3.6: An Example of Ideal Cooperative Interaction
3.8 The Idea of a Common Sense Principle
3.8.1 Solutions to Cooperation from Game Theorists
Perhaps the most important contribution to cooperative games is the Nash Solution
to the Two-person Bargaining Set [Nash 51]. Nash constructed a bargaining set which
consists of several possible joint cooperative strategies for the the two players, agent 1
and agent 2. For each strategy agent i (E A = {1,2}) receives a payoff of u;(E 9?). The
payoff pair (tq, V2) is therefore a point in 5ftx5ft domain. Nash located all possible payoff
pairs on a continuous convex region on the 5ftx5ft plane as shown in Figure 3.7 (each
point on the convex is a payoff pair for a strategy). Nash defined several axioms each
of which points out what a solution should be. For example, if the bargaining set is
symmetric, (i.e., existence of payoff pair (a, b) means the existence of payoff (5, a)), then
the solution should be symmetric as well. According to these Axioms, Nash proved
that there exists a unique solution to the bargaining set, and the solution maximises
f(vi,V2)
f{vI.U2) = ("1 - u?) * (V2 - v°)
For each strategy agent i (E A = {1,2}) receives a payoff of V{(£ 5ft). The payoff pair
(^1,^2) is therefore a point in 5ftx5ft domain. It is also required that possible payoff
pairs should be located on a continuous convex region on the 5ftx5ft plane as shown
in Figure 3.7 (each point on the convex is a payoff pair for a strategy). As pointed
out by Harsanyi [Harsanyi 77], Nash's solution is equilibrium cooperation. We can
consider the Nash Solution is obtained in the following way: the axioms limit the




Figure 3.7: The Nash Bargaining Set
agents' attempts to achieve higher payoffs, while rational agent assumptions encourage
agents to achieve higher payoffs. Agents will finally agree on a strategy from which
none of the agents has the incentive to move: such a move will either be inconsistent
with the axioms or yield a lower payoff.
Focal point is another concept for cooperative game. Schelling [Schelling 60] argued
that, in a game with multiple equilibria, anything that tends to focus the players'
attention on one equilibrium may make them all expect it and hence fulfill it. For
example, in the Battle of the Sexes (see Example 3.3), if the couple are living in a
maternal society, then they will all agree that ladies' wish should be more respected
than men's. In this case, the couple may focus on the strategy of going to the theatre
together.
3.8.2 Solutions to Cooperation from DAI Researchers
Assumption-based cooperative interaction by Rosenschein and Genersereth (e.g.,
[Rosenschein 85] [Rosenschein & Genesereth 88]) suggests that cooperative solutions
can be obtained based on agents' behaviour motivated by their assumptions about
themselves and about other agents. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma (see Ex¬
ample 3.4), Rosenschein and Genersereth argued that agents can finally concentrate on
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the (deny, deny) strategy according to reasoning about each others' behaviour based
on their assumptions about each others' behaviour.
The focal point concept is also studied in DAI [Kraus Sz Rosenschein 92]
[Fenster et al. 95]. For example, in DAI [Kraus Sz Rosenschein 92], a model of co¬
operative interaction is presented in which agents are given knowledge about focal
points which are the distinguishing properties of strategies. Uniqueness, for example,
may become a focal point that could guide two conflicting agents' cooperation to
converge to a cooperative strategy. The following example which we quoted from
[Kraus Sz Rosenschein 92] may explain to the reader further the concept of a focal
point:
Imagine two players on a TV game show. The MC explains to the players
the simple rules of the game: each is to go to a separate, private room, where
they will be handed a pile of 100 $1 bills. They are each, in isolation, to
divide the single pile into two piles, A and B, with any distribution of bills
between the piles. Their distributions will then be announced, and if they
are identical (i.e., the players' A piles are the same size, and their B piles
are the same size), they will each win a Mercedes. If their distributions are
not identical, they will receive the consolation prize (a home version of the
game). ...
... experiments with a game of this type [shows] that the overwhelming
majority of players chose to divide the 100 $1 bills into two equal piles, 50
bills in each.
Hence, the strategy < 50,50 > becomes the focal point of the game.
3.8.3 Cooperative Interaction in Open systems and Non-open Sys¬
tems
Game theory, with its interesting name and interesting models, has fascinated many re¬
searchers in many areas such as social science, psychological studies, economics studies,
etc throughout the past several decades. Recently, game theory has become an inter¬
esting topic in DAI field (e.g. [Ephrati Sz Rosenschein 94], [Zlotkin Sz Rosensein 96].
[Kraus Sz Wilkenfeld 90], etc.). One important assumption under which this work
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was carried on is that agents do not have a social goal. The research objective of
this work is almost the same: investigating mechanisms that could guide cooperation
between conflicting agents to converge to a resolution. In this work, there is a com¬
mon implicit assumption: apart from agents' rational, benevolent and fully-informed
assumptions, agents need have some more knowledge such as focal points. Where does
this extra knowledge come from? It comes from the view points of these researchers
and these view points come from these researchers' investigation on human behaviour
and imagination (e.g. focal points, symmetrical strategies — if the two players are
symmetrical (e.g., in the Battle of the Sexes), since the payoff matrix is symmet¬
rical, therefore, the cooperative strategy must yield a symmetrical pair of payoffs —
the two agents have to have the same payoff, no matter what cooperative strategies
they choose). In DAI, in term of the global objective, there are mainly two types
of the multi-agent system. The first type is called the open system, and the second
type is what we call the non-open system. In an open system, there are no possib¬
ility for global control or global success criteria, or even a global representation of a
system [Hewitt 86][Agha & Hewitt 85][Agha & Hewitt 86]. Open systems are systems
that have the following features:
• They are composed of independently developed parts in continuous evolution;
• They are concurrent and asynchronous, and they have decentralised control based
on debate and negotiation;
• They exhibit many local inconsistencies;
• They consist of agents with bounded knowledge and bounded influence;
• They have no fixed global boundaries visible to the agents constituting the sys¬
tem.
Since in an open system, there is no global success criteria, game-thoretical approaches
to modelling agents' behaviour in conflicting situations may be suitable. A recent
example is Zlotkin and Rosenschein's work on automated negotiation in stated oriented
domains [Zlotkin &; Rosensein 96]. They assume that automated agents are built by
separate, self-interested designers and their research focuses on designing protocols
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for specific domains that will get those agents to interact in useful ways. In this
cooperative interaction situation, interaction is carried out according to intentions
of different designers. However, there are many DAI systems where global success
evaluations are necessary. For example, a DCSP problem is often associated with
a global goal (e.g., in [Adler et al. 89] the global objective is to maximise the total
number of constraints being satisfied). In this case, agents' behaviour must be bounded
to actions that can lead to the global goal achievement. So, for example, a DCSP
with the global objective aforementioned, each agent must make its effort to satisfy
as many of its own constraints as possible. In a case of a conflict in which two or
more agents' local solutions are not compatible, then they must agree on an agreement
that (1) is locally consistent, (2) is globally consistent, and (3) satisfies the maximal
number of constraints. Most application DAI models have global objectives, they can
be explicitly expressed or implicitly described. These global objectives come from the
user's requirements. For example, in the Battle of the Sexes, game theorists could not
find a cogent decision on choosing going to the theatre together or going to the football
together. We may suggest many different reasonable ways of solving the problems (e.g.,
let the two agents toss a coin to decide where they will go). When there is no social
goal for the two agents, we may say any solution is good or we may say none of them
is reasonable. So, what is the best solution is not discussed between the two rational
agents, but between ourselves — those who are studying the game. However, when
there are social goals, then some games may be easy. For example, if we have a global
objective 7r(<r) which is the sum of the wife's utility ir\(cr) and the husband's utility
7T2(cr), i.e.,
7r((7) = 7T] (a) + 7T2(cr) (3.44)
then the arguing between the husband and the wife will be easily solved: either solution
(going to the theatre together or going to the football together) is an optimal solution
in the global sense, since they both yield the same value, 5, by the global objective
function 7r(cr). So, in this case, if the wife proposes going to the theatre then the
husband should agree on it without delay. In other words, the husband's local objective
(which suggests that it is better that they both go to the football match) should be
subordinated to the global objective. To summarise the discussion in this paragraph
we have:
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• In an open system, when agents are in conflict, a conflict resolution can be sought
according to a set of axioms or assumptions. These axioms or assumptions comes
from the researchers' viewpoints which might come from these researchers' own
social sense or come from their investigation on human behaviour exhibited in
conflicting situations.
• In a non-open system, agents, like those in an open system, have their own local
objective to achieve. Conflicts exist between them due to their local goals. If
conflicts happen, then agents should subordinate their local objectives to the
global objective.
3.8.4 Our Solution to Cooperation: Common Sense Principle
We have discussed that in non-open systems, there are global objectives expressed
explicitly or implicitly. The knowledge about global objectives should be downloaded
to each agent. However, since agents have already been downloaded with their own
local objectives, there is possibility that these local objectives are in conflict with the
global objective in some situations. As we mentioned before, in this case, agents' local
objectives should be subordinated to the global objectives.
In most DAI problems, agents are computational entities created by the system de¬
signers to carry out some tasks in a distributed ways. Agents have been told their own
objectives, and are expected to achieve their own objectives as well as possible so that
the global objectives can be best served. In this sense, all agents must be rational. The
benevolent agent assumption is also necessary for improving social performance. When
agents are assumed to be rational and benevolent, to some extent, as we have proved
in previous sections, agents are able to cooperate: they will be able to concentrate
only on a subset, E^, of E. In this subset, all interactive strategies are not irrational.
Sometimes, the size of E^ can be very small and we believe that the smaller the size of
E^, the easier it will be for the cooperation to converge to a cooperative strategy. On
the other hand, however large E^ is, as long as it consists of more than one strategy
and agents have conflicting viewpoints about which strategy to choose, the cooperation
will not possibly continue if agents are merely assumed to be rational and benevolent.
Agents must be given new knowledge. The new knowledge we propose here is called the
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common sense principle. The idea of a common sense principle is described as follows:
By rational and benevolent assumptions, becomes the possible cooper¬
ative interaction strategies. Assume it is a difficult cooperative situation,
i.e., £* = (f) (see Section 3.7.1), then any agent's move in attempt to gain
a higher payoff will mean at least another agent's lost of payoff. In this
case, cooperation will be guided by a common sense principle which sug¬
gests what a cooperative strategy should be (therefore it also implies what
a cooperative strategy should not be). Once agents are given the common
sense principle, they can continue their cooperation by dropping all those
strategies that can not meet the principle. When there is only one strategy
that satisfies the principle then the strategy will be the cooperative strategy.
If no cooperative strategy can be found that meets the principle, then fur¬
ther common sense principle will be introduced to carry the cooperation
forward until such a strategy is found.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the difference between approaches to CIP problems in open sys¬
tems and approaches to CIP problems we proposed to non-open systems. A common
sense principle takes part in a role the same as that of axioms or assumptions in open
system approaches. However, a common sense principle is an incarnation of an global
objective. For example, in the Battle of the Sexes, if the global objective is to maxim¬
ise the sum of their individual payoffs, then a common sense principle might be "the
strategy will be decided by a result of tossing a coin". Whichever the result of tossing
a coin is, the sum is always 5. In this case, the result is decided by nature.
3.9 Example of Common Sense Principles
There are many ways of transforming an objective into other forms. The following are
a few examples. We only consider two-agent cooperative interaction.
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A global goal exists explicitly or implicitly.
Agents are given a common sense principle
that suggests a solution in the sense of
global goal achievement.
Figure 3.8: Road Forks of Open Systems and Non-open Systems
3.9.1 The Global Objective Function is the Sum of Local Objective
Functions
In a CIP situation < A, £, < 7ri, 7r2 >>, suppose there is a global objective n
*(<*) = E m = {1'2)) (3-45)
ieA
Suppose E has a continuous domain and ^ exists (i G A), then an optimal solution
might satisfy
(ITT d-Ki „
-r = Y~r1 = 0 (3.46)da ~ da
i€A
or
? = (3-47)da da
So, Equation 3.47 has transformed the global objective function 7r(cr) which is a soft
constraint into a hard constraint. Since it is a constraint concerning two agents, it is
an inter-agent hard constraint.
For example, in the Cake-sharing Domain (see Example 3.1), suppose a is the portion
for agent 1, then agent 2 will get a portion of 1 — cr, the sum of their local objectives
will be:
7r(a) = hi(a) -I- /i2(1 — &) (3.48)
A road fork where open systems
and non-open systems go apart
Agents are assumed to have social sense:
(Axioms-based. Assumption-based, etc.)
A Road Fork where open systems




Agents are rational and benevolent
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suppose also
hi(x) = x2 (3.49)
then from Equation 3.48 and Equation 3.49, we have a common sense principle:
cr = l -a (3.50)
The principle says that the two agents' portions should be equal.
3.9.2 The Global Objective Function is the Product of Local Object¬
ive Functions
In a CIP situation < A, E, < ir\, 1T2 >>, suppose there is a global objective 7r
*(") = E[ 7r'(<T) M = {L2}) (3.51)
ieA





Equation 3.53 transformed the global objective Equation 3.52 which is a soft constraint
into a hard constraint. It is also an inter-agent constraint.
So, in Example 3.1, suppose h{(cr) remains the same as given in Section 3.9.1, then
from Equation 3.53 we have:
- = 7^— (3.54)o 1 — a
3.10 Characteristics of a Common Sense Principle
It is obvious that to achieve different social goals we need different common sense
principles. Different application domains will have different common sense principles.
We are not able to give a general common sense principle that can be applied to all
application domains, but the following characteristics may be necessary to be exhibited
by a common sense principle.
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1. A common sense principle is a hard constraint. Since a common sense principle
only points out what is a solution or what is not a solution, it is not relaxable at
the agent level. This characteristic is required based on the following considera¬
tion:
In a multi-agent system, each agent has been given a local objective to
achieve. It is a soft constraint and it is relaxable at the agent level. A
global objective should not be relaxable at the agent level. Otherwise,
it seems not necessary from the beginning to let each agent have a
local objective, because each local objective should be always subor¬
dinated to the global objective. On the other hand, if all agents, when
their local solutions are in conflict, are seeking compromise based on
the global objective, then the research topic should be classified into
the multi-agent coherence coordination problem which concerns how
several agents can effectively coordinate to avoid "extraneous" activity
and conflicts to performing some collective activity (e.g., [Gasser 84]
[Gasser 86] [Bendifallah & Scacchi 87]). Further, a common sense prin¬
ciple in form of hard constraints is analogical to common sense in hu¬
man negotiation that drives negotiators to agree on an agreement that,
from either negotiator's perspective, is in accordance with the common
sense. For example, in the Cake-sharing domain, although each agent
wishes have a large portion of the cake, if they both have common
sense "the elderly should have a larger portion than the junior", then
they will agree at least on that the elderly should have more than
50% of the cake. Here, the common sense is given in form of hard
constraints rather than in form of soft constraints. In short, common
sense principles given in form of hard constraints make it possible that
all agents in the whole process of cooperative interaction consistently
and continuously stick to their local objective.
2. A common sense principle suggests a social equilibrium. By social equilibrium I
mean this principle will imply a strategy and if any agent attempts to move from
this strategy it will not increase the social goal achievement.
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3. A common sense principle should be efficient. By efficient we mean it can help
conflicting agents to reach an agreement as quickly as possible.
4. A common sense principle should be simplistic. By simplistic, we mean the com¬
mon sense principle involves little computational time and little communication.
Although a complex common sense principle may be necessary in some difficult
situations, simplicity is always sought if cooperative situations allow.
3.10.1 Social Languages
A common sense principle can be expressed as
PRINCIPLE(Li(cr),L2(cr),...,L,(CT),...) (i £ A)
we call Li(cr) the social state of agent i if a becomes an agreement. For example,
in two-agent negotiation, if the global objective is the sum of the two agents' local
objective, then
^
and the common sense principle can be:
(3.55)
PRINdPLE(LlW,L2(a)) = {^^ =^ (3.56)
If the global objective is the product of the two agents' local objective, then
(* {
t f the tv
1 (3 57)
L2(o) = J
and the common sense principle is in the same form as Equation 3.56.
Note that, here an agent's (agent i) social state is described by Li(a) instead of 7t2(cr).
The reason is very simple, which evaluates agent i's state individually is not
comparable. This is the same reason as we found in human interactions. For example,
when an American buyer and a Canadian seller are bargaining over the price of a
product, they would probably offer their price in term of the US dollars instead of
the Canadian dollars. Here the US dollar becomes the common language. For this
reason, we call Li(cr) the social language. Briefly, when agents exchange proposals
in discussion of choosing an agreement, they must describe their own state in social
language. Now, when asked how much o is worth, agent i can say "it is worth Li(cr)".
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Figure 3.9 illustrates the conflict resolutions in the Cake-sharing domain suggested by
common sense principles, (a) (c) show the conflict resolution in a CIP situation where
the global objective is the sum of the local objectives and (b) (d) show the conflict
resolution in a CIP situation where the global objective is the product of the local
objectives.
3.10.2 An Example of Using Common Sense Principle to Solve the
Prisoner's Dilemma
As we mentioned before, in Example 3.4, cooperative agents will probably choose
(deny, deny) as their joint strategy. This is also the solution suggested by many
researchers' work. For example, Rosenschein [Rosenschein & Genesereth 88] derived
this solution by assuming that each agent has various assumptions about itself and
about the other agent. Axelrod ([Axelrod 80], [Axelrod 87]) shows that the (deny,
deny) strategy can be achieved through the use of evolutionary algorithms. Now, we
construct a situation of the Prisoner's Dilemma (see Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11). In
this situation, according to Rosenschein's reasoning in [Rosenschein & Genesereth 88],
the two agents' cooperative interaction would still converge to the (deny, deny) strategy.
His reasoning does not involve any arithmetic calculation. In this situation, there
might be a possibility for agents to agree on the (confess, deny) strategy or the (deny,
Figure 3.9: An Example of the Common Sense Principle
CHAPTER 3. COOPERATIVE INTERACTION 65
agent 2
of (deny) of (confess)
<rj (deny) (5,5) (4.990,100)
o2 (confess) (50,4.990) (4.999,4.999)
Figure 3.10: Payoff Matrix of the Prisoner's Dilemma
pure strategy Index n probability pn payoff 7r™ payoff fif?
(confess, deny) 1 Pi 50 4.990
(deny, deny) 2 P2 5 5
(deny, confess) 3 P3 4.990 100
(confess, confess) 4 Pi 4.999 4.999
Figure 3.11: Another Version of the Prisoner's Dilemma
confess) strategy, since the denying agent only loses a payoff by 0.002 compared with
that of his payoff from the (deny, deny) strategy. We can construct a CIP problem
< A, E, < 7Ti, 7T2 >> for this situation:
A = { 1,2} }
£ = {<Pi,P2,P3,P4 > I o <p„ < 1; Y.iPn = 1; " = 1,2,3,4} I (3.58)
= E^=i KPn J
It can be easily proved that a subset, E^, of E, which is given by
s = {< P1,0,P3,0 > | 0<pi,p3 < 1; Pi+p3 = 1} (3.59)
satisfies (1) for all strategies in £},, it is preferable or indifferent to any strategy in £
in both agents' perspectives. We can also prove that for any two different strategies,
< 0,pi,p3,0 > and < 0,^,^,0 > suppose agent 1 and 2's payoff's are respectively
7Ti,7TJ and 7T2,7T2, then
7Ti >- 1 7Tj =» 7T2 -< 2 7T2 (3.60)
So, is obtained from E by removing all irrational strategies, i.e.,
E^ = remove-irrationals(E,A) (3.61)
Actually, the subset construct a line as shown in Figure 3.12. Let us suppose that
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Figure 3.12: Another Version of the Prisoner's Dilemma
there is a global objective which is the product of the two agents' utilities
7r = 7Ti7T2 (3.62)
In Equation 3.59, each strategy can also be expressed by
a —< 0, a, 1 — a, 0 > 0 < al
tri = 50a+ 4.998(1 -a) 1
P2 = 4.998a + 100(1 — a) J
and we then have:
r / dix\ /_ 45.002
—
dc /T2 — 50<r+4.998(l-<r) I
T i \ _ d.TT'2 /_ 95.002 |E2\0) ~ da /7T2 — 4.998cr+100( 1—a) J
Solving this equation, we have
a = 0.7580
So, if this global sense, they would probably agree on a strategy
< 0,0.758,0.242,0 > (3.67)
That is, they would agree on that they use the (confess, deny) strategy with a probab¬
ility of 0.758 and the (deny, confess) strategy with a probability of 0.242. In this case,
their payoff pair is (39.110, 27.988), much better in both agents' perspectives than that
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3.11 Further Discussion on the Concept of a Common
Sense Principle
3.11.1 The Role of a Common Sense Principle
Our understanding of the role of a common sense principle is that it guides agents'
cooperative behaviour in a cooperative interation situation. The common sense prin¬
ciple's role can be likened to a law in a society which guides the members' behavior in
the society. The law can not fully control these members' behavior and these members
have a certain degree of freedom in how they should behave. Each individual in this
society may use any means to achieve what he/she wants to achieve as long as he does
not break the law. When disputes happen due to conflicts between individuals' goal
achievements, the law will be used to resolve the conflicts. Each individual must obey
the law. Each society (e.g., a nation) has a law different from that of other societies.
The law reflects the respective goverment's wishes about how its society should be run.
Likewise, a common sense principle reflects the system designer's wishes about what
should be achieved from the system's performance. The common sense principle can
not fully control the behaviour of the agents in the system. They have a certain degree
of freedom in their own goal achievments. They can use any means to achieve what
they wish. When there is any conflict between agents' goal achievements, the common
sense principle could be applied to resolve it.
So, a common sense principle is not exploited to degrade the distributedness of a multi-
agent system but to upgrade the performance of the system so that it produces results
that are prefered by the system designer especially when the system is a non-open
system.
3.11.2 Practical Considerations
The following points should be considered in an application domain:
1. So far, Li(cr) is given in a form of the first order differential of agent «'s utility.
This might not be practical in some application domains where TTi(cr) is not
explicitly expressed, or where does not exist due to o is not a continuous
domain. In this case, a common sense principle may be given in other forms.
CHAPTER 3. COOPERATIVE INTERACTION 68
For example, a common sense principle may be given in the form of a production
rule:
IfLi(a) is ... and Z/2(c) is ..., then choose o as the cooperative strategy.
Here l\(g) describes agent z's social state which may not be in the form of the
first order differential. Whatever, the form of a common sense principle is, it
should be endowed with the characteristics we examined in Section 3.10.
2. In some situations, we may not be able to derive a satisfactory common sense
principle in the first trial due to the complexity of the application domain. In this
case, a common sense principle may be obtained through experiments, through
learning processes. We may also borrow some assumptions and axioms that are
used for cooperative interactions in open systems.
3. There might exist also situations where a common sense principle suggests several
strategies. For example, for a principle,
there might be several strategies <ti,<72,... which satisfy this equation. In this
case, a further common sense principle is necessary to carry the cooperative
interaction forward. We can view a common sense principle as a heuristic in the
sense that it pruned the cooperative interaction strategy set gradually, until it
consists of only one strategy (which is then the cooperative strategy).
3.12 Summary: Cooperative Interaction Under a Com¬
mon Sense Principle
In this section, we will summarise the discussion in the last two sections, and form¬
ally present a solution for a cooperative interactive problem under a common sense
principle. We denote such a CIP problem by
Li(a)=L2(a) (a 6 S) (3.68)
l
< .4,E,C7I7^7~TX'< LI, L2.... >, PRINCIPLE^, L2,...) >
or by a brief notation
< A, E, 7r, L, PRINCIPLE >
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A solution to this CIP problem is in E*:
E* = {rr | <7 P £*,; PRINCIPLE(u) = TRUE}
T."a — remove-irrationals(£,.A)
In other words, the whole cooperative domain E will be reduced to E^ by cooperation
between conflicting agents under the rational agent assumption and the benevolent
agent assumption and VA will be further reduced to Ec by cooperation between these
conflicting agents under the common sense principle. If £c exists only one member
then the member is the agreement between those conflicting agents. If there is more
than one member in it, then a further common sense principle must be introduced
to let the cooperation continue. That is to say, a cooperative strategy may be found
after several common sense principles are called. However, how many common sense





This chapter focuses on cooperative interactions between agents with incomplete know¬
ledge about other agents. We will present a formal definition of negotiation. We
emphasise the distinction between situations in which our definition can be applied,
and the human negotiation situation. Due to these distinctions, we call negotiation
defined in this thesis metaphor-based negotiation. As a complement to this definition,
we constructed a computational negotiation model which details the metaphor-based
negotiation.
4.2 Revisit CIP Problems Under Fully informed Agent
Assumption
A solution to the CIP problem
< A. E, it, L, PRINCIPLE >
is a member of £* given by Equation 3.69. For the reason of simplicity, we denote a
procedure for obtaining E* by:
best-proposals(.4. E, 7r, L, PRINCIPLE) (4.1)
A member of E*, according to the discussion in Chapter 3, can be achieved by two
steps:
70
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1. The first step is to obtain a subset, of £:
T,'a = rerriove-irrationals(E. A) (4.2)
This subset is achieved based on the rational agent assumption and the benevolent
agent assumption. In other words, a solution to the CIP problem must be a
strategy that is not irrational for the group A.
2. The second step is to obtain a subset, £*, of
This subset is derived by the common sense principle. In other words, a solution
to the CIP problem must be a strategy that does not contradict the common
sense principle.
So, it looks as if there were forces driving agents to a cooperative strategy (see Fig¬
ure 4.1). To obtain such a strategy, agents must be endowed with complete knowledge
Figure 4.1: The Compromise Driven by Rationality, Benevolence and Principle
about the problem domain, E, about their payoff functions ni(a) (i G A) which repres¬
ent their individual preferences over £, about the common sense principle PRINCIPLE,
and about their social states Li(a) (i G A). When agents are all assumed fully in¬
formed, then they have the complete knowledge about them. Under this assumption,
£* = [a | or G £*; PRINCIPLE(L{a)) = TRUE} (4.3)
71,
driven by rationality and benevolence
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a solution can be worked out by any of the agents. Once it is worked out by an
agent, no other agents can possibly object to it. So, communication is not necessary.
The discussion in Chapter 3 has two other related implicit assumptions that were not
mentioned there, i.e.,
1. Computational time is not considered. There we are concentrating on what
knowledge is required by cooperative agents to construct a cooperative strategy.
Computational time is not the major focus. This assumption should be removed
since computational time is often one of important requirements for a problem
solving application.
2. Agents have unlimited capacities of problem-solving. We assume that agents
can know £ prior to cooperation. For example, in the Postman Domain (see
Example 3.2), cooperative interaction between two postmen means exchanging
letters so that each postman's delivery cost, i.e., the travel distance, can be
shorter than in the situation where they do not cooperate. Even if they agree on
a common sense principle, e.g.,
C(X) - C(X0) = C(Y) - C(Y0) (XUY = X0U Y0) (4.4)
which says that the two agents' benefits from the cooperation should be equal,
there still exists a question of how to calculating C(X) and C(Y) which is actu¬
ally one of the Travelling salesman Problem [Aarts & Korst 89] which concerns
minimising the length of a salesman's tour that starting from and returning his
home city after visiting a certain number of other cities. This is known to be
a NP-hard problem. However, in Chapter 3, we implicitly assume that agents
are able to solve this kind of difficult problem. This is also an assumption not
acceptable in real problem-solving situations.
Considered in this way, the cooperative interaction problem under a common sense
principle is only solved theoretically.
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4.3 Partially Informed Agent Assumption
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In application domains, the fully informed agent assumption (Assumption 3.3) must
be replaced by a partially informed agent assumptions:
Assumption 4.1 Partial-Informedness Agents do not have the complete knowledge
about the CIP problem-solving.
We will breakdown this assumption into details in a later section.
The assumption of full-informedness of agents is not acceptable in many situations:
agents may not have enough memory for storing all sorts of information; communica¬
tion is limited due to bandwidth considerations; etc. How can agents with incomplete
knowledge cooperatively solve a problem? When agents are partially informed, a pro¬
posed cooperative strategy made by one agent according to its incomplete knowledge
may be objected to by the other agents from their perspectives that are based on their
own incomplete knowledge. When agents are assumed to be rational, such a conflict
will be very difficult resolve since no agent will concede to an alternative that could
possibly affect its own goal achievement. To get out this difficult situation, more in¬
formation must be given to agents. For example, in the ideal cooperative interaction
given in Figure 3.6, any misunderstanding between the two agents who are willing to
cooperate could lead to a strategy that is not (cr},o"i) which is the result that can
be achieved if agents are fully informed. If the two agents can have some ways of
exchanging their preferences, then no conflicts could arise during their cooperation.
4.4 Limited Communication between Agents
Communication between agents can help agents to improve their knowledge about
each other. However, communication must be limited due to (1) bandwidth limit,
(2) computational speed limit, and (3) memory limit. Therefore, we must be very
careful about what message these cooperative agents to communicate. Communication
between agents serves different purposes in different situations, for instance
• For sharing problem-solving knowledge. For example, if agent 1 has has solved
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one of his local problems. The result might be communicated to another agent
which has a similar problem to solve. For example, in the Distributed Vehicle
Monitoring Testbed developed at University of Massachusetts at Amherst [Corkill 82]
[Durfee & Lesser 87], experts (Blackboard) communicate data monitored and in¬
terpreted by each expert from a set of sensors to construct a global picture of
vehicle traffic through an acoustically sensed area. Agents are helping each other
in this form of communication.
• For coordinating agents' activities. For example, if two agents are moving a pile
of blocks from one place to another, they need to communicate to let each other
know which blocks each of them is to move, the time order in which each block
is moved. They communicate in order to avoid potential conflict (e.g., the two
agents unnecessarily go to move the same block which only needs one agent).
• For exchanging information for resolving conflicts monitored among agents. We
are particularly interested in conflicting situations where agents are all rational,
benevolent and try to gain something from the communication. In this case,
communication may be different from that in the above two situations where
agents are helping each other. The content of information that is exchanged
between agents through communication must be those that can efficiently help
them to concentrate on conflict resolutions. When we assume agents are ra¬
tional, communication is self-interest-oriented, and much like a process found in
human negotiation, so we call it metaphor-based negotiation. We emphasise it is
metaphor-based in order to distinguish between it and real human negotiation.
A definition of metaphor-based negotiation is given in Section 4.7.
So, negotiation and communication in this context has the same interpretation: ex¬
changing information between rational and benevolent agents in order to resolve their
conflicts. In human negotiation, there are many characteristics of negotiators' com¬
municating behaviour such as cheating, threatening, honestness, boasting, etc. Some
of these characteristics are necessary to endow to automated cooperative agents, some
are not. We will discuss this further in Section 4.7.2.
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4.5 Definitions of Negotiation
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Although there is a large amount of DAI research on negotiation, as Gasser [Gasser 90]
pointed out, negotiation is a term that has been used in literally dozens of different
ways in the DAI literature. In [Zlotkin & Rosenschein 91], it is claimed that there
does not yet exist a universally accepted definition of what the word negotiation even
means. Smith and Davis can be considered as pioneers of introducing the negotiation
concept into DAI. Their definition is as follows:
[Negotiation] [Davis & Smith 83] is a discussion in which the interested
parties exchange information and come to an agreement. For our pur¬
poses negotiation has three important components: (a) there is a two-way
exchange of information, (b) each party to the negotiation evaluates the
information from its own perspective, and (c) final agreement is achieved
by mutual selection.
Durfee and Lesser's [Durfee & Lesser 87] definition is:
In general, negotiation is a complex process of improving agreement (re¬
ducing inconsistency and uncertainty) on common viewpoints or plans
through the structured exchange of relevant information.
We can also find a definition in [Adler et al. 89]:
Negotiation is a process of communication established between two con¬
flicting agents in which they try to develop or refine their plans jointly so
that the goals of each are satisfied.
To my knowledge, nearly all negotiation definitions found in DAI are similar to those
listed above: they are easily understood, no one could even possibly point out they are
wrong. The similar definitions can also be found in politics studies, economics studies,
etc. For example, social scientist Brams [Brams 90] defined negotiation as
By negotiation I mean exchanges between parties designed to reconcile their
differences and produce a settlement.
CHAPTER 4. METAPHOR-BASED NEGOTIATION 76
More definitions of negotiation can be found in [Pruitt 81] [Sathi & Fox 89].
The common problem of these definitions of negotiation is that they provide no domain-
independent knowledge about how a problem can be solved in a negotiation mechanism,
no indication about what is a proposal expressed formally. We may find some implic¬
ation about the real meanings of negotiation from the computational models built
behind these definition, but often, we can find that these models makes us even more
confused. For example, in [Davis &: Smith 83], negotiation is communication between
the managers and the contractors (bidders) to allocate tasks. When a manager an¬
nounced a task to potentially interested bidders, each of these bidders can show their
interest by sending a piece of message to the manager. The manager then select a best
bidder. There is only a single round of information exchange. This seems very rare in
human negotiation.
4.6 Two Phases of Negotiation
In human negotiation, negotiation is a complex process. There exists no universally
acceptable procedure controlling such a process. But, according to our understanding
as presented in Chapter 3, the following two phases might be included in a negotiation
process:
• Phase 1: Negotiating over common sense principle. In human negotiation,
negotiators are often situated in a so-called open system where no social goals
can be found. When these negotiators try to resolve their conflicts, they need
to resolve their dispute based on common sense. These so-called common sense
principles are learned from their life-time experiences, or genetically inherited
from their ancestors. What is more, the precise form of common sense in use
can be argued about during their negotiation. For example, when the two agents
are discussing how to share a cake (see Example 3.1), the elder one might say
"The elder should have more than the junior, this is common sense", and the
younger one might say "Young people usually eat more than old people". Each
will bring what they called common sense as a principle for sharing the cake. So,
in this sense, common sense is negotiable. So, each agent is trying to convince
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his negotiating opponent(s) to agree on using a common sense principle that, in
his current knowledge, would yield a result in his favour. The convincing ability
of a negotiator depends very largely on his knowledge about the world and his
personality.
• Phase 2: Exchanging information relating to finding an equilibrium in accord¬
ance with a common sense principle agreed by all agents at Phase 1. Again, the
Cake-sharing Domain, if the two agents do not know each others' ages, and they
agreed that "The Elder should have more than the junior". Then they will now
tell each other their exact ages. In this case, the junior might lie by telling the
Senior his age bigger than his true age.
The two phases are exchangeably used in human negotiation, we sometime even can¬
not distinguish which is which. We, in this dissertation, do not focus our investigation
on the first phase. There are several difficulties to let agents to have abilities of ne¬
gotiating common sense principles. Firstly, automated agents do not have a cultural
environment as human negotiators. Human being are living a society where there are
certain standards about whom to respect, whom to hate, whom to blame, etc. These
standards constrain their behaviour. Automated agents do not have such an environ¬
ment, hence they do not feel shy, embarrassed, respected, etc. Secondly, automated
agents do not have the ability of genetic inheritance. Thirdly, automated agents do not
have the ability of re-creating a goal. For example, in human negotiation, for example,
in the Cake-sharing Domain, one of the two agents who at the beginning pretends to
require a large portion of the cake might intend to have a small portion to please the
other. We will avoid this source of confusion in our discussion. However, in future,
there might be the possibility of introducing this, more intelligent, phase into auto¬
mated agent systems. Actually, there are a certain number of researchers in AI field
who are interested in how agents can be created to be as intelligent as human beings
(e.g., [Bratman 87], [Burmester & Sundermeyer 92], [Jennings 94] etc.). So, we would
like to make it clear that although we do not assume agents' ability to negotiate over
common sense principles, we do not exclude the possibility of that this ability may be
assumed in future.
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4.7 Defining Metaphor-based Negotiation
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Motivated by the fact that there does not exist a formal definition of negotiation and
for the purpose of solving our application problem — AGVSP, we propose a formal
definition of metaphor-based negotiation.
4.7.1 Our Definition of Negotiation
Definition 4.1 Metaphor-based Negotiation is a process of communicating pro¬
posals between rational, benevolent and partially informed agents in a cooperative in¬
teraction situation
< A, E, tr, L, PRINCIPLE >
The process terminates when a proposal by one agent is accepted by all other agents in
A or when no new proposal could be possibly made by any of these agents.
1. A proposal, pi, by an agent i (€ A) is a two-tuple:
Pi =
where Oi is a cooperative strategy that is constructed according to agent i's current
knowledge, and li is a value describing its social state when Gi can be accepted.
Oi G E* = best-proposals(.4, E, n, L, PRINCIPLE)
h = L{(oi)
where E, it =< it\,pi2,... >, L =< >, and PRINCIPLE are all agent
i's current belief about the respective pieces of knowledge.
2. The condition for any receiving agent, namely agent j (€ i), to accept a cooper¬
ative strategy Oi from another agent i, is that agent j cannot construct a better
proposal. More specifically, suppose Oj is the best cooperative strategy for agent
j to propose according to its current incomplete knowledge, i.e.,
cr/i e E* = best-proposals(^4, E, 7r, L, PRINCIPLE)
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Note that here E, 7r =< 7Ti,pt2,... >, L =< >, and PRINCIPLE are
all agent j's current belief about the respective pieces of knowledge. Then, if
Oj < j Oi
then agent j must accept &i instead of proposing Oj.
4.7.2 Features of the Definition
Our definition has the following main features:
1. It clearly states the problem domain, i.e., the CIP problem, to which the negoti¬
ation definition fits. As we have mentioned in the last chapter, many DAI prob¬
lems, such as the task allocation problem, resource allocation problem, DCSP
problem, etc., can be transformed into a CIP problem, our definition can be
taken as application domain-independent. As an application, we can see how
the AGVSP problem is solved by metaphor-based negotiation mechanism in the
later chapters.
2. It gives formal representation of a proposal.
3. A proposal consists a proposed cooperative strategy Oi and associated informa¬
tion L which represents the social state of the proposing agent. In other words,
when an agent puts forward a proposed cooperative strategy, it also tells the
opponents why the strategy is good by showing its social state under this co¬
operative strategy. A proposal in most negotiation models found in DAI means
only a cooperative strategy.
4.7.3 Why Negotiation is Metaphor-based?
As we have emphasised before, our negotiation strategy is metaphor-based which means
that the negotiation is not aimed at modelling human negotiation, but at applying our
knowledge about human negotiation for solving real problems. The following reasons
will further support our statement.
1. As we mentioned before, we do not assume agents' ability of negotiating over
common sense principles which is often negotiable in human negotiation.
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The system designer must download knowledge about global objectives to agents
that are created by him. In our definition, PRINCIPLE is this type of knowledge
that is given to agents at initial times. Common sense principle are not negotiable
in our definition.
2. We assume that agents are benevolent. In human negotiation it is not neces¬
sary to assume negotiators are benevolent. Cheating, threatening, hesitation,
malevolence, etc., are often useful characteristics to bring a dispute to a settle¬
ment. These methods are not acceptable in our definition. Although character¬
istics, such as cheating, may benefit the cheating agent on some occasion in open
systems [Zlotkin & Rosensein 96], we think they are not beneficial in non-open
systems. They only make an agent to spend longer time to process informa¬
tion received from other agents and, as a consequence, degrade the quality of
performance of the whole system.
3. Agents in our definition are created by the system designer for subproblem solv-
ings. Each agent is given an objective for solving its subproblem. It is assumed
that no attempt is made to alter the objective unless the system designer tell it
to do so. However, in human negotiation, negotiators are able to change their
goals during negotiation.
4.8 A Computational Negotiation Model
According to Definition 4.1, we develop a computational negotiation model. This
model has two-fold meanings. On one hand, it can be taken as a complement to
Definition 4.1. Many points such as communication procedure, updating knowledge,
conditions for agents to propose, etc., that are not clearly stated in the definition, are
clarified in this model. On the other hand, this model provides a framework for domain
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(1) initialising-agent(jf) (j £ A); ;; see Algorithm 4-2.
(2) i = l; ;; agent 1 is the first proposer
(3) i •$= {j | j £ A; j ^ i} ;; a set of receivers
(4) pi <— making-proposal(i)
(5) communication^, j,pi); (j € i) ;; see Algorithm 4-4-
(6) pj <— making-proposal (j); (j € i) ;; see Algorithm 4-3.
(7) if Vj(€ i) car(pj) = car(pi) then exit return car(pi) endif
(8) ifVj(€ i)car(pj) = 0 then exit return 0 endif
(9) Select an agent k (€ i) with pk ± 0;
(10) i <= k ;; agent k becomes the proposer.





agentvars: E, Ep, pj, pi;
functionvars: Lj(o), 7rj(cr), PRINCIPLE(L);
(1) initialising E, LRo), -nRo) PRINCIPLE(L)
according to domain specification
(2) Pj <- 4> (j e A)




localvars: j, fc, Ec, E"",p;
agentvars: pj ,pk, Ep;
functionvars: L,(cr);
(1) if Ep = ^ then goto 5 endif;
(2) Choose an agent, namely agent k, with pk ^ 0
(3) crk <- car(pie)
(4) updating-knowledge(i, A:, pk)
(5) Ec <— best-proposals(i)
(6) E** 4— {o | <7 G E*;cr £ Ep}
(7) if E" = 0 then p = 0 goto 13 endif
(8) Select an strategy, namely cr,, from E**;
(9) U «- ^(.rO;
(10) if Ep = 0 then p= (oi,li) goto 13 endif
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Algorithm 4.4





procedure updating-knowlege(z, j, p)
agentvars: E
functionvars: Lk,itk (k € A)
(1) updating E
(2) updating Lk,^k (k G A)
endprocedure
4.8.1 Some Notations
In the above two algorithms, there are several points to make:
1. localvars declares variables that only have effect in the procedure where they
are declared.
2. agentvars declares variables that belong to the respective agents. We can view
them as objects in object-oriented programming [Page & Thomas 89]. They can
be updated at any time and they can be used in only by the agent for which the
variables are declared. Note that these agent variables in principle can only be
assigned a value by the respective agent.
3. functionvars declares variables whose values are functions (or procedures), agents
variables and functionvars in regard to an agent are the agent's belief about
the knowledge represented by these variables or functions. This knowledge can
be modified when new information is received.
4. p,PjiPk,Pi represents proposals in form of (cr,/).
5. cri,0k are strategies.
6. Hp is a set of strategies that have been proposed by agent i before.
7. £* has the same interpretation as in Chapter 3.
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8. £** consists of strategies in E* that are not in £p (i.e., that have not been
considered before).
9. Li (a), TTj (a), PRINCIPLE are procedures and their interpretations are the same
as in Chapter 3.
10. i,j,k represent agents.
4.8.2 Comments on the Algorithms
Algorithm 4.1 is a procedure responsible for initialising a negotiation, coordinating
communication between agents, and terminating the negotiation procedure. Initial¬
ising a negotiation means downloading agents with initial knowledge about the prob¬
lem domain, about objectives, about their initial beliefs about themselves as well about
others. Communication is controlled by the procedure based on the principle that
every time there is only one proposer and the rest of the agents become the receivers
that could potentially become candidates for proposers in future. In this algorithm,
initialising-agent(i) (see Algorithm 4.2) is a procedure that assigns initial values to
agent z's agent variables and function variables. The procedure communication^, j,^)
(see Algorithm 4.4) is a process in which the sender sends out the proposal, and the
receiver receives the proposal, and as a result agent j's agent variable, Pj is reassigned
a value pi. They are very straightforward, therefore we did not list them here. The
negotiation procedure terminates according to the following two conditions:
• If all receivers respond to a proposer's proposal cr^ with the same strategy then
the procedure terminates and returns as the agreement (see step (7)).
• If, after a proposer proposes a proposal, no receiver responds, then the proced¬
ure terminates and returns no agreement ((f)) (see Step (8)). We can view no
agreement as a special agreement.
Algorithm 4.3 is a procedure that each agent uses to reason about the world. However,
each agent uses its own knowledge in its reasoning activities. When an agent receives a
proposal from another agent, its reasoning procedure can be divided into three stages
(1) updating current knowledge; (2) creating a set of proposal candidates, and (3)
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deciding whether to accept the proposal from that agent, or waiting for new knowledge
coming, or propose a new proposal. The third stage can further be detailed as:
• If it can not find a proposal better than that just received, than it will accept
that proposal just received (see step (10)).
• If it can not find any proposal (i.e., £* = 0), then it will make no proposal
(p = (f)) (see step (7)).
• Otherwise, it will make a proposal that has never been made before (i.e., the
proposed strategy Oi is in £**).
We may add more rules of accepting a proposal between step (11) and (12) in Al¬
gorithm 4.3. For example, we can add a no regret rule:
if Vcr £ T,pOk >z i (J then PROPOSAL = (a^) endif
which states that agent i must accept a proposal by another agent k, if it is preferable
or indifferent to any proposal (in Ep) agent i has made before. Adding such a rule could
possibly speed up the negotiation process. We leave this room for the application
domain system designer.
We also left a procedure updating-knowledge(i,j,pj) undefined. What knowledge
should be updated and how to update them largely depend on the application domain
the model is applied to. So, we think it is better to leave it open. For example,
in the cake-sharing example, agent i will have some incomplete knowledge about the
procedure Lj(a) of agent j. After communication, agent i received some proposals
(<rj,/j), (<7?,Zj), .... Based on these knowledge, an approximate procedure can be
worked out by polynomial approximate approaches. The more the proposals received
from agent j, the closer the approximate procedure will be. Sometimes, Lj(cr) could
be linear function. In this case, from a mathematical point of view, two proposals
from agent j are enough for agent i to precisely predict Lj(cr). We will use this linear
approximation method in the AGVSP negotiation model we developed (see Chapter
7).
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4.9 Summary
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In this chapter, we defined the term metaphor-based negotiation which tells us what
is a proposal, and what is the condition for an agent to accept a proposal made by
another agent. The definition is given in a more formal way than any negotiation
definition found in the literature to date. Our computational negotiation model based
on this definition describes the points that have not been explicitly expressed in the
definition. In other words, the computational model is a complement to the definition.
Chapter 5
Introduction to Kwa's Iterative
Negotiation Model
In this chapter, I shall introduce Kwa's Iterative Negotiation Model [Kwa 88a], [Kwa 88b]
that was designed to resolve resource conflicts in the AGVSP. His work in this direction
motivated us to take the subject of negotiation as the theme of this dissertation to in¬
vestigate further some major issues relating to cooperative interaction problem solving
that have not been solved in Kwa's model and other negotiation models found in the
DAI literature. We first overview Kwa's work on AGV movement planning briefly (see
Section 5.1), and then introduce his work on AGVSP in detail (see Section 5.2). For
the purpose of this dissertation, we reimplemented his negotiation model. An outline
of the reimplementation is given (see Section 5.3). After this, we raise some important
unsolved issues in Kwa's model (see Section 5.4).
5.1 Overview Kwa's Work on AGV Movement Planning
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, AGV movement planning involves task assignment,
route planning, and movement timings of the AGVs. Kwa [Kwa 88a], [Kwa 88b] in¬
vestigated these subjects at some depth.
5.1.1 Optimal Task Assignment
The task assignment problem is to determine how best to match a set of given tasks
to the available AGVs such that each AGV is assigned not more than one task. Op-
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timal task assignment means minimising the total distance which must be traversed
to achieve the given tasks. By minimising the travel distance, the running cost for an
AGV-based manufacture can be cut. The optimal assignment thus meets an econom¬
ical objective. Kwa developed a novel implementation of a global assignment algorithm
— the Hungarian method — which has been found to be more efficient than the con¬
ventional implementation.
5.1.2 Optimal Route Planning
Also, in order to satisfy the objective of economy, the same objective also requires
that every AGV minimise the route taken to achieve its assigned task. Basically, the
shortest path problem is the objective of optimal route planning. This is a searching
problem, one of the most important issues concerning search is searching efficiency
or computational speed. By examining existing searching approaches, especially the
bidirectional heuristic search (BS) and the A* searching algorithm. Kwa developed an
improved BS algorithm — BS* — which exploited all opportunities to achieve early
termination of search and information available during search to eliminate unpromising
nodes. Therefore the searching speed is greatly increased.
5.1.3 Tolerant Planning and Negotiation for AGVSP
Kwa argued that planning systems need to consider the difficulties of successful exe¬
cution to be useful in solving real world problems. A plan that is only logically correct
will be likely to fail due to possibility that the states of the world could change unex¬
pectedly according to our model. Therefore, plans must have a degree of executability
— the ability to cope with real world issues during execution. Also, when a plan fails,
it often needs to be repaired during execution. Therefore dynamic replanning may be
necessary. However, dynamic replanning can be expensive or is liable to be futile if it
fails to complete in time. Hence it is desirable to minimise or defer dynamic replan¬
ning as much as possible. Tolerant planning, which allows an activity to have more
resources than it logically needs, can make plans more robust, i.e. permitting the goal
to be achieved in spite of events which work against its successful execution. Therefore
tolerant planning increases the executability and at the same time reduces the need
CHAPTER 5. INTRODUCTION TO KWA 'S ITERATIVENEGOTIATION MODELSS
for frequent replanning.
However, tolerant planning raises another problem, i.e., resource conflict. Resources
are limited, allowing redundant resource allocation means more than logically needed
resources are requested. So, the chance of resource conflict during tolerant planning
is higher than that during non-tolerant planning. Kwa developed an Iterative Negoti¬
ation Model for resource conflict resolution. The idea and algorithm of the model are
introduced in the next section.
5.2 Iterative Negotiation Model for Resource Conflict Res¬
olution
5.2.1 Point-based vs Interval-based
In the case of the AGVSP, tolerant planning means interval-based scheduling instead of
point-based scheduling. A point-based schedule defines exactly the time instant when
an AGV will arrive at a position (Figure 5.1). It shows that an AGV departing from
A at time ta, moving at constant speed towards B, will arrive B at time fy,. It remains
at B until time ty (perhaps to pick up a load) before proceeding to C, arriving there







Figure 5.1: Graph of a Point-based Schedule
access to a position (Figure 5.2). The interval widths may vary: since an AGV is likely
to be late when a greater distance has to be traversed, the interval width should be
monotonically increasing with respect to distance travelled. As shown in Figure 5.3,







Figure 5.2: Graph of an Interval-based Schedule
an interval usually comprises front hedge, planned arrival time, waiting time, tolerance
and rear hedge. In a point-based scheduling scheme, an interval means the waiting
time only. So, the rest of the intervals listed above are all tolerance intervals for dif¬
ferent purposes. The front hedge and the rear hedge are two constant time-spaces in
distinguishing with the tolerance time space which varies according to travel distance.
Externally, point-based representation and interval-based representation of an resource
allocation are the same: each activity is assigned a piece of resource in terms of time-
space. However, they are different internally. In point-based representation, each
activity is assigned a fixed amount of resource which can be expressed by two vari¬
ables, i.e., starting-time and station of the time-space. In interval-based representation,
each activity is assigned some resource that could be shifted, reduced afterwards. So,
the resource must be expressed by at least three variables, i.e., starting-time, length,
and station of the time-space. Basically, interval-based representation requires more
memory space.
5.2.2 Tolerant planning aggravates resource conflicts
From Figure 5.3, we can obviously see that an interval-based schedule needs more time-
space resource than point-based schedules do, therefore eliminating chances for other
AGVs being assigned the resource used as redundant resource for the interval-based
schedule that could otherwise be used for these AGVs. Resources are often limited.
The more resources reserved by one activity, the less they will be available for other
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Figure 5.3: Component of a Reserved Interval
activities. Therefore there should be balance between ease of plan generation and plan
robustness.
5.2.3 Solving AGVSP in a Multiagent Environment
Without much arguing, Kwa suggested that an AGVSP problem can be solved in
a multiagent environment, taking each AGV as an agent responsible for assigning a
local schedule for itself. In this case, resource conflicts can be viewed as conflicts
between agents. Initially each agent constructs an interval-based schedule without
considering other agents' schedules. Then the agent checks whether this schedule has
been assigned any interval that overlaps with other agents' assignments. If there is
overlapping interval, then we say a conflict has occured.
5.2.4 Negotiation as a mechanism for Conflict Resolution
There are various possible approaches to resolving a conflict. Kwa's negotiation mech¬
anism is one of them. During negotiation, conflicting agents interchangeably concede
their initial demands (which are certainly the best assignments for their respective
schedules) by shifting their intervals or by shrinking (yielding) their intervals (see Fig¬
ure 5.4 and Figure 5.5).
5.2.5 Iterative Negotiation Model
A computational negotiation model is proposed by Kwa (see Algorithms A.l, A.2, A.3
and A.4). As claimed by Kwa, this model mimics many characteristics of negotiation,




Figure 5.4: Conflict Resolved by Yielding
some of which are described below:
• Conflict knowledge. An agent knows which other agent(s) it is in conflict with.
• Willingness to negotiate. Between any two agents in dipute, at least one must
be willing to attempt to resolve the conflict. In the absence of capital gains, it
is assumed that this motivation comes from altruism or benevolence imposed by
the system designer.
• Knowing the negotiable. An agent knows its own bottom line of negotiation,
although not necessarily that of other agents.
• Agents are selfish. An agent will minimise what it gives up to settle the conflict.
Each would hope that the gap of dispute can be narrowed by the other party's
effort rather than its own. In the context of multi-agent planning, the initial
tolerant plan of each agent is an "optimal" tolerant plan in the sense that any
yielding reduces its robustness and hence executability. Thus every agent should
want to practise the policy of being selfish, i.e., sticking as close as possible to
its initial plan.
• Negotiation is an iterative process




Figure 5.5: Conflict Resolved by Shifting
• Skillful negotiation. Every agent has a set of negotiation techniques to use.
• Nested negotiation. During negotiation between two agents, the concession by
one of the two agents by shifting its initially allocated resource may cause a
further conflict with a third party. In this case, the new conflict must be resolved
first through negotiation between that conceding agent and the third party.
5.2.6 Defining Negotiation Techniques and Skills
Kwa then defined various negotiation techniques each of which determines the way
of conceding. Techniques includes ShiftLeft, ShiftRight, YieldFrontHedge, YieldEnd-
Hedge, YieldFrontHedge&Shift, YieldEndHedge&Shift, YieldTolerance, YieldTol&Shift,
MoveLeft&Below and MoveRight&Above. The meanings of most of these techniques
are very plain, as we bear in mind that shifting means shifting an interval without
reducing the width of it and yielding means reducing the width of an interval without
shifting it. For example, ShiftLeft is a technique for reducing the overlap on its right
by shifting the whole interval to the left without reducing its width. MoveLeft&Below
and MoveRight&Above will be further explained as follows:
MoveLeft&Below is a technique for reducing the right overlap by shifting to the left by
CHAPTER 5. INTRODUCTION TO KWA 'S ITERATIVE NEGOTIATIONMODEL93
the required amount after intervals to the left and below have modified their tolerances
and/or hedges to allow such a shift. Likewise, MoveRight&Above is a technique for
reducing the left overlap by shifting to the right by the required amount after intervals
to the right and above have modified their tolerances and/or hedges to allow such a
shift.
Note that in a negotiation, some of techniques can not be used at the same time. For
example, ShiftRight and ShiftLeft are two techniques that move an interval into two
different direction, so they are not compatible and therefore can not be used at the
same time.
A negotiation skill is simply a set of negotiation techniques that are compatible. For
example,
(ShiftLeft YieldEndHedge YieldFrontHedge&Shift YieldTolerance MoveLeft&Below)
is a set of compatible techniques suitable for an agent that has an initially allocated
interval (which Kwa called RToken) in conflict with another Rtoken on its right reserved
by another agent. Several such skills have been defined by Kwa.
5.2.7 Implementation
Kwa implemented his iterative negotiation algorithm using the objected-oriented lan¬
guage Loops [Stefik & Bobrow 86]. Here is a simple example in his implementation to
show how conflicts can be resolved using the iterative negotiation model. The following
example is cited from [Kwa 88a] to show how does his model work (in Chapter 6, we
will give an example to show how does our spring-based negotiation model work when
the scenario is the same as one in this example).
Example 5.1 Suppose there are two agents X and Y. X will travel along a path (see
Figure 5.6):
(X$,X\Q,X\\)
and initially it reserves three Rtokens R\, R-2 and R3 at the respective stations, and Y
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will travel along a path
(£12>210,Z13)







Since R2 and R7 are two RTokens at the same station and they overlaps with each other,
therefore they are in conflict. This conflict can be resolved by Kwa's implemented model
in a way illustrated as below:
R2 and Rj are in conflict. Amount (amt) of conflict is 29.83.
R7: ShiftRight by 4.17, i.e. [259.17, 332.17] -> [263.33, 336.33]
Residue: 25.67
R2: ShiftLeft by 2.08, i.e., [217.50, 289.01] -> [215.42, 286.92]
Residue: 23.58
R7: YieldFrontHedge by 10, i.e., [263.33, 336.33] -» [273.33, 336.33]
Residue: 13.58
R2 YieldEndHedge by 10, i.e., [215-42, 286.92] -> [215-42, 276.92]
Residue: 3.58
R7: MoveRight&Above: ( Rg will shift right first before R7 can be shifted right).
ShiftRight by 3.58, i.e., [273.33, 336.33] -> [276.92, 336.33]
Residue: 0
CHAPTER 5. INTRODUCTION TO KWA 'S ITERATIVENEGOTIATIONMODEL95












Figure 5.6: Disposition of RTokens
5.3 Our Reimplementation of Kwa's Iterative Negotiation
We reimplemented Kwa's iterative negotiation model for the purposes of (1) examin¬
ing closely how various negotiation skills work, and (2) preparing some initial work
for further investigation — the implementation provides some fundamental work for
implementation of our Spring-based negotiation model. To reimplement the model,
we must consider the following requirements that have to be met by the negotiation
programme :
• The ability to find a resolution for the conflict. By ability is meant that a resolu¬
tion can be found if any exists. For a conflict there may exist several resolutions,
but it is of interest whether the negotiation process can find one of them.
• The minimum influence on other agents' plans. If two agents are in conflict,
it is better to resolve the conflict between them only without involving a third
agent for yielding resources. Otherwise there are problems which might result
from the chain reaction of nested negotiation. This does not mean that calling
a third agent is strictly prohibited. Over-emphasizing the spirit of altruism will
result in another problem of unbalanced overall robustness of the multi-agent
system, that is, the agents involved in the negotiation will severely compromise
their robustness for the sake of not asking a third agent to yield its resources.
Model
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• The fast speed of completing the negotiation. The speed must be fast enough
because negotiation is a dynamic procedure from the viewpoint of the whole
AGV planning system. If the speed is slow the negotiation will not serve the
purpose of overcoming the problem of frequent replanning.
To decrease the influence on other agents' plans, the negotiation skills can be combined
by using yield skills first and using shift skills after that. The fastest speed of completing
the whole negotiation process depends on several factors:
• The search strategy we choose.
• The computer programming language we use.
• The design of the negotiation program.
In this chapter we implement Kwa's interactive negotiation model, aiming to preserve
all the necessary information during negotiation so that it can be utilized to perform
backtracking in future work. We found that how the negotiation proceeds depends
largely on what negotiation techniques are used and how much resource is yielded in
every round. In our implementation, these two problems are solved by assuming that
a negotiation technique is chosen by selecting the first technique in a prioritized tech¬
nique list, and that the concession amount in every technique is a fixed number which
is given prior to the negotiation process. However, by doing so, the characteristics of
negotiation could not be sufficiently expressed. In the real case of negotiation, nego¬
tiation techniques and concession amount should be chosen dynamically according to
the updated information the negotiator can obtain.
The detail of our implementation is given in Appendix B
5.4 Discussion on Kwa's Model
During our reimplementation, the most difficult thing that we met is to choose appro¬
priate negotiation skills. According to Kwa's argument, these skills have to reflect the
characteristics of negotiating agents (e.g., selfishness, altruism, etc.). We believe the
characteristics presented by Kwa are right according to understanding about the term
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negotiation. However, Kwa did not model these characteristics into agents' knowledge.
For example, if an agent is selfish, then it will concede as little resource to others as
possible. However, what does "as little as possible" mean? Basically, we need a kind of
model that can tell how much the agent should concede in a formal way. As a complete
account for issues that have not been properly addressed, we listed them as follows:
• what to communicate?
Negotiation in Kwa's model means communicating proposals and a proposal
means a resolution to the conflict. So, during negotiation, agent will argue in
this way:
agent A I want the conflict to be resolved in this way.
agent B No, I do not agree. I want to the conflict to be resolved in that way.
In other words, negotiators do not present reasons why they want the conflict
resolution to resolved in their proposed way. This seems not the general way in
human negotiation. In human negotiation, negotiators often present resolutions
associated with supporting arguments.
• To what degree are agents autonomous?
Agents' autonomy is very limited. All negotiation skills are set for each agent
prior to negotiation. Choosing a negotiation strategy here means simply selecting
the first technique in a skill set. So, the strategies are not reasoned at agent level,
but by the system designer. This will bring a serious consequence, i.e., agents
cannot deal with situations during negotiation that have not been expected.
• Are there any global objectives?
It is obvious to us that the answer to this question is "yes". We need to let
agents have a sense of the global problem solving. However, this issue has not
been discussed in Kwa's model. To let agents have the sense of the global problem
solving does not mean to let agents to be controlled by a global controller (e.g., a
manager) but to let agents seek compromises according to wishes of the system
designer. We have clarified in Chapter 3 that to set a common sense principle
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(i.e., to let agent to have the sense of the global objective) is not for degrading
distributedness of a multiagent system but for upgrading individuals' perform¬
ance. We mean, in this sense, Kwa's model has to be improved by downloading
to agents some knowledge of the global objective. These agents are created by
the system designer and their knowledge is given by the system designer (e.g., the
conceding techniques and skills are created by the system designer), therefore,
their knowledge should reflect the designer's wishes.
• What is the belief of an agent about other agents?
Negotiating agents are situated in a multiagent environment. Each agent is an
expert for its own local problem solving. It can be assumed that (in Kwa's model)
each agent knows its own local scheduling perfectly. However, it is not assumed
to be fully informed about other agents' local problem solvings. We believe that a
good negotiating strategy for an agent should be reasoned by it based on its own
problem solving as well as problem solving of agents involved in the negotiation.
• What does it means that "an agent is selfish"?
Terms like "selfishness", "benevolence", "altruism" are well understood by us in
human activities. We can literally interpret them. However, we can not model
them if we do not have a formal definition of them. So, bringing these terms
into a scientific and technical discussion without being formally defined will only
make the discussion more ambiguous and confusing. Although Kwa claimed that
his model can display these characteristics of a negotiating agent, we did not find
any clue from it.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced Kwa's work on AGV movement planning, especially his
work on AGVSP. We detailed his iterative negotiation model and illustrated an example
of how conflicting agents cooperatively resolve a conflict by iterative concession. We
briefly introduced our reimplementation which is designed as a building environment
for further investigation into the AGVSP. Finally, we listed several important issues
that have not been addressed or solved in Kwa's model.
Chapter 6
The Spring Model for Local
AGV Scheduling
6.1 Introduction
This chapter details the domain specification of the AGVSP and proposes the idea
of the spring model for AGV local scheduling. We view the AGVSP as a Distributed
Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DCSP) which consists of several small Constraint
Satisfaction Problems (CSP) problems each of which is called a local AGV scheduling
problem, which concern the construction of a local schedule for an AGV. This domain
specification will specify intra-agent constraints as relations between variables relating
to each local schedule and inter-agent constraints as relations between variables relating
two local schedules (see Section 6.3). Constraints can be divided into hard constraints
which define the solution space for a CSP (or DCSP) problem and soft constraints which
define the quality of a solution. Realising that soft constraints are relaxable during
problem solving, we propose a spring-model for representing a local AGV schedule:
soft constraints are represented by springs, and hard constraints are represented by
other elements such as cylinders, walls, etc. The model is a representational model
which has two functions: (1) it suggests a local AGV schedule given a limited amount
of resources; (2) it suggests negotiation techniques when a local schedule is in conflict
with others.
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6.2 Prerequisites and Objectives
6.2.1 Prerequisites
The investigation which is described in the rest of the dissertation is carried out based
on our belief that the following viewpoints presented by Kwa about solving the AGVSP
problem are acceptable:
• Tolerant planning makes plans robust. So we will assume that agents' activities
will be assigned redundant resources on top of their logical demands.
• Tolerant planning increases the possibility of resource contention and therefore
conflict resolution is required. Multiagent approaches to conflict resolution are
suitable for an AGVSP problem. So, we will view the AGVSP problem as a
distributed problem consisting of several local AGV scheduling problems each of
which is solved by a respective agent.
• Negotiation is a suitable mechanism for conflict resolution. We accept the main
stream of Kwa's iterative negotiation model which is featured by (1) a global
AGV schedule is built in an incremental way, (2) each time a new local schedule
is built by an agent, the agent will make sure it is not in conflict with those
having been scheduled before, and (3) negotiation between the agent and other
agents with which it is in conflict is initialised by the agent.
6.2.2 Objectives
We have pointed out in Chapter 5 that there are several issues that were not addressed
in Kwa's iterative model. Some of the issues are related to general DAI research on
negotiation models and some of them are related only to the AGVSP. We have closely
examined general negotiation issues in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. After investigating
cooperation between rational, benevolent agents, we proposed the idea of a common
sense principle to solve a CIP problem in which one agent's gain means definitely at
least one of the other agents' loss. We have defined formally the term of (metaphor-
based) negotiation and proposed a computational negotiation model. As a specific
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application domain, we, motivated by some unaddressed important issues in Kwa's
model, will develop a spring-based model for representing a negotiating agent.
6.3 Domain Specification for the AGVSP
6.3.1 Layout of an AGV-based Factory
The layout of an AGV-based factory provides the general geometrical information
about the configuration of the area where AGVs move about, such as the location
of stations, junctions, the distance from one place to another, etc. The layout set T
contains the data we are concerned with
T =< X,Sl,A >
• X is the station set consisting all stations in the factory layout. A station here is
defined as a place on a path where loading/unloading is carried out or a junction.
• 0, is the arc set. Each member, arc, of Cl is a list described as follows:
arc = ({xhxk) v%ax dik t%tn) xt,xk 6 X
where, (xi, xk) represents a traversable path from station x/ to station xk. Between
xi and xk there exist no other stations. dik is the distance between the two sta¬
tion. u[Jax is the speed limit that each AGV is allowed to travel (we assume all
AGVs have the same speed limit on the same path). t™n is the shortest travel




Example 6.1 Layout: Figure 6.1 shows the layout of an AGV-based Electronics
Manufacture — Linn Product Ltd. Our implementation of the spring-based negoti¬
ation model is based on this layout. On this layout, at, bi,...,li are loading/unloading
points near working desks, S{ are loading/unloading points at storerooms, and X{ are
junctions. They are all taken as stations in this dissertation. There are many arcs.
For example, (01,02) is an arc. But (02,01) is nut an arc. Note, (01,03) is not an arc
either, since there is a station 02 between ai and X3.












































































Figure 6.1: The Linn Product Ltd. Layout
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6.3.2 A Local AGV schedule
A local AGV schedule can be represented by an ordered list of RTokens.
where rtjk (k = 1, 2, is called an RToken, i.e., a reserved interval of space-time.
• j represents a particular job for an AGV j.
• jk is indexed to a particular station Xjk in X.
We sometimes say that Xjk or rtjk are the /cth node of the local schedule of agent j.
So, a local schedule means also an ordered list of stations
(Xji j xj2,Xjk,XjN. )
which represents a traversable path, i.e,
(xjk,xjk+i) (k = 1,2, — 1))
are arcs.
6.3.3 External Form and Internal Form of an RToken rtJk
External Form of an RToken rtjk
The external representation of rtjk is
(stjk, etjk)
where stjk represents the starting time of this RToken and etjk represents the end time
of the RToken. An external representation is useful when internal structure of the
RToken is not of interest. Generally one AGV will not be interested in another AGV's
RToken internal structures. It is interested in only their external expression.
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Internal Form of an RToken rtj.
The internal structure of an RToken rtjk can be represented by
[toljMn\toO





ST stJt eth et,r*
Figure 6.2: The Infra-Structure of Time Interval rtjk
• tjk is the arrival time scheduled.
• tolJk is the front tolerant interval set to allow the AGV arrive Xjk earlier than tjk.
• toljk is the rear tolerant interval set to allow the AGV arrive Xjk later than t^.
• tjjk is the operational time required to complete an operation at Xjk. Operation
here means loading/unloading goods at or passing Xjk. The width of u)jk is a
fixed value given by the user.
We have
toll = (stj tfk)
{tk
< =M„)-
The minimal number of variables for describing an RToken
By examining the internal structure of rtJk, we can see that 3 variables are enough to
completely describe the RToken. Let us also use toll, tol®k and u>jk to denote their
respective widths, then rtJk can be described by a set of variables
{t°L ,t. ,tolj }
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Other variables can be derived from these three variables:
• the departure time, tjk, at which, AGV j is planned to leave Xjk:
£=$+"» <61)
• the starting time of the RToken, stjk.
stjk = tfk - toll (6-2)
• the end time of the RToken, etjk.
eth = tjt + toljk (6-3)
• the travel time, tfkjk+1 ■> which is the time for AGV j to travel from Xjk to Xjk+l:






Figure 6.3: An Example of a Local Schedule for AGV j
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Point-based vs Interval-based
Point-based scheduling does not allocate redundant resources for any AGV, formally,
Vj.fc toll = toll =0
Otherwise, we say schedules are interval-based.
6.3.4 Intra-agent Constraints
Notations
In this paragraph we define a set of notations for describing relations between two
arbitrary RTokens, namely rta, rfj, (see Figure 6.4).
rta = (tla,tl) tla<t2a
rtb = {t\,tI) t\ < t\
We say rta is BEFORE rtb, if
tl>tl
and we denote this relation by rta\\rtb. There are two possibilities for rta\\rtb'.
1. The first possibility is
t2 - flla — lb
we sometimes denote this by rta\rtb and say that rta TOUCHES rtb.
2. The second possibility is
tl>tlb
we sometimes denote this by rta|||r^ and say that rta and rtb SEPARATE.
We say rta is OVERLAPPING rfy, if rta A\r^b and rtb A\ria and we denote this
relation by rta ^ rtb. So, (1) in Figure 6.4 (a) (b) rta\\rtb, (2) in Figure 6.4 (a)
rta\rtb, and (3 ) in Figure 6.4 (c) (d) rta ^ rtb (or rh ^ r^a)- The relationships
defined above are more simplistic and more suitable for describing the problems in the
thesis than any others we know. For example, Allen [Allen &: Hayes 87] defined a set
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rK I I
Figure 6.4: Relationships between Two Intervals
of interval relationships in logical formulae with universal quantifiers and existential
quantifiers. The defined relationships include MEETS, BEFORE, OVERLAPS,
STARTS, FINISHES, and DURING. We could prove that the three relationships
can be used to derive all the relationships defined by Allen. So, they might be taken as
the smallest and complete set of the temporal interval representation. The interested
reader could do further investigation on this point. However, this is not the main issue
of this thesis. We intuitively defined these relationships that, we think, are sufficient
enough for our purpose. Similar description about the relationships between intervals
can be also found in [Conway et al. 67]. Intra-agent constraints are those concerning
relations between variables relating to one AGV.
Intra-agent Hard Constraints
Hard constraints are not relaxable. These constraints are listed as follow:
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1. No overlapping is allowed between any two RTokens reserved for the same AGV's
activities, i.e.,
rtjk ^ rtj, (6.5)
2. The starting time, stjk, of RToken rtjk must be no earlier than the earliest arrival
stJk > st™" (6.6)
time st™", i.e.,Jk
st™tn is specified by the user;
3. The end time, etjk, of RToken rtjk must be no later than the latest departure
time, et™ax, i.e.,
etJk < et™* (6.7)
etj^ax is specified by the user;
4. The travel time tjkjk+1 between two stations Xjk and Xjk+1 must be no smaller
than the mimimal travel time t1Jlkjlk+l
> S+, (6-8)
e^max) js bottom line of allocating resource to rtjk. The bottom line could
determined by following way:
Suppose a local schedule is (rtjl, rtj2,rtj3), as a requirement, the user will often specify
the earliest time stfrom which the job could be started, and the latest time stj3
before which the job must be finished. We then can derive the rest as follows:
cj.min aj.min , j.min
bl32. ~ bLj 1. 2





j 1 32 j\32
In other words, the left bottom line in Figure 6.5 is derived through forward propaga¬
tion, and the right bottom line is derived through backward propagation.
6.3.5 Intra-agent Soft Constraints
A local schedule is an assignment of variables tjk, tol°k and toljk (k = 1,2,...,) such
that all intra-agent hard constraints are satisfied. Generally speaking, there exists
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stations
often more than one possible local schedule. The user often has his preferences over
these local schedules. The preferences may include:
• The preferred arrival time t°*, i.e., the arrival time of tj is as close to tj* as
possible.
• The preferred tolerance widths tol°' and tol^*. The preferred tolerance width
will be decided by the user.
• The preferred travel time tj'j • The preferred travel time could be decided by
the optimal travel speed.
These preferences usually cannot be strictly satisfied, so we need have a method of
measuring closeness between a real assignment and the preferences. The closeness can
be represented as follow:
Atolf = tolf - tolf'
At°lJK = tolJK ~ tolj'K
A tT ■ = tT • -tT*
JkJk+i JkJk+i JkJk+i
(6.9)
Hence, AtJk, Atoljh., AtoljK, and Atjkjk+l represent the respective errors between as¬
signment and preferences. Consider Equation 6.4, we have
*T — iQ _ *0 — * _ *Ct _ .
Ljkjk+1 - lJk+1 ljk ~ lJk+l Ljk 3k (6.10)
CHAPTER 6. THE SPRING MODEL FOR LOCAL AGV SCHEDULING 110
therefore, we have
AtW=A$+.-A$ (6-11)
So, Af!i, a is a derived variable.7 JkJk+ 1
A good assignment will make these errors as small as possible. In this way of consid¬
eration, we can construct a local objective function ej:
ei = *tol°K,Atol^Aejkh+1) (6.12)
And fj(xi,X2,X3,xt) should have the following property:
4^ < 0(i = 1,2., 3,4) (6.13)
axi
That is to say, when X{ increases then fj will decrease (or, strictly speaking, will not
increase). So, to increase fj, Xi must be as close to zero as possible. The following
function can have this property:
(Ato%)2 -C<A<-)2 - *WAti»»+,>2 (6 u)
kfk,^,^s,k^k+i>0
This objective function is usually called the energy function and especially suitable for
evaluation of closeness of assignment.
6.3.6 Inter-agent Constraints
Inter-agent Hard Constraints
There are mainly two inter-agent hard constraints:
• Overlapping is not allowed between two RTokens, rtak and rt^, reserved respect¬
ively for two agents, formally,
rtak rtbtif 1
(1)a #6 J.(2)^afc = xbi J
• Ova taking is not allowed. In other words, if AGV a and AGV b will both travel
along the same arc, then if agent a departs from the starting station of the arc
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(2 )arcakak+1 = arct,bl+1
(2)rtai\\rtbk
A Global Objective
A global schedule is a collection of all AGVs' local schedules that satisfy inter-
agent hard constraint. Having set the local objectives for each AGVs, we can
expect that the global objective of AGVSP is that all local objectives are achieved
as well as possible. The global objective could be:
Eagvsp — (6.15)
6.3.7 Summary of Domain Specification
In this section, we systematically addressed the AGVSP problem by viewing it as a
DCSP problem in which each subproblem is a local scheduling problem for an AGV.
There are several constraints which are classified into hard constraints and soft con¬
straints according to their relaxibility. Constraints are also divided into inter-agent
constraints and intra-agent constraints. We also proposed the local objective function
and global objective function for measuring the degree of satisfaction of soft constraints.
This domain specification laid foundations for introducing the spring model in the rest
of this Chapter.
6.4 Spring Model for AGV Local Scheduling problem
In this section, we describe a novel model — a spring model — for representing a local
scheduling problem. The spring model will serve two purposes:
1. It, in any situation, provides an optimal solution to a local AGV scheduling
problem in the sense that the local objective is e3 suggested by Equation 6.14.
2. It provides a negotiation skill for the respective agent during negotiation.
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6.4.1 Intuitive Explanation of a Spring Model
In this paragraph, we explain why a spring model could be suitable for AGV local
scheduling problems in an intuitive manner to help the reader to understand the ap¬
propriateness of the model. The explanation is given below:
• As we already know, the AGVSP problem can be described as a DCSP problem
which consists of soft constraints and hard constraints. These constraints can
also be classified into intra-agent constraints and inter-agent constraints. Hard
constraints are not relaxable, so any solution must strictly satisfy them. Soft
constraints are relaxable, and the objective function of the problem measures
the quality of solutions in which some variable assignments have relaxed. Gen¬
erally speaking, a solution that yields a higher utility (the value of the objective
function) is better than one that yields a lower utility.
• In a negotiation process, agents negotiate when they are in conflict, i.e., some
resources that are allocated by one agent to produce a high payoff utility are re¬
quired by other agents. In this situation, some inter-agent constraints have been
violated. In order to satisfy the inter-agent constraints violated, they have to dis¬
cuss to reach an agreement on an alternative resource reallocation. It is obvious
that hard constraints are not negotiable, therefore, whatever an agreement is, the
resource reallocation must ensure that all hard constraints are strictly satisfied.
So, reallocation actually means relaxing the degree of satisfaction of some soft
constraints. In this sense, "relaxable" means "negotiable".
• Some soft constraints are more important than others. For example, an AGV
which is loaded with goods urgently needed by an important customer should
be scheduled to meet the customer's requirement concerning the delivery time.
More important constraints often are less relaxable. Therefore we should have
some way to describe the importance of a constraint.
• A soft constraint may be analogical to a spring. The relaxed state (when no
external forces are acting upon it) of the spring is normally considered the best
state of the spring (it keeps the lowest energy). The spring can be stretched (or
compressed) by external forces. The more it is stretched (or compressed) the
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bigger the external forces are required. The force is proportional to the product
of the length being stretched (or compressed) and Hooke's constant. If the force
remains the same, then the larger Hooke's constant, the smaller the length change
will be. This feature of the spring could be exploited to represent negotiating
agents. Suppose, there are two RTokens, rtjk for agent j and r£j, for agent i.
They overlap by T, then this overlap can be resolved by agent j conceding Tj
and agent i conceding Tj (Tj + Tt = T). And Tj and Tj are decided by their
relaxibility — or Hooke's constants: the more important RToken (e.g. a RToken
for an activity that has an urgent deadline) will have a larger Hooke's constant
(or smaller relaxibility).
6.5 The Basic Elements of a spring model
6.5.1 Hooke's Law and Newton's Law
A Spring and Hooke's Law
A body is said to be elastic if it suffers a deformation when a stretching or compressing
force is applied to it [Hughes & Martin 77]. The force with which an elastic body
resists deformation is called restoration. A linear spring is an elastic body which obeys
a simple empirical law known as Hooke's Law: the magnitude of the restoring force is
directly and linearly proportional to the deformation (see Figure 6.6):
F = kAl
A l = l-la (6'16)
where k is the Hooke's constant. la is the state of the spring when it is relaxed
(Figure 6.6 (a)). Figure 6.6(b) shows the spring being compressed and Figure 6.6(c)
shows the spring being stretched.
Newton's Third Law
We are interested in a static state of a spring. When a spring is in a static state, then
the external force acting on the spring should be equal to the restoration force. This
comes from Newton's Third Law [Ohanian 85] which gives the quantitative relationship
between the action force (external force) and the reaction force (restoration force):
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.6: A Spring Being Stretched or Compressed
Whenever a body exerts a force on another body, the latter exerts a force
of equal magnitude and opposite direction on the former.
Convention of describing forces
Since we are only interested in the static state of a spring, and Newton's third law
states that the action force and reaction force should be equal, we will not state again
whether a force we described is external force or internal force. To make the description
simple, we will set a convention that all forces we describe are external and any force is
directional: from left to right is the positive direction of a force. So, a force is denoted
by F■ If the value of F is negative, then the force is from right to left; if the value of
F is positive then the force is from left to right.
6.5.2 Basic elements for a spring model
A spring model is a proper connection of springs, movable walls, unmovable walls,
hollow cylinders, and unbendable bars (see Fig 6.7). A movable wall (Figure 6.7(b)) will
di 1
Figure 6.7: The Elements of Spring Models
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be moved by an external force however small it is. An unmovable wall (Figure 6.7(c))
can never be moved by any force howevpr large it is. A cylinder (Figure 6.7(d))
represents a constitutional part of an event that is unchangeable, such as the waiting
time of an RToken, the minimal traverse time, etc. A cylinder may slide by external
force along a dimension but can never be stretched or compressed by any force ( A
cylinder can be taken as a particular spring with k = oo). Figure 6.7 (e) is the cross-
section of the cylinder. Each cylinder is supported by a bar which passes through
the hollow hole of the cylinder. The bar guarantees the cylinder to move only in two
directions: move left and move right. An example can be seen in Figure 6.8 where
tOjk can only move right or move left. An unbendable bar (Figure 6.7 (f)) is used to
represent a connecting rod which connects two events.
6.5.3 A Spring unit for arrival time t°k
The soft constraint for arrival time t?, isJk
A (6-i7)
Its spring model is shown in Figure 6.8. Where and et™ax are analogical to two
unmovable walls which guarantees the departure time will not be earlier than sf™"1
and the arrival time will not later than et™ax. The cylinder represents the operation
time uijk. When the spring is relaxed, At°k = 0. This is the preferable state of At" .
CO*
Figure 6.8: Spring Unit for t"k
fc"1 and fc"2 represent the Hooke's Constants. In Figure 6.8 (b) when a force is applied,
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—Kl
then the cylinder Ujk is pushed forwords (i.e., Atjk > 0) by a force (Fjk> 0, we have
= (6.18)
—
Likewise, when the cylinder is pushed backwards (i.e, At°k < 0) by force Fjk < 0, then
"^=^,>#1 = "*>>$ (6-19)
Then Equation 6.18 and Equation 6.18 can be unified as
(6.20)
where
k°-{k£ >fAtl< o (621)Jk ~ I kh *f Ath >0
may be different from k®fc2. For example,
k?t < k%
means that lateness is worse than earliness if the AGV can not be scheduled to arrive
at place at the required preferred arrival time.
6.5.4 A Spring unit for Traverse Time # •
on it is
^& (6-22>
and the soft constraint on it is:
^jkjk+i = tjkjk+1 ~~ tjkjk+1 = ® (6.23)
The spring model for tjkj is one shown in Figure 6.9 (a). The cylinder represents
the minimal traverse time and two springs represent the rest parts of tjkjk+l-
When the spring is relaxed, Atjkjk+l = 0. This is the preferable state of the spring.
Note that this spring is movable. When a force is applied to the spring, it will be




ik ^k^k+^ ?ut.+i (6.24)
F = kT A tTr Jk+1 jkjk+l jkjk+\






Figure 6.9: A Spring for tTJk3 3k+\
6.5.5 A spring Unit for RToken rtjk
Figure 6.10 (a) illustrates a spring unit for rtjk. The cylinder represents the u>jk; the
spring on the left of the cylinder represents tolJk; the spring on the right represents
tolf . The Hooke's constants for tolJ and tolf are respectively and Both3k 3k 3k 3k 3k
springs are attached to the cylinder as shown. rtjk are limited by two movable walls.
The left wall represents the end time of an RToken (denoted by rtl) which is reserved
by an AGV at Xjk and the RToken directly precedes rtJk. The right wall represents
the starting time of an RToken (denoted by rt^) which is reserved by an AGV at xlk
and the RToken directly follows rtjk.
Note that, notations rtjk and rt!*k will be used in situations where the agents which
reserved them are not of our primary interest. Figure 6.10 (a) shows also the state of
the spring model when it is relaxed. This is a situation where no other agents' resource
allocations are considered. In this case,
(6.25)
In Figure 6.10 (b), is compressed (e.g. consider a situation where the resource on
right has been allocated to another agent). We have:
(6.26)
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tCflj
Figure 6.10: Spring Unit for rt3i










6.6 A Spring-based Local Scheduling Model
Having defined basic spring units for rtjk, tjkjk+1 and we now propose a spring
model for a local scheduling problem which is a spring network connecting these basic
units (see Figure 6.11). In this figure, a three node schedule is presented though, it
will be easily extended to an n node schedule. According to previous discussion, we
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Figure 6.11: The Spring Model for Local Scheduling




r farce£,t>2 = k%laAtoljka
Fik~
—*t2
r? — _LT AfTr jkJk+l jkjk+l jkjk+\
J:
F°m k^AtoljS
^tjkjk+1 = ^jk+i ~ ^ik
(6.29)
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6.7 Theoretical Justification for Local Scheduling Spring
Model
We justify our spring local scheduling model by two steps. The first step is to find the
equilibrium point of forces in the spring model according to Newton's Third Law. The
second step is to find the optimal local scheduling solution when the objective is an
energy function given by Equation 6.14.
6.7.1 Equilibrium of Forces
When a spring network is in static state the resultant of forces at any point in the
network should be equal to zero. In Figure 6.11, the resultant of forces in the dotted
rectangle should be equal to zero (see also Figure 6.12), i.e.,
—»r 1 —►to/a2 —k* —*tol01 —>t2
?»+?» +Pi>+Fi> +Fiu = Q <6-3°)
Figure 6.12: The Spring Model for Local Scheduling
6.8 Optimal local scheduling solution
When the objective function of a local AGV scheduling problem for agent j is given by
Equation 6.14, then we can find its optimal solution by solving simultaneous equations:
^=0 (1 = 1,2,..) (6.31)
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6.8.1 Optimal local scheduling when resources are fully available
When resources are fully available for a local scheduling, inter-agent constraints will
not possibly be violated. In this case, tolerance times can always be fully guaranteed,
i.e.,
A tolfk = Atol? = 0 (6.32)
We only need to consider how to assign At*k and . Since we have
AFnn+, = - At» (6.33)
consider, Equation 6.14, Equation 6.31 and Equation 6.33, we can derive the following
simultaneous equations:
kjk-UkA^-dk + knAtn ~ klh+A^k+, = 0 (* = 0,1, ty) (6.34)
Compare this Equation 6.34 with Equation 6.29, we can see that, in Equation 6.34,
—>rl —>t2
fct Aft is in the same form of F,_, —kl,, Aft- is in the same form of F,.Jk—\Jk Jk—Uk Jk JkJk+ \ JkJk+1 Jk
—Ml
and k"^Atjk is in the same form of Fjk, so we have
—iT 1 —KJ —>T2
Fh + Fh + Fh = 0 = °. Ni) (6-35)
Also, since Equation 6.32, we know that
—itola2
Fn = Ato/f = 0Jk Jk Jk
->tolbeta 1 . Ia a
Fn =-^<=0
Consider Equation 6.35 and Equation 6.36, we then have
—>r 1 —>tola2 —>q —*tol01 —>r2
Fjk + + Fjk + Fik + Fik = °
Compare Equation 6.37 and Equation 6.30, we can conclude:
(6.36)
(6.37)
Theorem 6.1 The spring model proposed in Section 6.6 suggests an optimal local
schedule in the sense of ej given by Equation 6.14 when resources are fully available.
That is to say, the spring model is suitable for local AGV scheduling when resources
are fully available.
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6.8.2 Optimal local scheduling when resources are constrained
One of major difficulties for any scheduling problem is that resources are tight. Fig¬
ure 6.13 shows RToken rtjks resource assignment when there are a total amount, T,
of resources in short:
Th=T]k+Tjk (6.38)
Tl and Tl are two constants representing the unavailable amounts of resources re¬
spectively on the left hand side of rtjk and on the right hand side of rtjk. That is to
say, on left side, rtjk must concede by Tjk and on right side rtjk must concede by Tjk.
/c
Resource Unavailable for AGV j Resource Unavailable for AGV j
Figure 6.13: Resources Are Not Fully Available
That is to say, on left side, rtJk must concede by T\ and on right side rtjk must concede
by T2. This problem could be overcome by yielding some tolerant times and/or shifting
the RToken:
Tx = -Atolfk + At%
T2 =-Atol?t -All
(6.39)
From Equation 6.39, Equation 6.33 and the Equation 6.14, we can derive:
Atol?k+kJ,
(k = 1,2,..., ATj)
t ll Atl ~ -CA<< = 0
(6.40)
If we do the similar replacements as in Section 6.8.1, then we have:
—»r 1 —>tola2 —ya —*tol(31 —>t2
FJk=0 (6.41)
This equation is the same as Equation 6.30, therefore, we conclude:
CHAPTER 6. THE SPRING MODEL FOR LOCAL AGV SCHEDULING 123
Theorem 6.2 The spring model given in Section 6.6 suggests an optimal local AGV
schedule in the sense of ej given by Equation 6. If when resources are constrained.
6.8.3 Solving the force equilibrium
Based on Theorem 6.2, then an optimal solution can be obtained by solving the force
equilibrium equations, Equation 6.30. Considering Equation 6.29, Equation 6.39, we
have:
At? = A r1ACj
Atol? = At? - AT?
Atolf = -At? - AT?
Atj = AjAt?
(6.42)
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So, when we know how much resources are in short, i.e., what are T? and T?, then
we are able to get the optimal solution to a local scheduling problem through Equa¬
tion 6.42. Care must be taken when some spring unit is not alive (or is dead) then aJt
should be modified based on its basic form given in Equation 6.49. By " a spring unit
is not alive", we mean the spring is either over stretched or over compressed such that
it has lost elasticity. For example, when Atol°t is smaller than —tol°'■*, then there is
no tolerance time left and therefore the spring tol°k can no longer be compressed. In
this case, we say tol°k is not alive. We will discuss this in Section 6.9.
6.8.4 Optimal Global Scheduling
When the global objective of an AGVSP is Eagvsv and
Eagvsp = 2^, ei (6.54)
there is always a possibility of a resource conflict when two or more agents are making
gains on achieving their individual goals. Suppose, two arbitrary RTokens, rtJm for
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agent j and rt{n for agent i, are reserved at the same station, and overlap T (see
Figure 6.14), and also suppose that this conflict will be resolved by agent j conceding
Tjm and agent i conceding T}n,
Resource Unavailable for AGV i
rC
Resource Unavailable for AGV j
Figure 6.14: Two Agents' Resource Allocation Overlap
T/m + T/n = T (6.55)
according to Newton's Third Law, then in the the spring model for agent j, the fol¬





? . -|- p




FJrn + Ftn = 0
(6.56)
(6.57)
Now, we will prove that, suppose e, is given by Equation 6.14, then, to maximise Eagvsp,
Atjk, Atjkjk+l, At*?1" and Amust also satisfy Equation 6.56 and Equation 6.57.
The proof is delivered in the following steps:
step 1: Since Eagvsp is the sum of all local objective functions, therefore given a fixed
amount of resources, each agent j must maximise e, for the objective Eagvsp
so that Eagvsp can be maximised. For two arbitrary agents, agent j (here j is a
specific agent) and agent i (i is another specific agent), when they have an overlap
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as indicated in Figure 6.14, let us assume that that agent j will concede Tjm and
agent i will concede Tf. In this case, we know from Theorem 6.2 that solutions to
maximising ej and e, will be given by their respective spring models. That is to
say, the solutions are decided according to the force equilibrium, Equation 6.56.
Let us denote the optimal assignments for agent j are Atf", AtJ*jk+1, Atolf"
and Atolj" (k = 1,2,...,Nj), and the optimal assignments for agent i are Atf".
Af[**+J, Atolf" and Atolf" (I = 1,2,...,N{).
step 2: Let us rearrange Eagvsp according to Equation 6.54
Eagvsp Eagvsp ^'agvsp (6.08)
where E'agvsp consists of items relating only to Atoljm and Atolfn, and Eagvsp con¬
sists of all the rest of Eagvsp. Since ej and are given according to Equation 6.14,
so
E'agvsp = ^(Atol^'f + kf>°(Atolfla")2 (6-59)
From Figure 6.14, we can see that, AtolBm and Atolf can be reassigned values
without demanding any further resource and influencing other variables' assign¬
ments, if
A tolBm + A tolf = AtolB" + Atolf" (6.60)
or
Atolf = tolB" + Ato!?" - tofjm (6.61)
can be satisfied. Since such reassignment will not influence other variables' as¬
signment, therefore, Eagvsp will not be affected. Now, let us find an assignment
that maximises Eagvsp from the following equation:
jr'
—- = 2kfBAtol1] - 2kflaAtolf = 0 (6.62)
dAtolBm Jm
or
k^Atol^ - k\°jaAtolf = 0 (6.63)
We know from Equation 6.29 that this equation is equivalent to:
—>tol02 —*tola 1
Fjm + Fin =0 (6.64)
That is to say, optimal glubal assignments must also satisfy Equation 6.57.
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From the discussion in step 1 and step 2, we have the following conclusion:
Theorem 6.3 In a global AGVSP problem, when the precedence order of all
RTokens is fixed, the spring network which connects all local spring models armrding
to the order suggests an optimal solution to the AGVSP in the sense of Eagvsp where
ej for all agent j is given according to Equation 6.14-
The phrase "the precedence order of all RTokens is fixed" must be emphasised, since
the spring model network does not explicitly tell how those RTokens should be ordered.
6.9 Negotiation Equations
6.9.1 About Spring Constants
Spring constant for tfk
In previous discussion, we implicitly assume that the restoration force of a spring is
linearly proportional to the deformation of the spring. However, this assumption must
be used very carefully. Let us first examine the Hooke's constant kfk of spring tfk
(see Figure 6.15). We normally expect tjk to be within the normal region (£3,^4) (or
Figure 6.15: Hooke's Constant of Spring tfk
(s£™m,et™ax — cjjk). In this region, the spring has normal elasticity. Suppose the
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Hooke's constant is k"k, i.e.,
Now, suppose that the spring is over-compressed such that tgoes to the region of
(£1,^2) (or ($i,stj£m)), then spring should no longer be able to be compressed since
(£i, £2) is region of hard constraint for tjk. I11 this case, we say the spring is dead or not
alive. Theoretically, we should assign assume that the spring constant in this region is
00, i.e.,
k\ — &2 — 00
However, practically, we can assume the spring constant is a finite number relatively
much larger than normal k^k, kjkjk+1, kj°la and kl°k^. Likewise, if the spring is over¬
stretched such that tjk goes into region (£5,^) (or (et— ujjk, tg)), then the spring is
dead. Similarly, instead of giving the spring an infinite spring constant, we assign the
spring a relatively large spring constant but not infinite. In this way of consideration,
the spring constant kA should be exnressed in the following wav:
where, k°° is a very large number. So, even when the spring is dead, if there is an
external force acting upon it, it can still be deformed, but the degree of deformation
should be very small.
The reason of assigning a spring in dead regions (the zones of hard constraints as shown
in Figure 6.15) is that we want the spring to be alive all the time such that it could
automatically recover to its relaxed state should the external force be removed. We
know that a spring has function of remembering its history of being deformed.
Spring constant for tol^k and toljk
Since tol^ and toljk are the similar variables, we only discuss about one of their spring
unit, i.e., tolfk. Figure 6.16 illustrates the spring constant kj°la for spring toV*k. There
are three regions:
• The first region is "zone of soft constraint" where tolJk has normal elasticity (the
spring is alive). In this case, the spring constant is kj°kQ, i.e.,
k3 = *4 = kjk
(6.65)
k3 = k4 = k£a
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.of, k
Figure 6.16: Spring Constant for kj°la
• The second region is "zone of hard constraint". For the same reason given in
Section 6.9.1, the spring is dead, but we assign the spring a relative large spring
constant.
• The third region is a "zone of disconnection". In this region, external forces will
not be able to act upon it. More specifically, in this case, RToken rtJk does not
TOUCH any RToken rtjk (an arbitrary RToken on the left of rtjk). Therefore,
the spring is virtually disconnected from any other spring. Since no external
force is acting upon it, it will not be deformed, therefore, there is no possibility
for tol^k going into this region. In this way of consideration, the spring constant
in this region is not necessarily to be considered.
To conclude the above explanation, we have:
(6.66)
Spring Constant for P'jkjk+i
The spring constant /cjkjk+1 for spring t]kjk+x is shown in Figure 6.17. It has two regions,
"zone of hard constraint" where the spring is dead, and "zone of soft constraint" where
the spring is alive. For the same reasons as we presented in the previous two paragraph,
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zone of soft constraint
Figure 6.17: Spring Constant for Spring tjk'j jk+i
we have:




6.9.2 Revisiting Kwa's Negotiation Procedure
In Kwa's negotiation model, the whole scheduling problem is solved in an incremental
manner: a new local schedule will be brought into consideration only after the previous
local schedules that have already been brought into consideration have been made
conflict-free. RTokens reserved for these conflict-free schedules are stored in RT-DD
(see Appendix B). RT-DB stores RTokens in a well-sorted manner: RTokens reserved
at one station are stored in the same list and RTokens in the same list are in an temporal
order. In this way, retrieving RTokens from RT-DB can be very efficient. Suppose,
agent j has an initial resource allocation (which is based on for its local schedule as
shown in Figure 6.18. Let us call RTokens in RT-DB old RTokens, and RTokens for
agent j new RTokens. These old RTokens' relationship have already been built in the
past. For each old RToken, namely rt{n it generally has a right hand side RToken, rt^,
and a left hand side RToken, rt^. They have the following relations:
So, they do not overlap each other — they are conflict-free. Conflicts, if initially exist¬
ing, have already been resolved through negotiation between agents that reserved the
rt^Wrt^Wrt;vR
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Figure 6.18: Allocating Resources
RTokens. So, all old RTokens have been connected as a conflict-free network. We can
visualise that there is also a spring network in which all spring units for RTokens are
connected in the same order as this conflict-free network.
Some of these old relationships will be broken when the schedule for agent j is con¬
sidered. For example, in Figure 6.18, rtj4 is initially in conflict with two old RTokens,
rtj4 and rt^. Suppose, agent j wishes to allocate rtj4 between the two old RTokens,
then the following procedure must be taken:
1. it has to inform the two agents, namely agent a and 6, which reserved respectively
rt^4 and rt!fk, of that that the old relationship:
<W< (* = 4)
is disconnected,
2. it will then try to build a new relationship with agent a,
rtfjlrth (^ = 4)
by resolving their conflict through negotiation.
3. if the overlap between rtkt and rtjt has been successfully resolved, then it will
try to build a new relationship with agent 6,
rtjk\\rtn (k =4)
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by resolving their conflict through negotiation,
4. if the (3) and (4) are all successfully gone through, then rtj4 is successfully
allocated, and it now becomes an old RToken.
Based on these considerations, during the process in which agent j is trying connecting
its RTokens with these old RTokens in RT-DB, each old RToken rt^ will generally have
the following relationship:
However, here it is possible that rt^ or may be a RToken for agent j newly suc¬
cessfully connected into RT-DB.
RTokens for agent j will fall into the following two situations:
1. RTokens that have been successfully connected into RT-DB will can be treated
as old RTokens and hence
<IKJ!rtfk
will hold for them.
2. RTokens that have not been considered could be treated as free RTokens, i.e.,
there do not exist rtjk and rt^k constraining rtjk 's shifting. In this case, we can
denote rtjk = (p and rtjk = </>, and then
will still hold.
So, all in all, for any RToken rt{r no matter whether it is old or new, it generally have
In this way, we now consider, how agent j is to connect a specific RToken, for example
rtjt in Figure 6.18 into the RT-DB. Suppose some of its RTokens have already been
connected into RT-DB. and also suppose that agent j will first resolve conflict between
rtJ4 and rt^ then between rtu and rtjj by:
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1. disconnecting rtj4 and by informing agent b (which reserves r/jj) of that it
will temporally have no left hand side RToken relationship, i.e.
<t>\\rt?k (k = 4)
For agent j, rt]t will have right hand RToken relationship, i.e.,
rtjk\\4> (k = 4)
rtjt and rtjt are currently overlap, i.e.,
rtj, ^ rtu
suppose, they overlap by T, then a new relationship
rtjJrth (fc = 4)
can be built if differential T can be resolved. This conflict can be resolved by
agent a taking up TQu and and agent j taking up Tj, where
+ Tjk =T (k = 4)
2. Any other RTokens' relationships will not be affected.
In this way, we can see that each time the connecting process focuses on only one con¬
flict between agent j and another agent (e.g., agent a), and all the rest of RTokens are
treated as if they were all conflict-free even though some of them for agent j are having
conflicts with those in RT-DB. The above discussions help us to understand the fol¬
lowing negotiation modules which are equations for calculating negotiation strategies.
6.9.3 Negotiation Modules
Viewing Resource Conflict as CIP Problem
Suppose rtau (an old RToken) and rtjk (a new RToken) has an overlap T, then this
conflict can be resolved by agent a taking up T„u and agent j taking up so we will
have a strategy set:
E = {(Ta„,Tjk) | Tau+ TJk = T) (6.68)
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the common sense principle for the negotiation, according to Theorem 6.3, is that
(suppose the negotiation objective is rtak\\rtjk),
-*tol02 —>tola\





That is the common sense principle for negotiation is that the restoration forces, Fa
4-tolal
and Fjk must be equal. This principle is illustrated in Figure 6.19. where the
Figure 6.19: The Common Sense Principle
horizontal axis is for £ which is represented by a parameter Tjk which is the amount
of resources agent j concedes (hence, agent a concedes T — Tjk. When the two lines
intersect each other, then an agreement should be made.
We now can construct a CIP situation:
L PRINCIPLE
A. ft " r ,
/——s ^ —>tol02 i-tola 1 —>tol02 4-tola 1
<{a,j},E,<e0,e, >,<Fa„ ,FJk >,Fau =Fjk > (6.71)
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Negotiation Modules
How much will agent j concede? What to concede? This paragraph will solve this prob-
i—tolan
lem. Suppose agent j now has already conceded and the force is Fjk , but still can
not meet the common sense principle, then it try to concede further byA. Then,
through Equation 6.42, we can calculate At^n+l\ Atol^n+1\ Atol^n+1\ A^"*^ for
I = 1,2,k,..., Nj. When then have
<—tola(n+l) i—tolan
77> T? L.tOl* jk * jk Kjk
rpn+1 _ rpn I A ry-tn+1"* l\ 1* L. ' I',.
1Atola(n+l)
(6.72)






Since only rtjk will concede some resources on its left hand side. aJl is given by
Equation 6.49, i.e,
aii = kLd, " k<
tola
(I = 1,2,..., Nj)
kT = kT — D
]03\ 3N3N+\ u




31 -{ (6.75)0 if^Hrtj, or rtj[\\\rtjlkl°la (see Equation 6.66) otherwise
ktoia js zero e [.tola js omitted from a,,) when there is no left hand RToken (i.e.,
rtl = </>), or when the left hand RToken separates from A:j°,Q (i.e., rtjL\\\rtj,). This
is because, in these cases, there is no external force acting upon on its left side.
—*tola2
So, Fjk ( = 0) can be omitted from Equation 6.30. k° p can be similarly delivered
(But we will not list it here for space reasons). To summarise the discussion in this
paragraph: agent j can use the recurrence formula, Equation 6.72, to calculate TJk
CHAPTER 6. THE SPRING MODEL FOR LOCAL AGV SCHEDULING 136
and Fjk until Fjk reaches to the point where Fjk intersects Fau■ At this point, the
calculated Tjk is the amount to be conceded by agent i.
Internally, how does agent j modify its previous assignments? This is easily answered
by the following recurrence formula:
,a(n+1) _ ,a(n) a ,a(n+l)
3l
, x 3l 31
tol°(n+1) = tolfn) + Atolfn+l)
tol^n+l) = tol^n) + Atol^n+1)





A nested negotiation process will be applied when an agent, during its negotiating with
another agent, monitored a new conflict with a third agent. The nested negotiation
process will resolve the conflict with that the third agent. In our spring model, the
new conflict is represented by a spring, (i.e, toljj, or tolbeing over-compressed, or
—ttola —>tol/3
say that Fjt or Fjt becomes very large. The negotiation is very similar to the main
negotiation discussed in last paragraph, except that (assume that the negotiation is
between agent j and agent a — two arbitrary agents).
Tji + Tau = 0 (6.77)
That is to say that agent j and agent a do not have resource conflicts prior to ne¬
gotiation. However, since agent j has been over-constrained, so it will ask for some
resources from agent a. The amount of resources Tjt agent j asked for is equivalent
to |Tau | — the amount of resources conceded from agent a. Figure 6.20 illustrates in
nested negotiation agent i and agent ji's concession.
6.10 Related Work
6.10.1 Operations Research
Scheduling or resource allocation is a problem that has been examined in Operation
Research literature since the early Fifties [Conway et al. 67). Methods and theories
CHAPTER 6. THE SPRING MODEL FOR LOCAL AGV SCHEDULING 137
Figure 6.20: Conceding in Nested Negotiation
developed are based on strong mathematical theories. For a given objective, a typ¬
ical scheduling task falls into the mathematical class of "NP-hard" problems. For this
reason, the main focus ofOperations Research has been on finding fast algorithms (e.g.,
the Hungarian Method, the Branch and Bound Method, the Dynamic Programming
Method, etc.) for solving mathematical formulas. Our spring model, to some extent,
is similar to nonlinear programming methods [Eiselt &: vonFrajer 77] which concerns
finding fast algorithms for solving problems with non-linear objective function. For
example, the Lagrange Method formulates the Lagrange-function as the sum of ob¬
jective function and the weighted constraints. Each partial derivative of the function
is set equal to zero resulting in a unique system of equations (simultaneous equations
as we interpreted). In this way, all variables' elasticity has been transformed into the
simultaneous equations. However, Operations Research methods generally have the
following problem [Dorn &: Slany 94]: the algorithms are too complex for real world
applications. This problem is solved in our model by dividing the whole problem into
many subproblems which are assigned to a set of cooperative agents.
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6.10.2 Constraint-directed Scheduling
The ISIS job-shop scheduling system was the first attempt to formulate and operation-
alize the view of scheduling as a heuristic, constraint-directed activity [Fox 87] [Fox 94].
ISIS emphasised a complete representation framework that recognised the conflicting
and negotiable nature of many of these constraints. A representation of preference
(i.e., relaxable) constraints was defined to encode knowledge relating to various fact¬
ory objectives and operating preferences, including their relative importance, possible
relaxations of preferred choices, the utility of each alternative, and the types of de¬
cisions that the constraint impacts. This knowledge about preferences was embedded
in a larger relational framework for modelling the entities and physical constraints of
the production environment. Constraints were classified into non-relaxable (hard con¬
straints) and relaxable (soft constraints). What is of our most interest is his concept of
the elasticity of the relaxation of a constraint which describes the difference between
alternative relaxations. The elasticity is modelled in the system in production rules.
Importance of a constraint was introduced to emphasize the relative influence on other
constraints' relaxation.
Our spring model has some common features with ISIS:
• They are both representational model or system for representing constraints —
hard constraints and soft constraints.
• They both emphasize the elasticity of a soft constraint. We represent the elasti¬
city by a spring unit, while Fox represented the elasticity through production
rules.
• We use the representational model to guide negotiation. Fox used his represent¬
ational model to direct the search for solution.
6.10.3 Train Scheduling
Fukumori's work on train scheduling [Fukumori 80] is very relevent to our spring model.
He proposed an algorithm that uses a range-constriction search technique to schedule
the timing and pass-through relations of trains smoothly and efficiently. The basic
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ideas of the algorithm are:
• Train schedules are represented by a "belt" (which is similar to Kwa's interval-
based scheduling) instead of a "line" (which is similar to point-based schedulinng).
• This representation potentially allows a train's schedule to be "bent": if the
train's (e.g. an express's) schedule is in conflict with other trains' schedules, the
conflict could be solved by letting the express slow down to avoid the conflict.
This is similar to compressing the tjkj in our spring model.
• A train's belt could be shrunk when other trains' belts overlap with it. This is
similar to reducing tolerant time in our spring model.
Fukumori's algorithm is based on human experience. It was not systematically de¬
veloped.
6.10.4 Neural Network: The Elastic Net Approach to TSP
Our spring model is an analogical approach. We may find some similarity to the elastic
net approach to Travelling Salesman Problem [Durbin et al. 89] [Simmen 91]. A elastic
net can be visualised as a rule for deforming an imaginary elastic band placed in the
city plane by attractive, distance-dependent forces from the cities and by elastic forces
within the band itself. A scale parameter controls the effective range of the city forces.
It is initially set high, then gradually reduced. In practice, the net is modeled by a finite
number of points ("beads") and the algorithm reduces to an iterative procedure for
updating the bead positions. Our model and the elastic model have some similarities.
For example, the two models are anological to elastic properties. They yield solutions
when the elastic entities (springs or elatic net) preserve the lowest energies. Solutions
are gained under the effect of forces from the elatic entities.
6.10.5 Various Spring Models
There were various spring models used in other fields. Here we just give some examples.
In [Arbib 72], Arbib proposed a spring model for representing muscles of human hand.
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In [Liritzis et al. 95], a spring model — spring-block model — is applied for the cross-
correlation analysis of seismic time-series to clarify the complicated space-time pattern
of the world wide mosaic of tectonic plates interaction. In seismicity study, similar
model to the spring-block model is the spring-mass model proposed in [?].
Closely related to our spring model we found is the combination of a certain number
of spring models in the finite element methods to represent some properties interested
by researchers and engineers. For example, [Yue et al. 97] presents a new flexible rotor
beam element to study the dynamic behaviour of manipulators with flexible links and
joints. Both link and joint flexibility are incorporated together by using the element
model which is the combination of a finite element model for links and a torsional
spring model for joints. The coupling terms of link and joint flexibility are considered
in the dynamic equations of the minipulator.
In [Okamoto et al. 95], a new algorithm for particle tracking, called the spring model
technique, is proposed to anlayze image data. The algorithm is based on pattern
matching of particle clusters between the first and second image. A particle cluster is
composed of particles which are assumed to be connected by invisible elastic springs.
Depending on the deformation of the cluster patern (i.e., the particle positions), the
invisible springs have some forces. The smallest force pattern in the second image
is the most probable patten match to the correspondent original pattern in the first
image.
The idea of text spacing technique used in [Knuth 86] can be expressed as a spring
model as Knuth described: TeX makes complicated pages by starting with simple indi¬
vidual characters and putting them tegother in larger units, and putting these together
in still larger units, and so on. The terms used to describe such page construction are
boxes and glue. During spacing these boxes, they should be stretched or compressed.
The proporties of these boxes can be expressed by springs.
All applications of spring models have a common feature: they use spring models to
represent some properties that can be described by forces, elasticity, flexibility, etc. In
this aspect, our spring model serves the same purposes as other spring models. How¬
ever, there is a major distinction between our model and other spring models we know
so far: when constructing a spring network by connecting basic spring elements, much
work is involved in computing how they should be connected (e.g, while connecting
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two RTokens, we must first compute which RToken should be on the right and which
should be on the left), but this does not seems to be a problem in these other models
where how spring elements should be connected is known.
6.10.6 Job Shop Scheduling Problem (JSSP)
Taking stations and junctions as machines, we can see that the AGVSP is related to
the JSSP which involves allocating start-times to activities (or operations). A JSSP
can be described by four aspects [Conway et al. 67]: (1) m machines, (2) N jobs with
each of them being a set of operations with each of them being specified by a machine
where the operation is processed and a processing-time needed for the operation being
processed; (3) constraints that restrict the manner in which allocations can be made
and (4) the criteria by which a schedule will be evaluated. Efforts have been made by
researchers in the last several decades to seek efficient searching algorithms of solving
complex JSSPs with large solution spaces. Some algorithms are based on enumerat-
ive search (e.g., Bound and Branch Search [Balas 69] [Carlier & Pinson 89], etc.) —
they aim to obtain the optimal solution by dropping non-optimal solutions. However,
they often prove to be ineffective when seaching spaces are huge. Some algorithms are
based heuristic search (e.g., Tabu Search [Glover & Laguna 93], Simulated Anneal¬
ing Search [Shen et al. 94], genetic algorithms [Fang et al. 93] [Corne et al. 93], etc.).
Heuristic search algorithms aim to obtain sub-optimal solutions. Solutions are achieved
by gradual improvement on previous solutions obtained and the final solutions will be
given when there is no improvement possible or when searching time is due. For more
detailed review of JSSP algorithms, the reader is recommended to refer [Fang 94].
Although the AGVSP has many features similar to the JSSP, it has its own unique
features as well. These unique features are listed below:
• Strictly ordered activities — for each AGV, its planned route prior to the AGVSP
determines the order in which the AGV moves from one station (or junction)
to another. So, the order of activities are fixed and cannot be changed during
problem solving. This is not the case in many JSSPs where the order of activities
may be changed.
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• Strong links between activities — for each AGV, two consecutive activities are
linked by the travelling time between a station for the first activity and another
for the second. The constraints on the travelling time are critical: the shortest
travelling time (e.g., is limited by the AGV's speed, and longer travelling
times will affect the feasibility of the overall system. By feasibility we mean
whether a planning system can organise all the movements of the AGVs required
by a factory. Obviously, the longer the travelling times, the fewer movements
can be organised.
• Strong preferences over solutions — the parts should be delivered to each work
station at the time when workers (or robots) need them, arriving earlier may
cause local inventory problems, while arriving later will make less efficient use of
resources— workers, machines, robots, etc; ready products should be delivered to
custermers in time to satisfy them. In other words, Just-IN-Time (JIT) require¬
ment is important. Classical approaches to the JSSP are aimed at shortening
the makespan — the time period between the time when the first job is started
and the time when the last job is finished. The makespan in the case of JIT as
in the AGVSP is not as strongly desired as would be in the case of other JSSPs.
• Tolerance allocations — to reduce the need for frequent rescheduling, in the
AGVSP we are concerned, AGVs' activities are allocated some redundant re¬
sources so that they can be made more robust. Classical JSSP algorithms do not
consider in this dimension.
Due to these distinguishing requirements, there are difficulties in directly applying the
existing JSSP approaches to the AGVSP.
6.11 Summary
In this chapter, we systematically developed a novel spring model to represent an
agent's local scheduling. The spring model has several purposes:
1. It is a representational model — it represents various constraints.
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2. It is an optimal local scheduling model — it can suggest an optimal solution to
a local AGV scheduling problem given a certain amount of resources.
3. It is a negotiating model — it can suggest a negotiation strategy (i.e., how much
to concede) for an agent, and suggest how to concede so that a local scheduling
problem can have an optimal solution. The negotiation is based on the common
sense principle that the force and reacting force between two RTokens should be
equal.
Our model solves the important issues that Kwa's model was unable to solve in the
following way:
• What negotiating technique does the conceding agent use?
Negotiating techniques are generated based on the spring model of a local sched¬
ule. Each time, the conceding agent will use combined techniques which is similar
to Kwa's negotiating skill. However, instead of shifting and yielding resources
allocated to one node (i.e. rtjk for a particular A;), our model is to shift and
yield resources allocated to all nodes (i.e. k = 1,2,...). In other words, each time
agent j takes up some differential of overlap, its internal resource allocations are
all modified. This modification is made under a prerequisite that there is no
third party being affected.
• How much differential does the conceding agent take up?
This isssue is solved by the common sense principle in our negotiation model:
the conceding agent must take up an amount of differential by which the two
negotiating agents' restoration forces are equal (see Figure 6.19).
• What do negotiating agents communicate with each other
They communicate proposals during negotiation. A proposal comprises the
amount of differential the conceding agent wishes to take up and the state of
it provided the proposal is accepted by its opponent. The state is represented by
the restoration force of its spring-based local scheduling model.
• What is the belief of a conceding agent about its negotiating opponent?
The belief of the conceding agent about its negotiating opponent is the predicted
CHAPTER 6. THE SPRING MODEL FOR LOCAL AGV SCHEDULING 144
restoration force of that opponent provided that the proposal from the conceding
agent is accepted. So, our model allows the conceding agent to reason about
negotiating strategies based on its belief about its opponent's state.
• What does it mean that "an agent is selfish"? As we argued in Chapter
5, terms, such as "selfishness", "benevolence", "altruism", etc., are well under¬
stood by us in human activities. However, without formal definitions of them,
we are unable to model them into computational models. In our model, the al¬
truistic agent assumption is not made, nor is the selfish agent assumption. We
assume that agents are rational and benevolent and rationality and benevolence
are formally defined. The rational agent assumption requires each agent to seek
the optimal solution to its local problem and the benevolent agent assumption
requires each agent to help other agents under the condition that its own interest
is not affected during the help.
In conclusion, our spring-based negotiation model possesses properties that are required




In this chapter, we will first introduce our implementation of the spring-based negoti¬
ation model. Then we will give some experimental results to compare our model with
Kwa's model to show whether our model is better than Kwa's.
7.2 Implementation of Spring-based Negotiation Model
7.2.1 System Structure: A Small Multiagent System
The system architecture which outlined our implementation of the spring-based nego¬
tiation is characterised as a small multiagent system (Figure 7.1). We view an agent
here as an entity consisting of databases plus a set of procedures which manipulate
these databases.
Two Types of Agents
The system is a multi-agent system consisting of two types of agents. The first type
consists of only one agent called the manager which is responsible for distributing
jobs to proper agents which then undertake the assigned jobs. These agents being
assigned jobs to undertake fall into the second type. We still call each of them an agent
or an AGV. A job here is a specification of requirements (soft constraints and hard
constraints) for a local AGV schedule. Each agent's task is then to assign resources
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global database
Figure 7.1: System Structure
for the schedule according to the requirements. It initially assigns resources to the
schedule based only on its intra-agent constraints (see Chapter 6), and then it checks
whether the initial assignments are in conflict with those of other agents' schedules
which have been made before. If there are conflicts, then the agent will initialise
a negotiation process to resolve the conflicts. The initiator is also responsible for
controlling the whole negotiation process, e.g., when the negotiation will terminate,
whether the negotiation is successful or not. If the negotiation is successful, then it
informs all other agents involved in the negotiation that the results of the negotiation
should be honoured; these agents therefore modify their schedules according to the
results. If the negotiation is not successful, then the initiator will also inform those
agents involved that the negotiation is not successful and that they should keep their
schedules as they were before the negotiation. So, it is important for each agent to
keep all its schedule made before each round of negotiation so that backtracking is
possible.
Databases
There are two types of databases: RT-DB and SP-DB. The RT-DB is a database
mainly for recording RTokens reserved by each agents. This database can be used by
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every agent: (1) to check whether its own RTokens are in conflict with those of other
agents, (2) to insert a RToken into the RT-DB if it is conflict-free with all RTokens in
the RT-DB. The structure of the RT-DB is based on the one given in Appendix B. The
SP-DB is a database for storing a spring model: the initial state of the spring model,
the intermediate state of the spring model, and state of the spring model during a
negotiation. We can visualise it as in the following structure:
(AGV SM2 SM1 SM°)
where SM° is the initial state of a local schedule made by the respective agent based
only on its intra-agent requirement. It is then the optimal local schedule. SM1 is
the intermediate state of the schedule. SM2 is the state of the spring model during a
negotiation. SM1 and SM2 have the following relationship:
• At the starting time of a negotiation process initialised by the agent itself or by
any other agent, SM2 = SM1;
• During negotiation, SM1 remains unchanged. But SM2 will be modified accord¬
ing to conceding proposals it may wish to make.
• At the terminating time of the negotiation, if the negotiation is successful then
SM] will be changed to the new state the same as SM2, i.e., SM1 <— SM2. If
the negotiation is not successful, then SM2 should be undone and changed back
to its state prior to the negotiation, i.e., SM2 <— SM1.
This data structure makes it possible for an agent to do backtracking search should a
negotiation fail.
Communication Between Agents
When agents negotiate over resource allocations, they exchange information. The
content of information, according to Definition 4.1 is:
(",i)
where a is a cooperative strategy proposed by an agent, and I is the state of the
agent when the strategy proposed is accepted. In our spring-based negotiation, o is
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an interval (T) which is conceded willingly by the proposing agent and I is the force of
the agent under this proposal. So, a proposal is:
(T,F)
In order to let the opponent to predict the proposing agent's state F, we modify the
form of the proposal to:
where ^ represents the slope of F with respect to T. With the additional information,
the opponent is able to predict the proposing agent's state and make a counter-proposal
more accurately (i.e., closer to the requirement given by a common sense principle) (See
Section 7.2.2 and Section 7.2.2 for details). This could make negotiation more efficient.
7.2.2 Predictive Concession vs Qualitative Concession
When two agents, namely agent i and agent j, have a conflict that their rt^ and rtjk
(they are two RTokens at the same stations reserved by agent i and agent j respectively)
overlap by T, then a negotiation procedure
negotiate^', z, T)
will be called to resolved the conflict. The basic framework of the procedure is based
on Algorithm 4.3. However, in spring-based negotiation where each time there are
only two negotiators, regarding how the two negotiators make proposals, we will have
the following simplied version of negotiate^', z, T). We call this version the predictive
version (see Algorithm 7.2) to distinguish the qualitative version (see Algorithm 7.1).
The two versions differ in ways of proposing offers. In the predictive version, each
proposing agent will make a proposal based on its knowledge about itself (what is its
state if the proposal is accepted) and its prediction about its opponent's state under
that proposal. In the qualitative version, each proposing agent makes proposals only
according to its current state and its opponent's current state.
Qualitative Concession
The first style of concession is what we called "Qualitative concession". Algorithm 7.1
shows a qualitative concession procedure.
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Algorithm 7.1
procedure negotiate(j, i, T)
1. Tj = AT ;; agent j concedes Tj
2. T, = AT ;; agent i concedes Ti
3. Computing Fj and Fi
4. if Tj + Ti < T then exit return (Tj,Tj) endif
;; the conflict is resolved
5. if Fj = Fi = oo then exit return 4> endif
;; none of the agents is able to concede anymore.
6. if Fj < Fi then




7. T = Ti + AT
Fi =Fi(Ti)
8. goto step 4
Predictive Concession
In the qualitative concession algorithm, a conceding agent is one of the two agents
which has smaller force. But how much the force is smaller than the other's is not
important. Each time, each conceding agent concedes a fixed amount of resource.
Although qualitative concession is very straight forward and easy to apply, it still
suffers some serious problems. For example, the fixed amount AT is very difficult
to determine: (1) A large AT will speed up the negotiation process but sometimes
will cause a conceding agent to over-concede and hence affect the agent's rationality
assumption; and (2) a small can limit the damage to agents' rationality, but will
increase negotiation time. A "predictive" concession algorithm, Algorithm 7.2 and
Algorithm 7.3 can solve this problem.
Algorithm 7.2
procedure negotiate(j,i,T)
1. pj <— initial-concession (j, T)
2. Oj = car(pj); Fj = cadr(pj)
3. pi <— p-concession(z, Oj, Fj, T)
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4. a = car(pj)
5. Fi = cadr(pi)
6. if <7i = oj exit return Oj endif
;; since both agents agree on the same strategy, it then becomes the agreement.
7. if Fj = Fi = co then exit return 0
8. pj 4— p-concession(j) Ci, Fi, T)
;; negotiation continues and now is agent j's turn of concession.
9. Oj = car (pj)
10. Fj = cadr(pj)
11. if (Tj = (Ti exit return Oi endif
12. if Fj = Fi = oo then exit return 0 endif
;; since none of the agents is able to concede, the negotiation terminates with no agreement.
13. goto step 3 ;; negotiation continues
Algorithm 7.3
procedure p-concession(j, ai, F,, T)
1. Fj =
2. if Fj < Fi then exit return (<7*, Fj) endif
;; agent j agrees on ai proposed by agent i.
3. Predict Fi(a)
4. Find a aj such that Fj(aj) = F,(<7j)
5. return (crj,Fj)
;; agent j makes a new proposal.
In the predictive algorithm, each conceding agent chooses a cooperative strategy based
on its prediction about the force of the other agent. It will select a strategy that satis¬
fies, according to its prediction, the common sense principle, i.e., the forces of the two
agents will be equal. The process is iterative because the prediction can not be 100%
precise due to that the predicting agent does not have complete knowledge about its
opponent. Despite this, this predictive model is expected to be much faster than the
qualitative model. In our spring-based negotiation, we will use the qualitative version
for nested negotiation procedures and predictive version for main negotiation proced¬
ure. This is because (1) nested negotiation normally requires each conflicting agent
to make small modifications to their resource allocations (one agent is gaining some
resources while the other is losing the same amount of resources), therefore negotiation
efficiency is not essential and qualitative concession is simple and acceptable, and (2)
in the main negotiation procedure, two conflicting agents often have a large amount of
overlapping resource allocation, therefore negotiation speed is very important, and so
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we use predictive concession.
Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 illustrated how the predictive concession algor-
thim works.
Initially, agent j and agent i reserve RTokens rtj and rt{ respectively. They overlap
by T as shown in Figure. Heuristically, the conflict can be resolved by agent j shifting
leftwards and/or yielding rear tolerance, and agent i shifting rightwards and/or yield¬
ing front tolerance. As we already know that the optimal state of global scheduling
is that
|it°"V)l = K,a(°)\ (*6E) (7.1)
That is <t(= (Ti^Tz)) is one that satisfies Equation 7.1. So, we can use this equation as
a common sense principle to guide negotiation. And force F is the common language
used to communicate during negotiation.
So, each agent (e.g., agent j) will select a negotiation strategy based on the following
knowledge:
1. Its knowledge about Fj°l^(a). Since agent j knows its local scheduling spring
model completely, therefore it knows Fj°l(3(a) completely (see below).
2. Its belief about Ff°lo(cr). Agent j does not have complete knowledge about
F*°lQ(cr), it can only predict it based on its incomplete knowledge about agent i.
The incomplete knowledge comes from communication between the two agents
during negotiation. Assuming F*°la(a) is a linear function will make the predic¬
tion easy.
7.2.3 Examples of Spring-based Negotiation
In this section, we give two examples of how resource conflicts in AGV scheduling
are resolved by our spring-based negotiation model. The two examples are based on
two scenarios used by Kwa (see Example 5.1 for the first scenarios and [Kwa 88a]
(pp!81-183) for the second scenario).
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Figure 7.2: The Elements of Spring Models
A Simple Example
The simple example is based on the scenario given in Example 5.1. Below is the trace
of negotiation between two agents AGV1 — which is to schedule Rl, R2 and R3 —
and AGV2, which is to schedule R7, R8 and R9.
Scheduling for AGV1




The provisional local schedule is made by the respective
AGV when other agents' resource allocations are not
considered.









Initial state of negotiation between AGV2 and AGV1:
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Figure 7.3: The Elements of Spring Models
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X10;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 19.50;
(3) AGV2 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV1 will concede on TOLB side;
(5) AGV2's RToken is (264.50 337.50);
(6) AGVl's RToken is (212.50 284.00);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV2 conceded on TOLA by 8
"AGV2 conceded on TOLA by 8" means that concession is
made on the front end of the RToken.
AGV2's force changes from 0. to 68.02
The force of the conceding agent is calculated by the
conceding agent according to its own spring model,
hence it is the true force of the agent.
the oppenent's force changes from 102.92 to 60.70
The force of the opponent is predicted by the conceding
agent according to its current knowledge about that
opponent, therefore it may not be the same as the true
force of the opponent.
AGV2's internal modification is as
follow:
(0. 1.15 0.)
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T"
Figure 7.4: The Elements of Spring Models
TOLA of the first node of AGV2 remains the same
Arrival Time of the first node increased by 1.15
TOLB of the first node remains the same
(-3.7 4.22 0.)
The width of TOLA of the second node decreased by 3.7
The Arrival Time of the second node increased by 4.22
TOLB of the second node remains the same.
(0. 4.18 0.)




AGV1 conceded on TOLB by 12
AGVl's force changes from 0. to 63.32
the oppenent's force changes from 165.84 to 63.80









The conflict-free local schedule for AGV2 is as follow:




The comments interspersed in the trace are made to help the reader to understand it.
A Non-trivial Example
The second example of resource conflict resolution by the spring-based negotiation
model is based on a scenario (see Figure 7.5) given by Kwa [Kwa 88a]. There are five
AGVs each of which has been planned a route as shown in the figure. Each agent's pro¬
visional schedule and final schedule (i.e., a schedule when the whole negotiation process
is completed) is illustrated in Appendix D and the negotiation process is illustrated
in Appendix C After negotiation, all conflicting allocations are resolved. In the whole
negotiation process, there are altogether 25 rounds of communication between negoti¬
ators to exchange proposals. Compared with 56 rounds of communication required in
a negotiation process to solve the same problem by Kwa's model (in Appendix D in
[Kwa 88a]), our model saves significant negotiation times. By examining our negoti¬
ation process and Kwa's negotiation process, there are two main distinctions between
them that makes our model faster than Kwa's:
1. Our model enables agents to predict their negotiating opponent's state so that
they can make proposals closer to the requirements given by the common sense
principle and speed up negotiation process. Kwa's model does not have this
ability.
2. Our model allows agents to apply combined negotiation techniques while Kwa's
model allows agents to apply one technique a time.
7.3 Experiments
Although the spring-based negotiation model we developed has strong theoretical sup¬
ports, we keep in mind the following three questions all the time:
1. Can our model outperform Kwa's model?
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Uncircled numbers are the nodes defining the route map
Bold circled numbers denote the AGVs
Paths of AGVs
AGV1 ... (29 24 25 20 15 10 15 14 13)
AGV2 ... (19 14 15 10 15 20 25 24 29)
AGV3 ... (9 4 5 10 15 20 25 24 29)
AGV4 ... (5 10 5 4 9)
AGV5 ... (20 15 10 15 14 19)
Figure 7.5: Trajectories of Five AGVs
2. Can our model be compared with other existing scheduling approaches?
3. Can our model be used to solve other scheduling problems?
In this section, we report some experimental results we achieved in comparing our
model with other models.
7.3.1 Comparing Our Model with Kwa's Model
The first objective of our experiments is to compare our negotiation model with Kwa's
negotiation model to see whether our model can solve an AGVSP problem better than
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Kwa's does.
Measuring Performance of a Scheduling Method
There are two main aspects to consider for measuring a scheduling method — effi¬
ciency, i.e., how fast a complete schedule can be achieved by the method, and quality,
i.e., how good the schedule is.
About efficiency, we mainly consider how many communication times are needed dur¬
ing the whole process of negotiation. Obviously, the more communication times are
needed, the less efficient the method is.
There are various objective functions to measure the quality of a schedule in the liter¬
ature of JSSP. The followings are some typical objective function [Conway et al. 67]:
1. An objective function for measuring makespan of a schedule, i.e., the maximum
completion time. An optimal solution is one that minimises the makespan.
2. Objective functions for measuring flow time. Flow time of a job is defined as the
interval between the time the job is ready and the time the job is completed. For
example, the weighted flow time objective function and the weighted mean flow
time objective function are for measuring flow time. Optimal solutions are those
that minimise these flow time objective functions.
3. Objective functions for measuring closeness of the completion time of a job and
the due-date of the job. For example, the weighted lateness objective function
and the weighted tardiness objective function, etc. are in this category. Optimal
solutions are those that minimise these objective functions.
The makespan objective function, which is the most common objective function in
the literature of JSSP, is not considered in our experiment. Makespan is the capacity
measurement which indicates the shortest time period for finishing a given set of jobs.
Our model mainly deals with satisfying various preferences over how each job is done.
For example, a job, which could be allocated to be finished by 3:00pm with the current
available resource, would be scheduled by our model (and Kwa's model) to finish by
4:00pm if that is the job's preferred finish time. In this case, the makespan of the
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whole schedule for the AGVSP will certainly be affected. Therefore, the makespan is
not of our primary consideration.
About flow time, we consider the travel time of a job, i.e., the interval from the starting
time of a job and the finishing time of the job:
= (7-2)
where Tj is the travel time of job t? is the starting time (arrival time) at the first
station and tjN is the completion time (departure time) at the last station. We use
the following weighted travel time objective function:
N
Tweight = ^ 'WjTj (7-3)
j
where Wj is the weight of job j. The spring constants in our model for a job are directly
proportional to the weight of the respective job.
Travel time is closely related to flow time in that they both focus on how much time is
needed for completing a job. However, flow time uses the ready time (the earliest start
time in our model) as the starting time. So, minimising flow time means scheduling a
job to be finished as close to the ready time as possible. This again is not acceptable
in the AGVSP. In the AGVSP, a job means that an AGV travels along a route with
various operations such as loading, unloading, etc. These operations are normally
required to be done at preferred times. So, the job is not necessarily to be started
and finished as early as possible. We use the following weighted deviation objective
function:
N
ETweight = ££ wi\eth - eth I <7'4)
j k
Here et°k is the departure time of AGV j (job j) at its A:th station. Superscript o
indicates that at this station there are loading/unloading operations required. This
objective function is different from classical JSSP objective functions relating to fin¬
ishing time which are concerned either with tardiness (how late a job is scheduled to
be finished than the due-date) or earliness (how much earlier a job is scheduled to
be finished than the due-date). ETweight concerns Just-In-Time (JIT) requirements
which, in the AGVSP, are more important than requirements of tardiness or earliness.
The last objective function we considered is related to the robustness of an AGV
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schedule:
Rweight - E "hdAt°l%\ I lAi<D (7-5)
j,k
This objective function measures how much tolerant time has been conceded after
negotiation. Obviously, the more the tolerant times are lost, the larger value the
objective function will yield. Therefore, a better schedule will return a smaller value
from the objective function.
Outline of the Experiments
Our experiments were carried out according to the following procedure:
1. Generating a set of N random jobs;
2. Generating a set of N provisional local schedules according to the job set;
3. Applying the spring-based negotiation model to the set of provisional local sched¬
ules until the process is completed.
4. Applying the iterative negotiation model of Kwa's to the same set of provisional
schedules until the process is completed.
5. Analysing the results of the both models and comparing them.
About how a local schedule is randomly generated, the interested reader can read
Appendix E.
About Setting Negotiation Skill in Kwa's Model
In Kwa's model, a negotiation skill is a list of negotiation techniques and a negotiation
technique indicates an amount of resource is conceded and a method (yielding or shift¬
ing) for realising the concession. It is fundamentally important that negotiation skills
be properly defined. Unfortunately, there are no clear instructions from Kwa's work
about what negotiation skill to use in a given situation. For this reason, we did various
experiments on choosing approriate negotiation skills. Generally, these experiments
tell us that:
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1. If a negotiation skill consists of only yielding techniques, then the robustness of
the whole AGV schedule will be seriously affected, since most of the redundant
resources are conceded during negotiation. Another observation is that the num¬
ber of local schedules that can not be made conflict-free after negotiation with
the yielding only techniques becomes very large when the number of total local
schedules increases. In other words, pr(n), which is the probability of resolving
a local schedule which is in conflict with one or more of n local schedules in
RT — DB (they are conflict-free), decreases more sharply when n increases than
when other negotiation techniques are used (about pr(^)? the interested reader
can refer to Appendix E).
2. If a negotiation skill consists of only shifting techniques, more local schedules can
be made conflict-free compared with using yielding only techniques. However,
although the robustness is not affected (since no redundant resources are yielded),
other qualities of the whole AGV schedule become worse: (1) Tweight becomes
larger and this indicates that the travel time for each AGV to complete its journey
generally becomes larger; and (2) ETweight becomes larger and this indicates
that the deviation of the finishing time for each job from its preferred due-date
generally becomes larger.
3. So, a good negotiation skill may be one that combines yielding and shifting tech¬
niques. The question that remains to be unanswered is, if combined techniques
are used, how much should be yielded and how much should be shifted. Kwa's
model does not give any guidance about how to combine them. In order to find
a combined skill that can produce the best result of conflict resolution, we did
the following experiment:
(1) A negotiation skill is constructed as:
(Yield(p), Shift(l-p)) 0 < p < 1
where p is the percentage of resource conceded by a yielding technique. In
other words, if an agent is considering to concede T to the opponent for
resolving a conflict, then it will first concede T * p by yielding techniques,
and then concede the rest (i.e., T * (1 — p)) by shifting techniques.
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Figure 7.6: The Probability of Resolving Conflicting Schedules
(2) For each given p, we will have a negotiation skill. Apply this skill for solving
the AGVSP with Kwa's model, then analyse the results to see how well this
skill can resolve conflicts during problem solving.
Figure 7.6 shows the probability of resolving conflicting schedules with parameter
p. The X axis is the number of conflict-free schedules in RT-DB. and the Y axis is
the probability of resolving a conflicting schedule. From this experiment, we can
see that when p = 0.35, the ability of Kwa's model to resolve conflicts reaches the
best point (which is very close to that — the up-most line — by the spring-based
negotiation model). Therefore, we used this negotiation skill for the rest of our
experiments.
Results of Experiments
The experimental results are listed in Tabel 7.1. These data are achieved according to
the following procedure: (1) generate 100 local schedules for 100 AGVs, (2) use Kwa's
model to build the 100 local schedules into a complete conflict-free global schedule and
calculate the values of (a) ComTimes — How many times of communication are needed
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Model ComTimes ETweiqht Tuieiqht Rweiqht \
Kwa's Model 956 1674.5 9064.34 1323 |
Spring Model 254 1299.03 6045.44 950.2 |
Table 7.1: Experimental Results from Kwa's Model and the Spring-based Model
during negotiatiation, (b) ETweight (see Equation 7.4) — the weighted deviation ob¬
jective function for measuring the error between the scheduled finishing time of an op¬
eration and the preferred finishing time of the operation, (c) rweight (see Equation 7.3)
— the weighted travel time objective function, and (d) Rweight (see Equation 7.5) —
the weighted deviation objective function for measuring the robustness of the complete
schedule, and finally (3) repeat (1) and (2) for 30 times and calculate the averages for
ComTimes, ETweight, Tweight and Rweight respectively. Data listed in Tabel 7.1 are
these averages. These data have shown that the spring-based negotiation model is
better than Kwa's model in many aspects. To help the reader to understand these
data, we clarify them further as follows:
1. Our negotiation model needs many fewer communication times during negoti¬
ation time than Kwa's model does. This implies that our model is more efficient
than Kwa's. Figure 7.7 roughly shows the communication times needed during a
negotiation process by the two model (the lines are based on three points when
the number, n, of schedules in the RT-DB are 0, 50 and 100 respectively).
2. Our model meets the JIT requirements better than Kwa's does, since it yields
a much smaller number of ETweight than Kwa's does. That is to say, finishing
times of operations are scheduled by our model closer to their respective preferred
finishing times than by Kwa's model.
3. Our model schedules AGV's travels with shorter travel times than Kwa's does,
i.e., Tweight by our model is smaller than by Kwa's. According to our analysis,
the main reason is that in our model, there are linking springs, i.e, tjkjk+1^ which
keep travel times as close to the preferred travel times as possible. Kwa's model
does not have such links.
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Figure 7.7: The Communication Times
4. Our model produces schedules more robust than Kwa's model does, in terms
of Rweight• Schedules by our model yields smaller values of Rweight• This can
be further clarified by the following Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9. Figure 7.8 illus¬
trates the probability (Y-axis: scale = 1:100) of percentage of remaining tolerant
time after negotiation by the spring-based model. 0.5021 in this Figure is the
mean percentage of the remaining tolerance resulted from by the spring-based
model. Figure 7.9 shows the probability (Y-axis: scale = 1:100) of percentage of
remaining tolerant time after negotiation by Kwa's model. 0.3444 is the mean
percentage of the remaining tolerance from Kwa's model. From these two fig¬
ures, our model produces schedules that keep more initially allocated tolerant
times than Kwa's does. Since, the major concern of allocating tolerant times is
to make schedules more robust, losing initially allocated tolerant times means
the robustness is affected negatively. In this sense, our model performs much
better than Kwa's. Our experiments also shows that, in the schedule built up
by the spring-based model, more important operation nodes (with larger spring
constants) will on average keep more tolerance than those with smaller constants
do, while in the schedule built up by Kwa's model, this property is not so evident
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Figure 7.8: The Probability of Percentage of Remaining Tolerant Time After Negoti¬
ation By the Spring Model
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Figure 7.9: The Probability of Percentage of Remaining Tolerant Time After Negoti¬
ation By Kwa's Model
— in other words — how much tolerance a node keeps after negotiation is not as
closely related to the importance of the node as it is in our spring-based model.
(We did not illustrate the experiment results due to space reasons).
7.3.2 Comparing Our Model with a GA Scheduling Method
We also made efforts on comparing our spring model with other scheduling approaches.
We tried to run Fang's GA scheduling model ([Fang et al. 93] [Corne et al. 93] [Corne et al.
on the AGVSP problem. However, the results achieved by that model are generally not
satisfactory. They are not comparable with the results achieved by our spring model.
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Afterwards, we analysed the reasons why Fang's GA scheduling model, which was
reported to perform remarkably well for solving JSSP problems, could not solve the
AGVSP problems. They are:
1. In general JSSP problems, tolerant planning is not considered. But the AGVSP
problem we considered is based on the assumption that tolerant planning is
allowed.
2. As is explained in [Fang et al. 93], in general JSSP, few heuristics rules can satisfy
JIT requirements. However, in our spring model, the spring unit, , which
attracts finishing time of an operation to its preferred finishing time, provides a
very good heuristic to satisfy JIT requirements.
3. His model is mainly aimed at reducing the makespan of a complete schedule for all
operations. It is a permutation problem, i.e., once the order of starting operations
is decided then the scheduling problem is virtually solved. For example, if there
are three operations, A, B and C, to be scheduled (they may use the same machine
or not, they may have some precedence constraints, e.g., A must be done before
B ...), no matter what constraints are, if we know the order in which these
operations are done, then the remaining problem of scheduling is to let starting
time of each operation be as early as possible as long as these constraints can be
satisfied. This means that negotiation between operations' resource allocations is
not possible. In our model, we assume that even if the order of any two operations
are decided, their starting times are still negotiable.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we outlined our implementation of the spring-based negotiation model.
We gave two examples to show that this model can solve the AGVSP problem. Some
results of experiments are reported to show that the spring-based negotiation model
performs better than Kwa's. Although we could not compare with our model with
other scheduling models, we presented some reasons to explain this.
Chapter 8
Contributions and Future Work
8.1 Introduction
This chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing the major contributions we
achieved in this dissertation and presenting some possible work that could be done in
future.
8.2 Major Contributions
This dissertation focuses mainly on two closely related issues: (1) in general, we invest¬
igated how agents, which operate in a situation of the cooperative interaction problem
(CIP) where they have to jointly choose a cooperative strategy, can unanimously focus
on a single strategy, and (2) specifically, based on the achievements we made in the first
part, we developed the spring-based negotiation model to solve the AGVSP problem
in a multi-agent system where each agent's local schedule is represented by a spring
model.
8.3 Contributions Relating to the CIP problem
1. We constructed the CIP problem and showed that many DAI problems such
as the resource allocation problem, the task allocation problem, etc., can be
classified as CIP problems.
2. We proved that, in general, a CIP, when agents are assumed to be rational and
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benevolent, will become a difficult cooperative problem in which none of these
agents is able to improve its current state (payoff) without negatively affecting
that of others. So, merely assuming agents are rational and benevolent can only
solve the CIP problem in part.
3. We proposed a concept of a common sense principle to allow agents to continue
their cooperation when such a difficult situation is met. The common sense prin¬
ciple played the same role as common sense in a social community. We argued
that the concept is especially important when we are dealing with a non-open
system where the system designer has some implicit or explicit requirements
about how the system should perform. The common sense principle, to some
extant, reflects these requirements from the system designer. We can also view a
common sense principle as a law made by a government — although the govern¬
ment may not be able to totally control how each individuals should behave, the
law will constrain these individuals' behaviour. The society is still a multi-agent
system, but the law could guide individuals' behaviour such the society develops
according to the government's wishes.
4. Based on the concept of a common sense principle, we formally defined metaphor-
based negotiation. This definition differs from other definitions of the term ne¬
gotiation found in the DAI literature in that (1) it formally defines what is a
proposal, (2) it formally provides conditions for an agent's accepting an proposal
by another agent. With this definition, we are able to derive a negotiation al¬
gorithm for solving an application problem, provided that we are able to equip
agents with common sense principles.
8.4 Contributions to Solving the AGVSP Problem
We continued the study of the CIP by developing the spring-based negotiation model
for solving an application problem: the AGVSP problem. Our major contributions
can be summarised as follows:
1. The spring model is a novel representational model for representing hard con¬
straints and soft constraints in the AGVSP. So far, in the scheduling literature,
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as far as we learnt, there does not exist such a representational model that can
represent hard constraints and soft constraints synthetically.
2. The spring model is a scheduling model which provides a solution space for the
AGVSP: as long as the spring model can be pushed, there exist legal solutions
to the AGVSP.
3. The spring model is a negotiation model. Two agents each of which has a local
spring network, if they are in conflict in resource allocations, will negotiate to
resolve the conflict based on their local spring network under a common sense
principle that their restoration forces towards each other must be equal.
4. We implemented a spring-based negotiation model for the AGVSP.
8.5 The Spring Model vs Kwa's Negotiation Model
We compared our spring-based model with Kwa's model and the comparison tells
us that our model performs better than Kwa's in various aspects: lesser rounds of
negotiation — which could imply less computational time, better robustness, short
travel times, etc.
In Kwa's model, the procedure of negotiation is very simple: when agents' resource
allocations are in conflict, there is an initiator (one which detected the conflict) invoking
a negotiation procedure. What each agent will concede totally depends on a skill set
which is set by the user prior to the negotiation. In each negotiation round, each agent
may work out a negotiation technique (retract the first negotiation technique in the
skill set) in a faster speed than it will do in our spring model. However, this also means
less autonomy for each agent in deciding what to concede in a particular circumstance.
Our model on the other hand allows each agent to work out its negotiation technique
based on the situation where the agent is located: more powerful agent (with stronger
restoration forces) will apply a technique that concedes lesser resource to other agents.
Another advantage of the spring model over Kwa's negotiation model is that our model
has a theoretical background while Kwa's does not. In Kwa's model, how a skill set
should be set has not been explained, therefore it will be very difficult for us to apply
it to a practical problem. In our model, how much an agent should concede and how
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to concede can be caculated based on the spring model.
Through experiments, we also found that our model needs much lesser negotiation
rounds to resolve a conflict than Kwa's does. This may imply that our model needs
lesser computational time than Kwa's does. However, further experiments must be
done in future to support this argument.
8.6 Future Research
There are several issues that could be raised for future research relating to the work
done in this dissertation.
First of all, about the general CIP research, we proposed the concept of a common
sense principle. Although, we have shown how to use it in the spring-based negoti¬
ation model, we are not able to study further on whether there exists some common
principles for generating a common sense principle.
Secondly, about the Spring model, we assume that springs are linear, that is the res¬
toration force of a spring is linearly proportional to the deviation of the assignment
of a variable from its preferred assignment. This may not be universally true in the
AGVSP. For example, an activity which, due to resource constraints, can not be alloc¬
ated resources to satisfy its preferred due-date, may be allocated with other resources
so that its finishing time is as close to the preferred time as possible. Currently, we use
a linear spring to attract the assignment to the preferred due-date. However, it might
be the case sometimes that if the activity can not be allocated resources to guarantee
its finishing to be very near the preferred due-date (e.g., within two hours), then it
might be less important when the activity should be allocated. In this case, we need a
non-linear spring unit to represent the activity. This issue has not been dealt with in
this dissertation.
Finally, our model is currently demonstrated only on the AGVSP problem. Although
we have showed that it can solve the AGVSP better than Kwa's model, it will be
more interesting if we can extend this model to other application domains. For ex¬
ample, the spring-based negotiation model may be applied to solve the train scheduling
problem [Fukumori 80].
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In conclusion, this dissertation is concerned with solving a cooperative interaction
problem. We reported our achievements both in general investigation and in specific
application. The experimental results reported have shown that our spring-based model
is a promising model in solving the AGVSP problem. It could possibly be extended to
other application domains of scheduling in future.
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/* Construct a conflict-free Plan */
vars: P, pi, MainConflictSet,Residuel, pi' P';
1. Generate Plan P independently for Agent to achieve Task.
/* P is feasible from the viewpoint of Agent, but may involve steps which conflict with
other agents. In general P is a partially ordered graph of primitive plan steps */
2. until all plan steps in P have been considered do
3. Choose a plan step pi not considered before.
4. Identify MainConflictSet, the set of agents in conflict with Pi.
5. if MainConflictSet is empty then goto step 13 endif
6. Residuel «— ResolveConflict(Agent, pi, MainConflictS
7. if Residuel = 0 then goto step 13 endif
/* pi cannot be made conflict-free */
8. Find an alternative plan step pi' for pi.
9. if pi' exists then pi «— pi'; go to step 4 endif
/* P is infeasible */
10. Find an alternative plan P' for Agent to achieve Task.
11. if P' exists then P <— P'; repeat step 2
afresh endif
12. signal failure and exit
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procedure: ResolveConflict(Initiator, Action, ConflictSet)
/* Attempt to eliminate all conflicts associated with Action; returns the residue */
var: Residue2, Respondent, C;
1. Residue2 «— 0
2. until Residue2 > 0 or all members of ConflictSet have been considered before.
3. Choose from ConflictSet, an agent Respondent not consi- dered before.
4. Compute conflict C between Initiator and Respondent with respect to Action.




procedure: Negotiation(Initiator, Respondent, Differential)
/* Iteratively negotiate to eliminate Differential; returns the residue */
1. Differential <— ApplyTechnique(Initiator, Differential).
2. if Differential = 0 then exit, return 0 endif
3. Differential <— ApplyTechnique(Respondent, Differential)
4. if Differential = 0 then exit, returning 0 endif
5. if no new techniques can be applied to reduce Differential
6. then exit, returning Differential /* Negotiation impasse occurred */ endif




/* Respond by applying a technique in the current negotiation round; returns the residue */
vars: T, SubAgents, Residue3;
1. Find technique T appropriate for Agent to reduce Differential
2. if prior to T's application, negotiation with Agent's subsidiary agents is required.
3. then identify Subagents, the set of Agent's subsidi- ary agents involved.
4. Residue3 «— ResolveConflict(Agent, T, SubAgents) endif
5. Apply T to reduce Differential as far as Kesidue3 would allow.
6. return Differential





In order to be able to perform backtracking search, every negotiator must keep the
history of negotiation with all the information undestroyed.
In this section, we present our reimplementation of Kwa's iterative negotiation model.
We are aiming to provide the top planner with the necessary information, so that
backtracking can be performed if the top level planner wishes to do so. To implement
the model, we must consider the following requirements that have to be met by the
negotiation programme :
• The ability to find a resolution for the conflict. By the ability is meant that a
resolution can be found if there exists any. For a conflict there may exist several
resolutions, but it is of principal interest whether the negotiation can find one of
them.
• The minimum influence on other agents' plans. If two agents are in conflict,
it is better to resolve the conflict between them only without involving a third
agent for yielding resources. Otherwise there are problems which might result
from the chain reaction of nested negotiation. This does not mean that calling
a third agent is strictly prohibited. Over-emphasizing the spirit of altruism will
result in another problem of unbalanced overall robustness of the multi-agent
system, that is, the agents involved in the negotiation will severely compromise
their robustness for the sake of not asking a third agent to yield its resources.
• The fast speed of completing the negotiation. The speed must be fast enough
because negotiation is a dynamic procedure from the viewpoint of the whole
AGV planning system. If the speed is slow the negotiation will not serve the
purpose of overcoming the problem of frequent replanning.
To decrease the influence on other agents' plans, the negotiation skills can be combined
by using yield skills first and using shift skills after that. The fastest speed of completing
the whole negotiation process depends on several factors:
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• The search strategy we choose.
• The computer programming language we use.
• The design of the negotiation program.
In this appendix we implement Kwa's interactive negotiation model, aiming to preserve
all the necessary information during negotiation so that it can be utilized to perform
backtracking in future work.
B.l The Programming Language Choice
The computer programming language used for implementing the iterative negotiation
models must satisfy with the requirement of the fast execution of the negotiation
procedure.
We have noticed that the iterative negotiation models are all procedural so it is better
to use a kind of procedural computer programming language to implement them. For
this reason, we choose the SCHEME programming language [Steele 78]. SCHEME
is a statically scoped and properly tail-recursive dialect of the LISP programming
language. It was designed to have an exceptionally clear and simple semantics and few
different ways to form expressions. Using a Scheme —» C interpreter, SCHEME
can be compiled to C and thus the SCHEME language can be combined with C,
fairly efficiently. C is generally considered as one of the fastest high level language
used for control purposes. Simply speaking, we choose the SCHEME language for
implementing the iterative negotiation models mainly because the SCHEME language
is a kind of procedural language and can be compiled to C.
There is another reason why we choose the SCHEME. The SCHEME programming
can be run in EZD, an easy drawing program for the X-window environment. All
drawing commands are written in the form of SCHEME lists. We can use this feature
to design a display system for our AGV planning system.
B.2 The Appearance of a Node in a Plan for an AGV
A plan for an AGV can be examined from various perspectives.
Firstly, we can regard a plan as a string of nodes which are the names of places that
the AGV will arrive at and depart from in due time:
Secondly, if we are interested in the INTERV s (or RTokens) that an AGV reserved
then we can regard a plan as a list of RTs:
PLAN = (PLCi,PLC2,.-,PLCn)
NODE = PLCi (i = 1,2,n)
(B.l)
(B.2)
PLAN = (RT\,RT2,..., RTn) (B.3)
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NODE = RTi (i = 1,2,n) (B.4)
Finally, if we concentrate on how each INTERV is composed then we can define a
plan as:
PLAN = (INTVuINTV2,...JNTVn) (B.5)
NODE = INTVi (i = 1,2,n) (B.6)
The three types of definitions of a node are consistent but they express nodes to a
different degree. A node in form of an INTV will contain more information than it
does in the form of an RT. Similarly, a node in the form of an RT contains more
information than it does in the form of a PLC. We do not pay much attention to the
form PLC, because it does not contain as much information as is needed during the
negotiation.
A node in the form of an RT contains the maximum limit of information that one
AGV is willing to offer to another. As stated in chapter 2, every AGV is selfish,
each one is trying to concede as little resource as possible during negotiation. This
means every AGV must keep its secrets from other AGVs, i.e, to keep their internal
compositional parts of the INTVs as well as other information such as bottomline ,
TECH , etc. concealed. Therefore it is better to distinguish the internal look of a node
in the form of an INTV (or in more complicated form) from the external look of a
node in the form of an RT. Every AGV does not want other AGVs to spy into its
own internal affairs, but the AGV itself knows the details of the compositional parts
of its every node. This is similar to the case of inviting tenders when a company is
trying to invite a contractor to accept an engineering business. If the bottom line of
the engineering business is revealed to one contractor then the contractor may possibly
to accept the business in its best favour, i.e, the company offers very high price. In the
case of negotiation, if one AGV 's negotiation bottom line is open to its opponent, the
opponent could possibly not yield any resource to the AGV before the AGV exhausted
all its redundant resources.
B.2.1 Layered Negotiation Process
In the iterative negotiation model, we can see that the process of conflict resolution
through negotiation is an iterative process, the negotiator and the respondent give in
resources in turn and it needs several rounds to finish. In every round, the initiator
and the respondent may possibly concede some of their resources and their internal
structures of nodes are therefore being modified, moreover, there are probably nested
negotiations involved and thus other AGV s' nodes are probably modified too. Those
modified nodes will be used in the further negotiation rounds and such modifications
will be continued until the whole negotiation process finishes. In order to be able to do
backtracking search, every modification should be stored in some way such that when
the negotiation fails in one round, it can still continue by going back one round and
seeking for other alternative conflict resolutions. Figure B.l illustrates such a layered
negotiation process. Every state in the tree presents the states of all the nodes in AGV
plans after a round negotiation is finished. Applying different negotiation strategies,
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such as, the order of using negotiation techniques, etc., by the AGV s involved in the
negotiation will lead to different states. Backtracking search allows the negotiation to
continue by shifting it from one level at which the negotiation fails to its previous level,
e.g. from Sill to Sll, and searching in an alternative direction, say, to SI 12, from Sll
and thus saves the searching time from SO to Sll.
In our reimplementation, the layered process is represented in terms of negotiation
depth. A unit of depth indicates one round. So all the nodes which are modified at
this depth will be stored with the depth associated.
B.2.2 The design
Our reimplementation is designed in three main modules: the negotiator, the data
bases with their handlers and the top level planner. We assume that the top level
planner exists and will do the final decision about whether the negotiation results can
be committed or not. So the main tasks of the reimplementation are to write the
negotiation program and data base handler. Figure B.2 shows the AGV planning
system modules.
Figure B.l: Layered Negotiation Process
Figure B.2: The AGV Planning System Modules
The negotiator for an AGV will find the conflict set by consulting the data bases
through the data base handler and then choose one respondent to negotiate with and
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record the negotiation history by storing all changes of its nodes along with the nego¬
tiation depth while leaving the information about the past of those nodes unaltered.
The negotiator does not make the final decision, leaving that right to the top planner.
B.2.3 Example
Suppose AGV\ has a plan (Noden Node 12 Node13) which is executable and the only
plan that has been inserted into the data bases sometime before, and AGV2 has a
plan, (Node21 Node22 Node2$), which is newly created by the planner and has not
been put into the data base yet.
The nodes for the two plan in terms of RTs are:
Node 11 = (AGVi PLCa 100 118)
Node 12 = (AGVi PLCb 200 230)
Node 13 = (AGVi PLCc 300 348)
Node21 = (AGV2 PLCd 80 99.8)
Node22 = (AGV2 PLCb 190 213.4)
Node23 = (AGV2 PLCb 300 354))
When we run the negotiation program, Node2\ is inserted into the data base where
the existing plan nodes (e.g. for AGV2) are stored, for there is no conflict node found.
After that Node22 whose RToken , (190 213.4), is reserved at a place called PLCb, is
found a conflict node, Node 12 which reserved an RToken, (200 230), at the same place,
PLCb. The negotiation procedures are then invoked to resolve conflict and the conflict
is resolved by Node22 yielding its RToken to (184.4 206) and Node 12 to (206 232).
The updated Node22 is then inserted into the data base. Node23 A35 no conflict node
in the data base and is inserted into the data base. The negotiation process is finished
in three rounds. Checking the data base after the whole process is finished we can find
the history of the negotiation stored in the data base.
The whole process is presented below:
RT : (AGV2 PLCD 80 99.8)
RT : (AGV2 PLCB 190 213.4)
RT for Nevplan node : (AGV2 PLCB 190 213.4)
































(AGV1 PLCB 202 232)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 186 209.4)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV1 PLCB 202 232)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV1 PLCB 204 232)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 184.4 207.8)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 184.4 207.8)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 184.4 207.4)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV1 PLCB 204 232)
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Concession Disp






rt : (AGV1 PLCB 206 232)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 184.4 207.4)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 184.4 207.4)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 184.4 206.)
RT : (AGV2 PLCE 300 354) Has been Inserted
From the example, we can see that: the negotiation process is completed in several
rounds (here is three rounds) and every AGV's negotiator may apply several nego¬
tiation techniques to concede its planned amount which it wish to give up in each
round.
Here is a more complex example:
Suppose the plan nodes for AGV\ and AGV2 are in the data base and they are the
results of the negotiation in the example above:
Node 11 = {AGV1
Nodeu = {AGV,










APPENDIX B. REIMPLEMENTATION OF THE ITERATIVENEGOTIATION MODEL190
Now, there is a new plan to confirm whose nodes are:
Nodesi = (AGVs PLCf 60 79.8)
Nodes2 = (AGVs PLCb 175 199)
Nodes3 = (AGVs PLCg 330 384)
Since Node32 is in conflict with Node22, the negotiation procedures are called. For
the Rtoken corresponding to Node22 is so close to that corresponding to Node\2, the
nested conflict occurs when Node22 concedes resource by SHIFT techniques and nested
negotiation is called. After the negotiation, Node22 and Node32 become respectively:
Node22 = (AGV2 PLCb 191.5 206)
Node32 = (AGVs PLCb 171 191.5)
The record of the process is listed below:
RT : (AGV3 PLCF 60 79.8)
RT : (AGV3 PLCB 175 199)
RT for Newplan node
Conflict node on RIGHT
Differential
(AGV3 PLCB 175 199)
(AGV2 PLCB 184.4 206.)
14.59999999999999
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 173.5 197.5)
Concession Disp










RT1 : (AGV2 PLCB 185.9 207.5)
RT2 : (AGV1 PLCB 206 232)
DF : 1. 5
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(AGV3 PLCB 172. 196.)
Concession Disp










RT1 : (AGV2 PLCB 187.4 207.5)
RT2 : (AGV1 PLCB 206 232)
DF : 1. 5
Conceded by One Tech






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 187.4 206.9)
Conceded by One Tech






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 187.4 206.)
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Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 195.)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 195.)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 194.5)
Concession Disp










RT1 : (AGV2 PLCB 188.9 207.5)
RT2 : (AGV1 PLCB 206 232)
DF : 1.5
Conceded by One Tech






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 188.9 207.5)
Conceded by One Tech
Type : Possitive Concesion





















(AGV3 PLCB 171. 194.5)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 194.5)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 193.)
Concession Disp










RT1 : (AGV2 PLCB 190.4 207.5)
RT2 : (AGV1 PLCB 206 232)
DF : 1.5
Conceded by One Tech
Type : Possitive Concesinn
Depth : 203
Technique : YIELDENDHEDGE




rt : (AGV2 PLCB 190.4 207.5)
Conceded by One Tech






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 190.4 206.)
Conceded by One Tech






rt : (AGV2 PLCB 190.4 206.)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 193.)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 193.)
Concession Disp






rt : (AGV3 PLCB 171. 191.5)
Concession Disp
Type : Possitive Concesion
Depth : 204
Technique : SHIFTRIGHT








RT1 (AGV2 PLCB 191.5 207.1)
RT2 (AGV1 PLCB 206 232)
DF 1.099999999999994














(AGV2 PLCB 191.5 207.1)














(AGV2 PLCB 191.5 207.1)














(AGV2 PLCB 191.5 206.)
RT : (AGV3 PLCG 330 384)
From the two examples, we can see that how the negotiation is going depends largely
on what negotiation techniques are used and the resources yielded in each round. In
our implementation, these two problems are solved by assuming that a negotiation
technique is chosen by selecting the first technique in a prioritized technique list and
that the concession amount in every is the fixed number which is given prior to the
negotiation process. However, by doing so, the characteristics of negotiation could
not be sufficiently expressed. In real case of negotiation, negotiation techniques and
concession amount should be chosen dynamically according to the updated information
the negotiator can obtain. This could be a very complex process and could be a very
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interesting topic in the future as the continuation of the project.
B.3 Summary
In this appendix, we described Kwa's iterative negotiation model and its implement¬
ation. We found that in order to allow backtracking to be performed, one important
premise is that the history of the negotiation must be preserved. We reimplemented
Kwa's model based on these thoughts and made the negotiation process layered so that
the history of the negotiation can be kept in an ordered way.
The results of the examples gave an outline of how the reimplemented negotiation
process works.
It is better to say the implementation provides the necessary information for backtrack¬





































Initial state of negotiation between AGV2 and AGV1:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X15;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 2.282016786405762;
(3) AGV2 will concede on T0LB side;
(4) AGV1 will concede on TOLA side;
(5) AGV2's RToken is (96.47474816186309 131.4747481618631);
(6) AGVl's RToken is (129.1927313754573 174.1927313754573);
Now Hie uegulialiwu alal't3 ....
AGV2 conceded on T0LB by 2
AGV2's force changes from 0. to 18.30473039661049
the oppenent's force changes from 20.0004740210011 to 2.553262579895375
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AGV1 conceded on TOLA by 1
AGVl's force changes from 0.09305932871413169 to 8.816665049266993
the oppenent's force changes from 20.88585101784847 to 11.73348581954323





















Initial state of negotiation between AGV2 and AGV1:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X10;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 14.2202036617465;
(3) AGV2 will concede on T0LB side;
(4) AGV1 will concede on TOLA side;
(5) AGV2's RToken is (110.9891796211664 155.9891796211664);
(6) AGVl's RToken is (141.7689759594199 176.7689759594199);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV2 conceded on TOLB by 6
AGV2's force changes from 0. to 100.0899717359672
the opponent's force changes from 165.5896471872104 to 95.72159840560538
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(0. -0.02979678954261544 0.)










AGV1 conceded on TOLA by 9
AGVl's force changes from 0. to 81.6494033207569
the oppenent's force changes from 237.2166304306505 to 87.08167282669982





















Initial state of negotiation between AGV2 and AGV1:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X15;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 26.93458864104605;
(3) AGV2 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV1 will concede on T0LB side;
(5) AGV2's RToken is (152.0988331584125 187.0988331584125);
(6) AGVl's RToken is (133.8409495151446 179.0334217994586);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV2 conceded on TOLA by 13
AGV2's force changes from 0. to 123.8542360149533
the oppenent's force changes from 232.4602168116404 to 120.2631137177369




















APPENDIX C. TRACE OF SPRING-BASED NEGOTIATION 200
(258.6253673718585 318.6253673718585)
AGV1 conceded on TOLB by 12
AGVl's force changes from 0. to 150.333137354945
the oppenent's force changes from 258.8304974558373 to 142.593471805899









(0. -0.6596468139758258 -2 .273736754432321e-13)
(0. -0.152226187840597 0.)










AGV2 conceded on TOLA by 2
AGV2's force changes from 123.8542360149533 to 143.9051989961156
the oppenent's force changes from 178.1368325850212 to 149.3930524964102










































Initial state of negotiation between AGV3 and AGV1:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X15;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 9.672704676359331;
(3) AGV3 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV1 will concede on T0LB side;
(5) AGV3's RToken is (216.2253687080857 251.2253687080857);
(6) AGVl's RToken is (190.898073384445 225.898073384445);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV3 conceded on TOLA by 4
AGV3's force changes from 0. to 92.04972943103911
the oppenent's force changes from 110.4570657120554 to 64.77922506340245



















AGV1 conceded on T0LB by 6
AGVl's force changes from 0. to 68.51605401143375
the oppenent's force changes from 223.5906110345626 to 84.46027821285321






































Initial state of negotiation between AGV4 and AGV3:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X5;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 13.52922007210563;
(3) AGV4 will concede on T0LB side;
(4) AGV3 will concede on TOLA side;
(5) AGV4's RToken is (143.7857315481657 178.7857315481657);
(6) AGV3's RToken is (165.2565114760601 200.2565114760601);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV4 conceded on T0LB by 7
AGV4's force changes from 0. to 101.8660300281963
the oppenent's force changes from 192.4344335773837 to 92.86912028789132













AGV3 conceded on TOLA by 7
AGV3's force changes from 0. to 99.56531328949239
the oppenent's force changes from 196.8811340175983 to 95.01510398940201



















Initial state of negotiation between AGV4 and AGV3:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X10;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 21.31449398040678;
(3) AGV4 will concede on T0LB side;
(4) AGV3 will concede on TOLA side;
(5) AGV4's RToken is (157.9205973748799 202.9205973748799);
(6) AGV3's RToken is (181.6061033944731 226.6061033944731);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV4 conceded on TOLB by 11
AGV4's force changes from 0. to 389.9511874673475
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the oppenent's force changes from 730.0854231265779 to 353.3023917407636













AGV3 conceded on TOLA by 11
AGV3's force changes from 0. to 338.1413563444869
the oppenent's force changes from 755.6011125386595 to 365.6499250713119



















Initial state of negotiation between AGV4 and AGV1:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X10;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 26.13589904436841;
(3) AGV4 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV1 will concede on T0LB side;
(5) AGV4's RToken is (151.7949872182216 191.9205973748799);
(6) AGVl's RToken is (150.7689759594199 177.93088626259);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV4 conceded on TOLA by 7
AGV4's force changes from 0. to 324.1037012695327
the oppenent's force changes from 390.365272566484 to 285.8134106494101













AGV1 conceded on T0LB by 20
AGVl's force changes from 0. to 298.7402875881696
the oppenent's force changes from 1307.402457051221 to 279.7018473209796
AGVl's internal modification is as
follow:




















Initial state of negotiation between AGV4 and AGV3:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X5;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 6.793928156772807;
(3) AGV4 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV3 will concede on T0LB side;
(5) AGV4's RToken is (199.4093350613428 234.4093350613428);
(6) AGV3's RToken is (172.25651147606 206.2032632181156);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV4 conceded on TOLA by 4
AGV4's force changes from 0. to 141.9820071883558
the oppenent's force changes from 231.612515178742 to 95.24809693104564













AGV3 conceded on T0LB by 3
AGV3's force changes from 0. to 102.2733136857723
the oppenent's force changes from 197.4825410460659 to 137.8884526406389
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Initial state of negotiation between AGV5 and AGV2:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X15;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 26.01009779859504;
(3) AGV5 will concede on T0LB side;
(4) AGV2 will concede on TOLA side;
(5) AGV5's RToken is (158.1089309570075 193.1089309570075);
(6) AGV2's RToken is (167.0988331584125 198.5012031835095);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV5 conceded on T0LB by 13
AGV5's force changes from 0. to 476.2319668087947
the oppenent's force changes from 765.6866635993969 to 454.9166271914877















AGV2 conceded on TOLA by 14
AGV2's force changes from 143.9051989961156 to 479.4834635023561
the oppenent's force changes from 1032.096666059611 to 433.9377659511263





















Initial state of negotiation between AGV5 and AGV1:
APPENDIX C. TRACE OF SPRING-BASED NEGOTIATION 206
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X15;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 17.16217117436298;
(3) AGV5 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV1 will concede on TOLB side;
(5) AGV5's RToken is (149.8712506250956 180.1089309570075);
(6) AGVl's RToken is (129.9204173784613 167.0334217994586);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV5 conceded on TOLA by 6
AGV5's force changes from 0. to 339.7838842868358
the oppenent's force changes from 362.4444475580057 to 264.7805241081946















AGV1 conceded on TOLB by 12
AGVl's force changes from 83.09028559041573 to 266.2754790412897
the oppenent's force changes from 1049.509924230323 to 286.5120857020236





















Initial state of negotiation between AGV5 and AGV3:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X10;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 33.95715816591198;
(3) AGV5 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV3 will concede on TOLB side;
(5) AGV5's RToken is (197.9129677211295 242.9129677211295);
(6) AGV3's RToken is (192.6061033944731 231.8701258870415);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV5 conceded on TOLA by 16
AGV5's force changes from 0. to 711.326268444113
the oppenent's force changes from 1341.565885668199 to 709.444255647965
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(0. 3.069820684737351 0.)
(0. 0.7084201580164518 0.)







AGV3 conceded on T0LB by 18
AGV3's force changes from 0. to 728.7466424745692
the oppenent's force changes from 1509.663662820295 to 709.4216108206672



















Initial state of negotiation between AGV5 and AGV3:
(1) They have reserved RTokens at station X15;
(2) The two Rtokens overlap with a differential of 16.711764818577;
(3) AGV5 will concede on TOLA side;
(4) AGV3 will concede on TOLB side;
(5) AGV5's RToken is (236.9342130897543 271.9342130897545);
(6) AGV3's RToken is (219.8062364286501 253.6459779083312);
Now the negotiation starts ....
AGV5 conceded on TOLA by 8
AGV5's force changes from 0. to 368.3231212567395
the oppenent's force changes from 691.3713869975343 to 360.4086696529255















AGV3 conceded on TOLB by 9
AGV3's force changes from 0. to 372.1536416716735
the oppenent's force changes from 780.6712633784989 to 354.6802780408091




























Provisional Schedules and Final
Schedules
This appendix lists the provisional local schedules and the final schedules (after nego¬
tiation) in an example given in Chapter 7.
D.l Provisional Schedule
AGV1:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X29 62. 5. (42. 77.))
(X24 80. 5. (60. 95.))
(X25 115. 5. (95. 130.))
(X20 128. 5. (108. 143.))
(X15 159. 15. (129. 174.))
(X10 161. 5. (141. 176.))
(X15 210. 5. (190. 225.))
(X14 247. 5. (227. 262.))
(X13 313. 25. (273. 328 ))
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X19 73. 5. (53. 88.))
(X14 88. 5. (68. 103.))
(X15 116. 5. (96. 131.))
(X10 141. 15. (111. 156.))
(X15 174. 5. (154. 189.))
(X20 203. 5. (183. 218.))
(X25 224. 5. (204. 239.))
(X24 266. 5. (246. 281.))
(X29 303. 30. (258. 318.))
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AGV3:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X9 130. 5. (110. 145.))
(X4 147. 5. (127. 162.))
(X5 184. 5. (164. 199.))
(X10 209. 15. (179. 224.))
(X15 236. 5. (216. 251.))
(X20 258. 5. (238. 273.))
(X25 278. 5. (258. 293.))
(X30 313. 25. (273. 328.))
AGV4:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X5 164. 5. (144. 179.))
(X10 189. 15. (159. 204.))
(X5 223. 5. (203. 238.))
(X4 267. 5. (247. 282.))
(X9 303. 25. (263. 318.))
AGV5:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X20 165. 5. (145. 180.))
(X15 178. 5. (158. 193.))
(X10 229. 15. (199. 244.))
(X15 250. 5. (230. 265.))
(X14 286. 5. (266. 301.))
(X19 314. 20. (279. 329.))
D.2 Final Results
AGV1:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X29 61. 5. (41. 76.))
(X24 79. 5. (59. 94.))
(X25 114. 5. (94. 129.))
(X20 126. 5. (106. 141.))
(X15 153. 15. (130. 155.))
(X10 156. 5. (151. 158.))
(X15 208. 5. (191. 220.))
(X14 246. 5. (226. 261.))
(X13 312. 25. (272. 327.))
AGV2:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X19 73. 5. (53. 88.))
(X14 88. 5. (68. 103.))
(X15 115. 5. (95. 130.))
(X10 139. 15. (109. 151.))
(X15 189. 5. (181. 199.))
(X20 212. 5. (192. 227.))
(X25 231. 5. (211. 246.))
(X24 269. 5. (249. 284.))
(X29 304. 30. (259. 319.))
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AGV3:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X9 131. 5. (111. 146.))
(X4 150. 5. (130. 165.))
(X5 189. 5. (172. 203.))
(X10 210. 15. (193. 214.))
(X15 236. 5. (220. 245.))
(X20 257. 5. (237. 272.))
(X25 277. 5. (257. 292.))
(X30 312. 25. (272. 327.))
AGV4:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X5 158. 5. (138. 172.))
(X10 185. 15. (159. 193.))
(X5 222. 5. (203. 237.))
(X4 267. 5. (247. 282.))
(X9 302. 25. (262. 317.))
AGV5:
Station ArrivalTime OperationTime RToken
(X20 161. 5. (142. 176.))
(X15 173. 5. (156. 181.))
(X10 238. 15. (214. 253.))
(X15 261. 5. (245. 276.))
(X14 291. 5. (271. 306.))
(X19 315. 20. (280. 330.))
Appendix E
Theoretical Analysis on the
Occurrence of Conflicts of AGV
Local Schedules
E.l Introduction
In an automated guided vehicle system (AGVs), the scheduling problem is as important
as other job shop scheduling problems (JSSP). To make an AGV schedule robust, a
intuitive way is tolerant planning and scheduling. However tolerance planning and
scheduling brings a new problem to the AGVs, i.e., the contest of resources. In other
word, the chance of conflicts among the AGV plans and schedules is bigger than that in
the non-tolerant case. In our previous work, according to the nature of AGVs, we take
AGVs as distributed problem solving (DPS), more acurately, as distributed artificial
intelligence (DAI) problems. The negotiation mechanism is applied to resolve AGV
scheduling conflicts, and some experimental results are obtained. In this appendix, the
occurrence of conflicts of AGV schedules is discussed from the aspects of experimental
and theoretical analysis. The theoretical analysis is useful in guiding us to investigate
various negotiation methods, to find the most suitable negotiation strategies in real
circumstances.
E.2 Experimental Results
E.2.1 The Outline of the Experimental Method
The experiment is originally aimed at comparing the qualities of the negotiations by
different strategies. The by-products are the occurrence of conflicts of AGV scheduling,
i.e., the occurrence of conflicts between a newly generated AGV local schedule and
all other AGV schedules which are accepted. By accepted is meant that an AGV
schedule is conflict-free, or an AGV schedule is not conflict-free but the conflict has
been resolved.
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To do such an experiment, large quantity of experimental results are expected to be
gained so that the experiment is convincing.
• Generating Random Data: In order to do many experiments, a large set of data
is needed for generating random factory LAYOUT and random AGV schedules.
An executable function ran— fun(n, s) (in C programming) is defined to generate
the n random numbers when the seed is s.
• Generating a Layout: Here a layout is described by a set , LAYOUT, of arcs.
Each arc is in the following form:
arc = (x{, Xjdij)
where X{, Xj are stations; dij is the distance from Xi to Xj. The layout is based
on Linn Product Ltd. AGV Layout (see Figure 6.1)
• Generating a route plan RP: A route plan
RP = (Xi,X2, ...)
Note that
(X{, Xi+1, )
must be an arc. Each RP is randomly generated.
• Generating a local schedule: Once a route plan, i?P, is given, a set of job can be
generated. Each job is specified by the prefered starting time, preferred finishing
time, weight (importance), loading/unloading time at each stations. These data
are also randomly generated.
• Once job specification is given, then a local schedule can be determined by apply¬
ing Equation 6.35. Let us denote each ramdomly generated schedule by Local-
Sch.
The main points of the experiment is described as follow:
1. Initial States: n = 0; /c(n) = 0 (the number of conflicting AGV Local-Sch);
fd(n) = 0 (the number of schedules in RT-DB);
2. Generate a Local-Sch;
3. If Local-Sch is conflict-free with all schedules in RT-DB, GOTO 7; GOTO 4
otherwise;
4. fc{n) = /c(n) + 1;
5. Call negotiation procedures: if the conflict is resolved, put the negotiated schedule
into RT-DB and GOTO 6; GOTO 7 otherwise;
6- fd(n) - fj{n) + 1;
7. n = n + 1; GOTO 2
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Figure E.l: The Number of Conflict Schedules Out of n Schedules
E.3 The Experiment Results
The experimental results include a large amount of data, such as the quality of ne¬
gotiations by different negotiation strategies. Of our interest here is the frequency of
occurrence of conflict AGV schedules, i.e., the /c(n). In Figure E.l, we can see the
curve of /c(^)- 30 experiments have been done, each time with one hundred local
schedules (Local-Schs). The average /c(n) is also shown in the same figure. It is very
useful to know the trend of /c(n). It indicates how often an AGV local schedule, which
is in conflict with one or more schedules in RT-DB, will occur. This can guide each
negotiator to choose proper negotiation strategies at different stages.
E.4 Theoretical Analysis
To gain the /c(n) curve through experiments is time consuming. This motivates us to
seek the theoretical statistical analysis of the occurrence of fr[n). We use following
Notations:
m : the number of schedules in RT-DB;
n : the number of total local schedules produced;
pc(m) : the probability of conflict of a newly produced AGV local schedule with RT-
DB.
pr(m) : the probability of resolving a conflicting local schedule when m schedules are
in RT-DB.
p(m) : The probability of conflict of a newly produced local schedule and any single
schedule in RT-DB when m schedules are in it.
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Figure E.2: Theoretical Analysis of Fd(n) and Fc(n): Case 1
q(m) : q(m) = 1 — p(m)
Now we can derive the expected fc(n) and fd{n) statistically. We first investigate two
simple cases, then consider the general case.
E.4.1 Simple Case 1
Let's consider the case in which RT-DB will accept any local schedules regardless of
whether the schedule is conflict-free or not. Then the following recurrence formula is
suitable for calculating fc(n) and }d(n)'-
fd(n + 1) = fd(n) + 1 (E.l)
fc(n + 1) = fc(n) + pc(fd(n)) (E.2)
Equation E.l is very obvious. Equation E.2 says that the total expected number of
conflicts is increased by pc(fd{n)) when (n + 1 )th local schedule is produced.
The initial states are:
MO) = o 1
fc(0) = 0 / (E-3)
According to Equation E.l and Equation E.3, we have:
fd(n + 1) = n + 1 (E.4)
So the number of AGV schedules in RT-DB increases by 1 as a new schedule is pro¬
duced. Figure E.2 shows how fc(n) and fdin) vary with n. fj{n) is always a straight
line, while fc(n) is a curve which depends on the probability of occurrence of conflict
of a schedule and RT-DB (see Fig E.2).
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Figure E.3: Theoretical Analysis of Fd(n) and Fc(n): Case 2
E.4.2 Simple Case 2
Another simple case is such that only conflict-free local schedules can be inserted into
RT-DB and that a local schedule which is in conflict with RT-DB will be put aside
regardless of whether the conflict can be resolved or not. In this case, the following
formulas exist:
fd(n + 1) = fd(n) + (1 - PcUd(n))) (E.5)
Sc(n + 1) = fc(n) + Pc(fd(n)) (E.6)
The initial states are the same as shown in Equation E.3. A property in this case is
that the sum of /^(n + 1) and fc(n + 1) is a fixed number n + 1, i.e.
fd(n + 1) + fc(n + 1) = n + 1 (E.7)
Fig. E.3 shows the curves of fd(n) and /c(«).
E.4.3 The General Case
In the real situation, the two simple cases above are very rare. When a conflict occures,
various efforts will be made to resolve it. If it is resolved it will be committed (i.e. to
be inserted into RT-DB). More explicitly, if a new local schedule is conflict-free, it will
be inserted into RT-DB; it is not, and the conflict is resolved, it will be inserted into
RT-DB as well; otherwise put it aside. In this case, we have:
fd(n + 1) = fd(n) + (1 ~Pcifd{n))) +
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Figure E.4: Theoretical Analysis of Fd(n) and Fc(n)-. General Case
Pc{fd(n)) * Pr(fd{n)) (E.8)
fc(n + 1) = fc(n) +pc(fd{n)) (E.9)
Equation E.3 gives the initial states. We can easily find that the two simple cases in
Section E.4.1 and Section E.4.2 are two extremes of the general case. In Equation E.8,
Pc(/d(^)) *Pr(/d(^)) represents the probability of conflict of a new schedule and RT-DB
and the conflict is resolved.
E.4.4 The properties of fd(n) and fc{n)
It is obvious that /d(n) and fc(n) are both increasing with n. They also depends on
pr(m) and pc(m). pc(m) will be further discussed in Section E.5, we will know then
that it can be approximatized by a binomial formula. pr(m) influences on /d(n) in the
following way (see Fig. E.5): /d(n) is inversely proportional to pr(rn).
pr(m) influences on fc(n) in the otherway round (see Fig. E.6).
E.4.5 Summary of the Theoretical Analysis So Far
Equation E.8 and Equation E.9 with the initial state, Equation E.3 are a set of re¬
currence formulas used to calculate the expected number, /c(ft), of Local-Schs which
are in conflict with RT-DB when n Local-Schs have been considered before, and the
expected numbei, /d(u)> of AGV schedules in RT-DB. /c(n) — ((n+1) —/^(n)) actually
reflects the expected Local-Schs which are in conflict with RT-DB and are not resolved.
So they are useful in analysing the resource intensity at different negotiation stages.
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Figure E.5: fd{n) with different pr
E.5 Discussion About pc{m)
From Equation E.8, we can see that the /d(n) and /c(n) can be solved if pc{m) and
pT(m) are known. Then what determines pc(m) and pr(m)? How to calculate them?
In this section we will discuss the approximate calculation of pc(m). There are two
obvious properties ofpc(m):
1. Pc(tu) monotonically increases with m;
2. pc(ra) positively proportional to the average resource each AGV schedule needs;
The more resources a schedule needs, the more possible the conflict of it with
other schedules is.
Suppose the probability of a conflict of any schedule in RT-DB and a new local schedule
is p(m) when there are m schedules in RT-DB, in addition to these, let's also assume
the m Local-Schs in RT-DB are independant, then pc(m) can be calculated by the
following equation:
Where pmj- is the Binomial Formula which calculates the probability of conflict of a
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Figure E.6: /c(rc) with different pr
schedules in RT-DB is m and the probability of conflict of the local schedule with any
schedule in RT-DB is p(m). The following formula is equivalent to Equation E.10:
When the negotiation mechanism is applied to resolve conflicts of AGV schedule, p(m)
is not a constant, or strictly speaking, Pc(m) no longer obeys the Binomial Formula.
This is because of that the allocation of resources is modified during the negotiation:
yielding negotiation techniques reduce the resources; shifting negotiation techniques
shift the resources while leave the total resource each AGV occupies unchanged. But
as a method of approximate calculation, we may still use Equation E.12 to calculate
pc(m). The p(m) is not a constant in general case, but depends on the strategies of
negotiation. We have some theorems about this.
Theorem E.l If only yielding techniques are used during the negotiation and all the
conflicts are resoluable by the technique then pc(m) can be calculated by Equation E.12
and p(m) = p(l).
Proof.
As we know, p{ 1) is the probability of conflict between two random Local-Schs which
have never been modified. Suppose we now produce a RT-DB in the following way:
Method 1
1. Initialize RT-DB;
Pc(m) = 1 - (1 — p(m))m = 1 - q(m)m (E.12)
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2. Produce a random Local-Sch;
3. Insert Local-Sch into RT-DB, if Local-Sch is conflict-free with RT-DB;
4. Insert Local-Sch into RT-DB, if Local-Sch is not conflict-tree with RT-DB;
5. Repeat from 2;
In this case, it is obvious that this is a coin-throw experiment, therefore p(m) = p(l)
will be always true, since no Local-Sch is modified from the beginning to the end. So
we can denote:
Pc(m) = f(p(m),m) = f(p(l),m) (E.13)
Here, function f(p,m) calculates the probability of conflict between a new Local-Sch
with a RT-DB in which m Local-Schs are located. The RT-DB is produced in Method
1. p is the probability of conflict between Local-Sch and any single schedule in RT-DB.
Now let's look at another method of producing RT-DB:
Method 2
1. Initialize RT-DB;
2. Produce a random Local-Sch;
3. Insert Local-Sch into RT-DB, if Local-Sch is conflict-free with RT-DB;
4. If Local-Sch is not conflict-free with RT-DB, resolve the conflict with the yielding
only techniques and then insert the negotiatied Local-Sch into RT-DB;
5. Repeat from 2;
What is different between Method 1 and Method 2 is that Method 1 allows the exist¬
ence of overlap and Method 2 does not. Let's denote:
S: the overall resource;
So: the expected resource each Local-Sch needs;
Sm,i: the resource assigned to the m AGV s in the RT-DB; i = 1 or 2 represents Method
1 or Method 2 respectively;
ipi(s): the allocation of the resource s over S (statistically);
1cAm)'- = 1 -Pc,i(m) (i = 1, 2);
Then we can know that qc^ can be decided by two factors: S — Sm,t, the unoccupied
resource and ipi(S — Sm,i), the allocation of it. We use the following function to
represent this:
1cAm) = 7r(S - Sm,i,i>i(S - Sm,i)) (E.14)
Obviously, if
s — SVn, i = S — SVn^ (E.15)
and
- Sm,i) = i/>2(5 - Sm,2) (E.16)






9c,i(m) = QcMm) (E.17)
5-5; =5-5? = S- S0 (E.18)
ip\(S - So) = ifo{S - So) (E.19)
9c,l(l) = 9c,2(1) (E.20)
S - Sm,\ = S - Smj2 (E.21)
MS - Sm,!) = rh(S - Sm,2) (E.22)
exists and there is one Local-Sch coming (randomly). If we use Method 1, then:
5 - Sm+U = 5 - Sm,i -So + el (E.23)
Where 6\ is the overlapping part between Sm,\ and the new Local-Sch.
If we use Method 2, then before negotiation, if the new Local-Sch is forced to be put
in RT-DB, then:
S — Sm+1,2 = S — Sm,2 — So + O2 (E.24)
And we also have:
02 = 0i (E.25)
S ~ Sm+1,1 = S — Sm+it2 (E.26)
1>i(S - Sm+hl) = MS - Sm+h2) (E.27)
because Equation E.21, Equation E.22 exist. After negotiation, the overlapping is
resolved through yielding techniques. But this will not decrease the unoccupied re¬
source (certainly will not increase suppose each AGV is selfish). So Equation E.25 and
Equation E.26 will still exist after negotiation. Therefore:
Qc,i(m + 1) = qc,2(m + 1) (E.28)
will exist according to Equation E.15, Equation E.16 and Equation E.17. So we proved
Qc,i(m) = Qc,2(m) for all m (m =1, 2, ...). Therefore we proved pCti(m) = pCf2(m) for
all m (m =1, 2, ...), that is:
Pc,2(m) = Pc,i(m) = 1 - (1 - p(m))m (E.29)
p(m)~p(1) (E.30)
This is what we want to prove.
So if only yielding strategies are used in negotiation, then Equation E.12 is a good
approximate calculation and p(m) = p( 1).
Theorem E.2 If only shifting techniques are used during the negotiation and all the
conflicts are resolvable by the technique, and if pc(m) is calculated by Equation E.12,
then p{m) > p( 1).
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The proof of the theorem is omitted here, but the reader can think in the following way:
(1) If only yielding techniques are used, p(m) = p(l), as we know from Theorem E.l;
(2) For any m(m > 2), when a conflict occurs, shifting skill is used to resolve it. So
the resource required is more than that in the case of yielding strategies. The conflict
chance for a new schedule will be higher than that in the latter case and we can easily
know from Equation E.12 that the p(m) will be bigger than that in the latter case;
(3) Because, in the case of yielding strategies, p(m) = p(l), so in the case of shifting
strategies, p(m) > p( 1).
E.6 Compare Theoretical Results with the Experimental
Results
In this section, we take p(m) as constant, p(m) = p( 1). Though experiments we obtain
the parameters, p(l) and pr(m). Then we calculate /d(n) and /c(n) according to
Equation E.8, Equation E.9. Finally the theoretical results of /d(n) and /c(n) will be
compared with the results from experiments.
E.6.1 Using Experiments to Obtain p(m)
Experiment:
• Purpose: Get the experimental data of the probability of conflict between two
random local schedules.
• Method: produce 100 pairs of random local schedules each time; check each pair
to see if they are in conflict; record the number of pairs with conflict:
1. Initialization: i = 0; n = 0;
2. Get two Local-Schs;
3. If the two local schedules are in conflict, i = i + 1;
4. n = n + 1
5. If n < 100, repeat 2;
6. End.
• Results: the following result comes from 100 such experiments. They are shown
in Table E.l
Let's take Table E.l as a matrix: [aZJ] where, aij is a number which indicates the
number of occurrence of conflicting pairs out of 100 pairs of random Local-Schs. So
the probability of a conflict of each pairs, i.e., p( 1), based on a 100-pair experiment
can be approximated as:
Pi,j = 00 (E.31)
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3 1 2 1 1 0 2 0 1 0
1 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 3 0
1 3 0 0 1 2 3 3 2 1
2 2 3 0 1 0 0 3 1 2
2 0 2 0 3 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 2 2 1 0 2 2 1
0 1 0 1 3 1 1 2 1 0
0 0 0 2 1 3 2 0 2 1
1 3 0 0 2 0 3 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 2
Table E.l: The Experiment Results on p(m)
Since we have 100 100-pair experiments, then we can calculate the average ofpiji
10 10
Pij)/100 = 0.0122 (E.32)
i=0j=o
pij, as a proximation of p(l), is more objective than any pij, since it is based on a
larger number of experiments. The more experiments are done, the more objective
p( 1) can be achieved. This is the principle of classical probabity. We can also prove
the objectiveness of approximation of p(l) as pij through following evidence:
As we know, suppose in an experiment, the probabity of event A is p, then if the
experiment is repeated n times, the event occurs k times with probablity pn,k, according
to Bernoulli's formula:
Pn,k= ( ^p*(l-p)""*(/c = 0,l,...,n) (E.33)
where, ^ ™ ^ is the binormial coefficient. If n k, then pn^ can be approximated as
(Poisson Formula):
pn,k ~ ^e~x (E.34)
where A = np. In the experiment on p(m), the event interested is the conflict between
two Local-Schs; n = 100 (pairs of Local-Schs). k = a{j[k = 1,2,..., 100). If we take
pij as p, then:
A = 100 x 0.0122 = 1.22 (E.35)




Pioo,3 = 0.089 (E.36)
Pioo,4 = b 027
Pioo,5 = 0.001
Pl00,6 = 0
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Figure E.7: The probability distribution of p( 1)
These numbers are shown in Figure E.7 by the solid line.
Now, let's examine Table E.l, we can see:
Pioo,o — 29/100 = 0.29
Pioo,i = -33
Pioo,2 = 0.25 (E.37)
Pioo,3 = 0.13
Pioo,4 = 0
These numbers are illustrated in Figure E.7 by asteriks. We can see they fit the Poisson
distribution very well.
E.6.2 Using Experiments to Obtain pr{m)
• Purpose: Get the experimental data of the probability of resolving a conflict
when there are n schedules in RT-DB. Denote the probability as pT(n)-
• Method: Let the number of schedules in RT-DB be m; produce 100 local sched¬
ules each of them in conflict with RT-DB; try to resolve the conflict by negotiation
procedures but do not insert any schedule into RT-DB until all 100 schedules are
tried; record the number, Npr, of schedules with conflicts resolved.
• Results: we choose: m = 30, 50, 70, 90, and the Npr(m) is listed as follow (N(m)
is the number of Local-Schs out of which 100 and only 100 Local-Sell s conflicting
with RT-DB are found. This date is used in Section E.5). The results are shown
in Table E.2 and Fig. E.8
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m Npr(m) pr (m) N(m) pc (m) p(m)
♦EXP15 15 94 .94
EXP30 30 85 .85 246 0.407 0.0173
♦EXP40 40 81 .81
EXP50 50 74 .74 192 0.521 0.0146
♦EXP60 60 71 .71
EXP70 70 66 .66 168 0.595 0.0128
EXP90 90 61 .61 129 0.775 0.0164
EXP90 90 61 .61 140 0.714 0.0138
* The data are obtained in an additional experiment but
they are not used in the following discussion.
Table E.2: The Experiment Results on pr(Tn)
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Figure E.8: The experiment results (m.)
E.6.3 Compare Theoretical Results with the Experimental Results
The lines drawn by asterisks in Fig E.9 and Fig E.10 are respectively the average of the
results from the 30 times experiments on /d(n) and fc(n)- In Fig. E.10 and Fig. E.9,
pr(m) comes from the experiment on pr(m) (see: Section E.6.2):
1 - 0 < m < 30
. . , 0.85 - a)0'74m 30 < m < 50 ...= < 0.74 - aAem 50 < m < 70 (E 38)
0.66 — °'6620°61171 otherwise
We firstly assume that p{m) = p(l) and p( 1) comes from the experiment on p(l) (see:
Section E.6.1). We can see from the two figures that: the theoretically calculated /</(n)
is very close to that from the experiment; but for /c(n), the error of the theoretical
calculation and the experiment increases with n. The reason can be given by The¬
orem E.2 which states that p(m) > p(\) in the case of negotiation with pure shifting
strategies.
Through experiments, we find that when p(m) = 0.175, both fd{n) and /c(n) from the
theoretical calculation are respectively very close to that from the experiment. The
dotted line in Fig. E.10 also shows the theoretical calculation with p(m) = 0.0145
which comes from the average of p(m) given in Table E.2:
, . 0.0122 + 0.0173 + 0.0146 + 0.0128 + 0.0164 + 0.0138p(m) = (E.39)
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dashed line : The Theoretical Result with p(m) = 0.0175
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Figure E.9: The Theoretical Results and the Experiment Results of /d(n) with Mixed
Strategies
E.6.4 Negotiation with pure strategy
We can see from Figure E.10, if we use p(l) (= 0.0122) to approximate p(m), the error
of the theoretical result and experiment result of /c(m) increases with p(m). This is
caused mainly by the shifting strategies according to Theorem E.l and Theorem E.2.
This can also be proved by experiments. Figure E.ll and Figure E.12 are the exper¬
iment results with respectively pure shifting strategies and pure yielding strategies.
Figure E.13 and Figure E.14 are showing the comparison of theoretical results and ex¬
periment results. We can conclude from the comparison that the error in Figure E.10
is mainly due to shifting strategies.
E.7 Conclusion
In this appedix, the theoretical analyses of the occurrence of conflict schedules (fdM)
are discussed in various aspects. The experiment results are achieved which, as are
seen, are very close to the theoretical results. Those analysis methods as well as the
experiment results may be used in further studies on AGV negotiation.
We also made some conjectures which have not been strictly proven. But the experi¬
ment results strongly support them.
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Figure E.10: The Theoretical Results and the Experiment Results of /c(n) with Mixed
Strategies
Figure E.ll: Experiment Results of fc(n) with Pure Strategy of Shifting
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Figure E.12: The Experiment Results of /c(n) with Pure Strategy of Yielding
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The number of local schedules n (shift only)
*"**: Average of experimental results
: The theoretical result with p(m) =
Figure E.13: The Theoretical Results and the Experiment Results of fc(n) with Pure
Strategy of Shifting
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Figure E.14: The Theoretical Results and the Experiment Results of /c(n) with Pure
Strategy of Yielding
